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Preface
The performance of public services is subject to sometimes ﬁ ery debate in the Neth-
erlands. Whereas, in the late 1990s, reforms of social security programs received a 
great deal of attention, in recent years the focus has shifted to failing public sector 
performance. Opinion polls and available statistical evidence indicate that the qual-
ity of public services leaves a lot to be desired, with waiting lists for health care, staff 
shortages in education and low crime clear-up rates. The aim of the present report 
is to trace differences in public sector performance in the Netherlands and twenty-
eight other industrialized countries and to improve insight in the factors that might 
explain these differences. The exercice serves several purposes. Above all, interna-
tional comparison of public sector performance allows the identiﬁ cation of best 
practices, may suggest explanations of perceived and actual differences in public 
performance and could contribute to more effective government interventions in the 
public sector.
This report is the result of a joint venture of bzk and scp. In view of the Dutch 
Presidency of the European Union in the second half of 2004, the Dutch Ministry of 
the Interior and Kingdom Relations (bzk) asked the Social and Cultural Planning 
Ofﬁ ce of the Netherlands (scp) to investigate public performance in the eu member 
states and four major non-eu Anglo-Saxon countries. The Ministry is particularly 
interested in the productivity and effectivenes of public sector producers and in the 
quality of their products. Taking lessons from abroad may assist in implementing 
improvements deemed necessary.
However, the present report will be used not only for the national policy agenda, but 
also to initiate an exchange of know-how with eu partners during the Dutch Presi-
dency. To this end, the results will be discussed at a Conference of Directors General 
and permanent secretaries for the public service, scheduled to take place during the 
second half of the Dutch presidency. It is hoped this Conference will produce recom-
mendations for improving the performance of various public bodies.
The project has been managed by Dr. Bob Kuhry (scp). This work would not have 
been possible without the active support of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom 
Relations (and particularly Frans van Dongen) and an advisory committee led by Pro-
fessor Flip de Kam. Thanks are due to Mr. Paul Smit (Research and Documentation 
Centre of the Dutch Ministry of Justice) and Dr. Esther Backbier (Ministry of Justice) 
for contributions to chapter 5. We are also grateful to the Public Management Insti-
tute (‘Instituut voor de Overheid’) of Leuven University to participate in this project 
and to contribute to chapter 6. This contribution of Steven van de Walle, Miekatrien 
Sterck, Wouter van Dooren, and Professor Geert Bouckaert is part of a more exten-
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sive report on public sector performance, published separately by the Public Manage-
ment Institute of Leuven University. Finally, we thank Mrs. Pauline Thoolen and Mr. 
Paul van Oijen of the Dutch Ministry of Education for useful comments.
Data from Eurostat, the oecd, the World Bank and the Council of Europe proved 
particularly useful in providing an empirical foundation for the ﬁ ndings. Of course, 
the authors remain responsible for all ﬁ ndings and conclusions presented in this 
report.
Professor dr. Paul Schnabel
Director of scp
3 
Summary
Flip de Kam, Bob Kuhry and Evert Pommer
Aim of the present report
By adopting the Lisbon Agenda, member states of the European Union (eu) set 
themselves in 2000 the daunting task of making the Union the most competitive 
economic area in the world. Four years on, it seems increasingly doubtful whether 
this ambitious mission can be successfully completed. Anyway, the performance of 
the public sector of national economies is a crucial factor in the race to achieve the 
goals included in the Lisbon Agenda. Countries can try to improve the functioning 
of their public sector by adopting best practices found in other nations. The present 
report is written with these purposes in mind. It compares the performance of the 
public sector in the twenty-ﬁ ve eu member states and in four non-eu members of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Our main aim is to trace differences in public sector performance (in terms of 
productivity, quality and effectiveness in the delivery of services) of all countries 
concerned, and to identify institutional factors that might help explain the differing 
performance of nations. The following policy areas will be addressed: education 
(Chapter 3), health care (Chapter 4), the criminal justice system (Chapter 5) and 
public administration (Chapter 6). 
For good measure, Chapter 2 ﬁ rst presents key demographic and socio-economic 
data for the twenty-nine countries covered. This essential background information 
is supplemented by data on the level and composition of public expenditures, and 
economic performance.
Demography and the economy (Chapter 2)
The population of the countries covered varies enormously in size, from almost 300 
million in the United States (us) to less than 0.4 million (Malta). Population growth 
in non-eu Anglo-Saxon countries, Luxembourg and Ireland is about 1% per year. 
Most other countries under review record limited population growth. The Czech 
Republic, Hungary and the Baltic states see their population actually decline. Gross 
Domestic Product (gdp) per capita is highest in the mini-state of Luxembourg, with 
the us following at some distance. Greece, Portugal, Spain and the new member 
states follow at a considerable distance. 
In 2003, government spending in the eu amounted on average to 47% of gdp. 
The public expenditure ratio was 48% in the Netherlands and in excess of 50% in 
Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, France, Austria, and Slovakia. Ireland and the us have 
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the lowest ratios, at 33% and 35% respectively. A breakdown of public expenditure 
shows that Sweden, Denmark, France, Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands devote 
a relatively large share of public outlays to ﬁ nance individual consumption (health 
care, education, and so on). By contrast, income transfers (social security beneﬁ ts) 
claim a relatively limited share of gdp in the Netherlands, and also in the Anglo-
Saxon countries and Ireland. 
If both public outlays and private expenditure on health care, education, social 
security and traditional government functions (public administration, law and order, 
defence) – for which we use the term ‘public service sector’– are lumped together, 
the picture changes signiﬁ cantly. For example, the us government spends 16% of 
gdp on consumption goods, putting the country almost at the bottom of the league 
of nations covered in the report. However, in terms of production (‘value added’) of 
the public service sector (accounting for almost 20% of gdp) the us is located in the 
higher middle range of the league. It follows that the level of ‘social’ expenditure in 
the us is no lower than in other countries, but a much greater proportion is paid for 
directly from private resources. 
Indicators to measure macro-economic performance are drawn largely from the 
criteria contained in the Stability and Growth Pact and the Lisbon Agenda. We focus 
on gdp growth, unemployment, labour market participation, inﬂ ation, the budget 
deﬁ cit, income inequality and the poverty rate. This summary highlights budget 
balances and income inequality.  
In the late 1990s, virtually all governments succeeded in reducing the budget 
deﬁ cit. In recent years, partly in response to the economic downturn (Europe) and as 
a consequence of an expansive policy stance (us), many countries saw their budget 
position deteriorate once more. 
Income inequality was reduced in most countries during the past ten years. One 
exception is the us, where inequality has been increasing for decades. The poverty 
rate, according to an eu benchmark, averaged 16% in the eu-15 in 2000. It was 
substantially higher in the us (23%), Australia, Ireland, Portugal and Greece. At the 
other end of the spectrum are the Czech Republic with a poverty rate of 8% and the 
Northern European countries, Germany, Slovenia and Slovakia on 10% to 11%. In 
2000, the Netherlands had the lowest poverty rate of the eu-15 (10%). 
Some postulate a trade-off between efﬁ ciency and equity. Generous beneﬁ ts 
(serving to reduce income inequality) are thought to blunt work incentives, thus lim-
iting potential gdp growth. At the same time, high government spending on income 
transfer drives up the tax burden, which can undermine the competitive position 
of countries. However, a recent analysis of the performance of eu member states 
(cpb/scp 2003) found the opposite: countries with limited income inequality, such 
as Denmark, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands, also post high labour market 
participation rates. They do, however, have a relatively large proportion of part-time 
workers and a relatively short ofﬁ cial working week. Clearly, high taxes stimulate 
workers to prefer untaxed leisure time over taxed working hours. Including the 
Anglo-Saxon countries in the analysis makes the picture more varied: labour market
5Summary
participation is highest in countries with marked income inequality, such as the us 
and the United Kingdom. 
Can the outcome of explorations in Chapter 2 be used to compile some kind of 
economic ‘Champion’s League’? Four of the measures examined concern stability 
and growth (gdp growth, unemployment, inﬂ ation and the budget deﬁ cit), the ﬁ fth 
concerns the personal income distribution. We have combined the four indicators 
of stability and growth, unweighted, country by country, to calculate a composite 
score. Scores awarded were then confronted with national performance in the ﬁ ght 
against poverty. The results show that the Central European countries combine 
moderate economic stability and a low poverty rate. Western and Northern European 
countries score generally well on both dimensions, while the Southern European 
countries show a less positive performance. The Anglo-Saxon countries, including 
the uk, are characterised by moderate economic stability and a relatively high poverty 
rate. The Netherlands scores reasonably well in terms of economic stability, and is 
apparently successful in bringing down the poverty rate. 
Education (Chapter 3)
Government intervention in the production and consumption of education is justiﬁ ed 
by positive externalities, and for reasons of social justice – to create equal opportunities 
of access. Based on the structure of primary and secondary education, the report 
identiﬁ es four types of education system:
1. Systems with a strong degree of differentiation from the ﬁ rst or second year of 
secondary school onwards. This groups comprises Belgium, Germany, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands and Austria, as well as Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic. 
2. Systems with a uniform ﬁ rst phase of secondary education. In the second phase, 
pupils receive either general or vocational education. This group comprises France, 
Ireland, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, Cyprus, Lithuania, Malta and Australia.
3. Systems where primary and lower secondary education are integrated. In these 
systems, too, there is differentiation between general and vocational education 
from the second phase of secondary school. This group includes the Scandinavian 
countries, Portugal, Latvia, Estonia, Poland and Slovenia.
4. Systems with uniform primary and secondary education, where vocational educa-
tion plays a minor role: the us, Canada and New Zealand. 
On average, countries spend 5.5% of gdp on education. The leaders include Denmark, 
Sweden and Cyprus, with a ﬁ gure of around 8%, while Greece, Luxembourg and Slo-
vakia make up the rear, on 4%. The Netherlands ﬁ nds itself with 5.3% somewhere in 
the middle range, having gained considerable ground in recent years. The number of 
teachers per 1000 inhabitants ranges from 21 in Spain to around 45 in Lithuania and 
the us. Here, too, the Netherlands is in the mid-range, on 27. Teachers’ pay is rela-
tively high in countries as diverse as Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Australia and New 
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Zealand. It is low in Sweden and a number of the new member states. The 
Netherlands pays high salaries to teachers in upper secondary education, and fairly 
average salaries for primary and lower secondary teachers.
Enrolment among school-age children is virtually 100% in all countries, as 
would be expected. In the 15-19 age group, enrolment ranges from 72% (Italy) to 91% 
(Belgium). The Netherlands follows directly behind the leaders, along with France 
and Germany. The eu Lisbon Agenda sets targets to reduce the number of early 
school leavers. Those leaving school should boast at least a basic qualiﬁ cation, i.e. 
they must have completed a general or vocational course at upper secondary level. 
Currently, only 50% of all youngsters achieve a qualiﬁ cation at this level in Malta 
and Portugal. By contrast, Denmark, Germany and the Czech Republic score 90% or 
more. At around 70% to 80%, the Netherlands again ﬁ nds itself somewhere in the 
middle. Most of the new member states and the Anglo-Saxon countries do well on 
this criterion.
A distinction is drawn in the report between two forms of tertiary education (A 
and B). Type A involves relatively long, theoretically-oriented courses, and type B 
relatively short, skills-based courses. With an entry rate for tertiary type A education 
of over 50%, the Netherlands takes a position in the upper middle range. At the head 
of the ﬁ eld are Finland, Sweden, Poland, Australia and New Zealand, with entry rates 
of 65% or more. If tertiary type B education is also taken into account, the Nether-
lands switches to a mid-ranking position. 
Only the non-European Anglo-Saxon countries, Sweden, Denmark, Austria and Italy 
spend more per pupil in primary education than the Netherlands (4000 euros per 
year). Spending levels in Greece, Ireland and – in particular – the new member states 
are substantially lower, reﬂ ecting lower per capita income in these countries. In terms 
of spending on secondary education, the Netherlands is somewhere in the middle 
(5500 euros per pupil). Spending is substantially higher in Austria, France and the 
United States, and considerably lower in Greece, Ireland and the new member states.
Dutch primary and secondary schools have a high student/teacher ratio. Only 
Ireland and Australia have larger primary school classes, while only Canada has a 
higher student/teacher ratio in its secondary schools. Recently, the Netherlands has 
introduced measures to reduce primary class sizes, raising spending per pupil sub-
stantially between 1998 and 2002. The extra money is intended to improve the qual-
ity of education, but whether this lofty goal will be met remains to be seen. Research 
trying to link average class size and educational attainment in Dutch primary educa-
tion has not found small classes to have a positive effect on the quality of education.
One objective indicator to assess the quality of national educational systems is the 
probability that pupils will complete their course successfully. Data on the ‘survival rate’ 
are available for tertiary education. The country average is 67%. The Netherlands comes 
close, on 69%. Spain, Ireland, Finland, the United Kingdom and Poland post relatively 
high scores (75% or more), while Sweden and Italy have low survival rates (between 40% 
and 50%). Apparently, this is the price Sweden pays for its very high intake ﬁ gures. 
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A subjective measure of quality is public conﬁ dence in the education system. Par-
ents express great conﬁ dence in schools in Finland, Malta, Ireland, Austria, Poland 
and Slovenia, and voice doubts on the quality of schools in Greece, Italy, the Czech 
Republic and Portugal. The Netherlands and the us take a middle position. Strikingly, 
public conﬁ dence bears little or no relation to the type of education system, the level 
of education spending (in terms of gdp); however, there is a positive correlation 
with objectively deﬁ ned qualiﬁ cations obtained by pupils.
Results of international comparative achievement tests – which measure reading 
skills, mathematical skills and scientiﬁ c literacy among 15-year-olds – are highly 
informative. The Netherlands scores high on these tests, as do Finland and Canada. 
The United States ranks somewhere in the middle, whereas Luxembourg, a number 
of Mediterranean countries and the new member states book low achievement test 
scores.
Besides data on pupils’ skills, information is also available on the quantity and 
quality of academic research performed. A quantitative indicator is the number of 
academic papers published per 100,000 inhabitants. The average for the eu-15 is 
around 100. With its score of 140 the Netherlands is among the leaders, along with 
the Scandinavian countries and the United Kingdom. The us comes close to the 
eu-15 average. One measure of the quality of academic papers is the extent to which 
they are cited by other academics. Roughly speaking, the score for this indicator is 
consistent with that for the number of papers published. 
Alongside skills, or educational achievement, educational attainment – the level 
of qualiﬁ cations acquired – is an important yardstick to measure the quality of an 
education system. An indicator is the proportion of the population aged 25-34 year to 
have attained upper secondary education or tertiary education. The country average is 
around 62%. The Netherlands scores only slightly higher (65%), which puts it behind 
eleven other nations. Portugal comes bottom with 20%. The Netherlands occupy a 
similar mid ranking position with respect to the proportion of tertiary (type A plus 
type B) graduates. 
We have attempted to encapsulate the overall effectiveness of national education sys-
tems in a single measure which combines achievement and attainment indicators. Top 
of the table are Canada and Finland, which score high on both indicators, followed 
by the other Anglo-Saxon countries, Sweden and the Netherlands. The Netherlands 
is something of an exception, combining a high score for achievement with a fairly 
mediocre score for attainment. 
oecd analyses provide additional insight into the effects of education systems 
in the form of literacy tests among 15-year-olds (Education at a Glance 2003: 91-98). 
They distinguish between ‘within-school variation’ and ‘between-school variation’. 
Scores reported by the oecd appear to correlate closely with the four education 
systems distinguished here. Countries in group 1 have high between-school and low 
within-school variation. The reverse applies to the other groups, particularly group 3 
(the Northern European countries).
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Promoting equal educational opportunity for children from different backgrounds 
is an important aim of Dutch education policy. This presumably is also the case in 
other countries. Ideally, the average achievement score should be high and there 
should be little difference in the performance of children from families with high or 
low socio-economic status. Reading skills scores suggest that these two aims are not 
mutually exclusive. It would therefore appear that there is no unavoidable trade-off 
between equality of opportunity and quality. Education systems that perform well 
are also better at reducing differences related to the varying social background of 
pupils.
Is there a link between the attributes of education systems, the average level of 
achievement and inequality of educational opportunity? Our results are far from 
unambiguous. Group 1 – countries with maximum differentiation in their education 
system – includes the Netherlands, with a high average score for achievement and 
good equality of opportunity, and also countries where the reverse applies (Germany 
and Luxembourg). Group 3 – countries with minimum differentiation – includes 
countries that score well in both respects (Sweden and, above all, Finland) and one 
country with fairly poor scores: Portugal. On balance, however, a pattern does emerge. 
Most countries in group 1 perform less well in terms of equality of educational 
opportunity and have mediocre to poor scores on results of the school system. The 
Netherlands seems to be the exception that proves the rule. The countries in groups 
3 and 4 generally score well on opportunity and results, and countries in group 2 are 
widely distributed around the average on both counts.
Although further research is certainly needed in order to draw deﬁ nite conclusions, 
our preliminary results indicate that broad-based, undifferentiated educational 
systems generally perform better. 
The effectiveness of national education systems can be set against the costs of edu-
cation (in euros). On the curve (the ‘frontier’) are Poland, with very low costs and 
poor results, Hungary and the Czech Republic with moderate costs and moderate 
results, New Zealand with good results at fairly low costs, and Finland and Canada 
which incur fairly high costs, but achieve very good results. The Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and Ireland also strike a good balance between costs and effects. 
The us, Sweden and Denmark achieve reasonable effects, but incur relatively high 
costs. Portugal, Greece and Italy have fairly low expenditure, but record also poor 
results.
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It was agreed in the Lisbon Agenda that the number of early school leavers should 
be reduced to 10% by 2010. By then, 80% of all persons aged 25-64 years should have 
attained at least upper secondary education.1 It is doubtful whether either of these 
targets will actually be hit. Despite the rise in the overall level of education over the 
past half century, there are signs that many countries are reaching saturation point. 
The Netherlands, for example, has a persistent problem group of around 17% – a 
ﬁ gure that is rising, if anything – comprising unqualiﬁ ed school leavers and problem 
pupils for whom upper secondary education is simply an unattainable goal. A further 
8% begin upper secondary education but fail to complete it. Against this background, 
it is difﬁ cult to understand why some other countries do not seem to have similar 
problems on this scale. Part of the explanation may well be that some countries 
apply less rigorous standards for their ﬁ nal qualiﬁ cations. Some features of the 
Dutch school system may also have a negative impact, notably early and radical dif-
ferentiation by school type that might lead to stigmatisation. The arrangements in 
lower secondary education may contribute to a discontinuation of the school career 
of pupils and weaken the labour market position of school leavers. If lower secondary 
education were to last three years or – as is the case in some countries – would start 
at the age of eleven, pupils would have the opportunity to make the switch to second-
ary vocational education earlier, and would experience greater incentives to complete 
their education. 
The moral of this story for policymakers in the Netherlands is that the nation will 
not succeed in bringing about a substantial reduction in the number of early school 
leavers, without either changing the system or setting more ﬂ exible qualiﬁ cation 
standards. As a result, the Netherlands is also unlikely to achieve the Lisbon target 
for secondary and higher qualiﬁ cations. As a matter of priority, the country should 
therefore reduce the number of people leaving secondary professional and higher 
education before graduating. 
Health Care (Chapter 4)
Universal access, high product quality and ﬁ nancial sustainability are key objectives 
of government health policy in virtually all oecd countries. The funding of health 
care is one of the greatest challenges facing governments today. Health spending is 
on the rise, for a number of reasons. One reason is that the costs of health care prod-
ucts are rising much faster than the costs of other goods and services. Many expect 
demographic ageing to push up health spending further.
The ﬁ nancial sustainability of largely publicly funded health care is a prime con-
cern for policymakers in the eu-15 countries. Most of the new member states face a .
1 Other objectives, such as those connected with lifelong learning and the reduction of 
differences in higher education enrolment rates between men and women do not fall 
within the scope of this chapter.
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different challenge of improving the efﬁ ciency and accessibility of their health care 
system
Most countries try to maintain the ﬁ nancial sustainability of their system by 
adjusting supply and introducing more market forces. Measures to adjust supply 
include providing more health care outside expensive institutions, introducing 
tighter budget restrictions and reducing the coverage of the compulsory insurance 
package. Market forces can be strengthened by introducing out-of-pocket payments 
to reign in demand for services. In addition, policymakers hope to encourage indi-
viduals to adopt a healthier lifestyle. Cleaning up the environment can also improve 
public health.
Although policy objectives are roughly the same everywhere, countries have put very 
different health care systems in place to achieve them. This applies both to supply 
mechanisms and to funding. In some countries, private parties supply care: doctors 
are self-employed, hospitals are privately run. In other countries, most doctors are 
on the payroll of state-run hospitals. In funding, the main focus is either on private 
payment (including premiums for private health insurance) or on funding from the 
public purse (taxes, compulsory social insurance contributions). Most countries in 
fact have mixed systems. At opposite ends of the spectrum are the United States, 
which has a mainly private system, and Sweden with its virtually exclusively public 
system.
Countries covered in this report can be grouped as follows:
1 East European countries where funding is from compulsory contributions (Bis-
marck system) and patients are rarely required to make out-of-pocket payments. 
2 Countries with a largely public health care system and a role for out-of-pocket pay-
ments: Finland, Latvia, Portugal, Italy, Australia and New Zealand.
3 Countries with a largely public system and few out-of-pocket payments: Denmark, 
Spain, Canada, Ireland and the United Kingdom
4 Corporatist countries, where funding comes from compulsory contributions and 
patients are frequently required to make out-of-pocket payments: France, Germany, 
Belgium and Austria.
5 A heterogeneous ‘other’ group consisting of the us, Greece, Sweden, Cyprus, 
Malta, Luxembourg and the Netherlands
In 2000, the eu-15 countries spent over 8% of gdp on health care. In the accession 
countries, health spending is 5% to 7% of gdp. The us has by far the highest health 
spending ratio of all, at 13% of gdp. High costs are caused in part by high incomes 
earned in the health care sector. Also, litigation by patients has pushed up insurance 
premiums, increased the number of medical tests carried out and prompted health 
care suppliers to use the most modern equipment available.
In the Czech Republic, Sweden, Denmark and the United Kingdom, more than 
80% of health spending comes from public coffers. The Netherlands belongs to a 
broad band of countries where 65% to 80% of health care is publicly funded. The 
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us is the only country where more than half of all health care is privately ﬁ nanced. 
In the Netherlands, private ﬁ nancing comes mainly from insurance premiums. The 
share of out-of-pocket payments is fairly small. In Portugal, Finland, Spain, Greece, 
Poland and New Zealand, on the other hand, private ﬁ nancing is mainly in the form 
of out-of-pocket payments.
The large differences in health spending per capita correlate strongly with gdp per 
capita. The higher a country’s income, the greater the demand for health care and 
the higher the cost price of health care products. There is virtually no link between 
spending levels and the type of health care system. Another notable point is that the 
differences in spending levels cannot be explained to any great extent by the degree 
of demographic ageing. Factors such as lifestyle (smoking, alcohol consumption, 
overweight), the use of medical equipment and the degree to which general practi-
tioners act as gatekeepers to specialist care also offer very little explanation for dif-
ferences in the share of gdp devoted to purchasing health care services.
Inpatient care is provided in regular hospitals, psychiatric hospitals and nursing 
homes. Austria is notable for its relatively high number of hospital admissions: 270 
per 1000 inhabitants. Austria as well as other countries in the corporatist cluster 
(particularly France and Germany) generally have high admission rates. The admission 
rate is high in the East European countries and Finland, too. Spain, Portugal, the 
Netherlands, Canada and the us have fairly low hospital admission rates, at around 
100 per 1000 inhabitants. The average number of hospital bed days per patient in the 
eu-15 was 6.7 in 2000. The Netherlands posted a higher ﬁ gure: 8.6 bed days. 
There are major differences in the number of doctors’ consultations per capita, 
both general practitioners (GP) and medical specialists. Two countries – Hungary 
and the Czech Republic – record exceptionally high scores, with an average of over 
12 consultations per person per year. The score in most countries is somewhere 
between 4 and 8, and the Netherlands comes just below the eu-15 average, on 6. 
There seems to be a slight positive correlation between the number of GPs and the 
number of hospital admissions. Where GPs act as gatekeepers, one might expect to 
see a negative correlation. However, this is not the case at country level, suggesting 
there is in fact complementarity between the consumption of both health services: 
countries where people visit the doctor more frequently also make greater use of 
inpatient care provisions.
Costs per bed day differ signiﬁ cantly from one country to another. These costs are 
relatively high in Sweden, followed at a slight distance by Canada, the us, Italy and 
Spain. The Netherlands comes just behind the leaders. Germany, the uk and Finland 
have the lowest costs per bed day in the eu-15. Analyses suggest that in the Netherlands 
three factors play a role in increasing costs per bed day: (1) more intensive treatments 
in hospitals, (2) demographic ageing and (3) the general rise in the relative cost price 
of labour-intensive services. The lower the number of bed days per capita, the higher 
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the cost per day. This is probably partly because of more intensive treatments and the 
more efﬁ cient use of the capacity available.
Product quality is an increasingly important issue in health care. On the basis of the 
data available, we can report here only on waiting times for non-urgent curative care 
(elective surgery) and public conﬁ dence in the health care system as a whole. Nine of 
the eu-15 countries report substantial to long waiting times for elective surgery. Five 
eu countries (Belgium, Austria, France, Germany and Luxembourg) report no waiting 
times of any note. The Netherlands occupies a position in the middle. 
Generally speaking, it would appear that greater capacity, more ﬁ nancial resources 
and higher user payments, all reduce the likelihood of waiting lists. Thus, waiting 
list problems occur primarily in health care systems with limited market forces. 
Since there is a clear link between capacity and the length of waiting lists, one is 
inclined to conclude that additional resources can help reduce waiting times. How-
ever, this is not necessarily the case. In practice, an unconditional increase in supply 
can cause a rise in demand. Policy makers may therefore consider to introduce 
targeted ﬁ nancial incentives, to prevent this happening. Improving patient manage-
ment in hospitals, such as more efﬁ cient planning of procedures and prevention of 
cancellations, can also help reduce waiting times.
One important quality indicator is public conﬁ dence. Residents of Malta, Austria 
and Finland express great conﬁ dence in their health care system, in contrast to the 
residents of some Mediterranean countries, including Greece, Italy and Portugal. 
Health care systems in the new member states of Eastern Europe do not generally 
enjoy much public conﬁ dence either. 
The main aim of health care systems is of course to improve the health of the popu-
lation. Good health is reﬂ ected in long life expectancy, low infant mortality, a high 
proportion of healthy life years and a general feeling of good health. These indica-
tors together constitute an index of health status, measuring the effectiveness of 
national systems. Scores on this index range from 1.6 in Hungary to 6.3 in Sweden. 
Most countries score between 5 and 6. Portugal, the us and the new member states 
fail to make 5. 
There is certainly no direct relationship between health spending as a proportion 
of gdp and the effectiveness of the health care system. The us combines relatively 
limited effectiveness with extremely high spending. On the other hand, the Czech 
Republic manages to achieve a reasonable effectiveness score with relatively limited 
inputs. Limited inputs are in some new eastern European member states linked to 
low labour costs, which is the source of dissatisfaction in the profession. Quite sur-
prisingly, the relationship between a country’s health status index score and health 
spending is hardly affected by differences in the demographic make-up and life 
styles of the population.
As noted, accessibility, quality and ﬁ nancial sustainability are other important 
dimensions of health care systems. Therefore, it is interesting to examine health 
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scores and health spending in conjunction with these dimensions, focusing on the 
effectiveness of systems in a broader sense. Indicators of the functioning of national 
systems selected here are (1) public conﬁ dence, (2) the length of waiting lists for non-
urgent hospital care and (3) the proportion of health spending in the form of out-
of-pocket payments. It is assumed that high out-of-pocket payments might impede 
access to health care for the poor. By analogy with the method applied by the World 
Health Organisation, the health of the population and the functioning of the system 
have been given equal weight.
Sweden, France and Austria lead the broad effectiveness index. Leading countries 
owe their position to the fact that they score fairly well on all four components 
(health of the population, conﬁ dence, waiting lists and out-of-pocket payments). 
Only Sweden scores lower on the waiting list indicator. France has very high out-
of-pocket payments. Countries at the bottom of the list score badly on at least one 
indicator: Hungary for the health of the population, Portugal and Poland for the 
high proportion of health spending out of patients’ pockets.
Some of the countries that do well in terms of effectiveness in the narrow sense 
(health status of the population) drop down the ranks when the effectiveness of 
their system in a broader sense is measured. 
If the aim is to achieve good health at a reasonable cost, one could do worse than 
follow the examples of Sweden and France. Austria and Belgium do almost as well. 
Although Germany and Luxembourg achieve similar results in terms of health and 
health care, these countries incur considerably higher costs. The Netherlands, Aus-
tralia, Canada and Denmark achieve a slightly lower standard of health and health 
care with similar costs as Sweden and France. Spain and Finland achieve the same 
levels – as do Ireland, the uk, Italy, New Zealand and Greece, albeit to a slightly 
lesser extent – but these countries spend much less on health. Portugal spends 
almost the same as Spain, but clearly achieves lower standards of health and quality. 
The same applies to Hungary, which spends almost the same as the Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic, but achieves lower standards. The us is again the exception: a poor 
performance in terms of the health of the population and the functioning of the 
system, at very high cost.
The correlation between the ﬁ ve types of health care system and the score on the 
composite index appears to be fairly weak, although corporatist systems do have 
systematically higher scores. They appear to allow countries like France, Germany, 
Austria and Belgium to achieve good performances. However, with the exception of 
France, corporatist countries fail to achieve the standards of Sweden, even though 
their spending exceeds Swedish levels. 
Law and order (chapter 5)
Observed trends in crime ﬁ gures may have speciﬁ c national causes, but they will 
often ﬁ t in wider international patterns. For instance, over the past ten years violent 
crime in the Netherlands and most of its neighbours rose at roughly the same rate. 
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Clearly, then, forces not conﬁ ned to the Netherlands are at work. For various reasons, 
national crime ﬁ gures are sometimes hard to interpret. The compilation of inter-
national comparative crime statistics is especially fraught with difﬁ culties, because 
law enforcement is organized so differently in the countries covered by this report.
In classifying legal systems, one can start with the traditional distinction between the 
Anglo-Saxon common law tradition and the continental European civil law tradition. 
However, the speciﬁ cs of the criminal justice system depend on many other system 
properties, including the distinction between an adversarial and an inquisitorial 
legal system (the former is characterized by a passive role of the judge and is typical 
for the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries), the importance of private secu-
rity ﬁ rms (high in the Anglo-Saxon countries), and the repressiveness of the system 
(severity of punishment and staff per inhabitant; high in Southern and Central 
Europe and the us). On the basis of these criteria eight country groups are recog-
nized: a Scandinavian, three West-European, a South European, a Central European 
and two Anglo-Saxon groups. 
In the publicly-funded law and order sector, staff numbers range from 270 (in 
Finland) to 830 per 100,000 inhabitants in Italy. Relatively high numbers also occur 
in most other Southern and Central European countries, low numbers in the Scandi-
navian countries, the uk, Australia and Canada. However, the latter three countries 
and the us are characterized by a sizable private security sector. At 400, numbers 
are slightly on the low side in the Netherlands. For the police force alone, the staff 
numbers for Finland, Italy and the Netherlands are 150, 540 and 260 per 100,000 
inhabitants, respectively. The Netherlands has average stafﬁ ng levels in its prison 
service. Greece, Slovakia, Denmark and Belgium have low numbers of prison staff, 
in contrast to the us and Estonia, which have high stafﬁ ng levels.
Sweden and New Zealand have the highest levels of recorded crime, at over 10,000 
offences per 100,000 inhabitants. Ireland, Cyprus and Slovakia, on the other hand, 
post fewer than 2000 recorded offences per 100,000 inhabitants. The Southern Euro-
pean countries and new member states also do fairly well. The same applies to the 
us, despite its bad reputation in this respect.
Arguably, the most dramatic of all crimes is homicide. Curiously, homicide is 
relatively frequent in a number of countries that do not otherwise post high crime 
rates, such as the Baltic states and the us. Even the rough data in this report sup-
port the theory that wide availability of ﬁ rearms increases the likelihood of violence 
involving ﬁ rearms.
The pattern is very varied when it comes to other violent crime. England/Wales, 
Sweden, Belgium and Finland have high rates of assault. The highest ﬁ gures for 
rape are found for the us, followed by Ireland, Sweden and Belgium. Robbery is 
most prevalent in Estonia. The Netherlands has average rates for all of these crimes. 
Greece, Italy and the new member states (with the exception of the three Baltic 
states) record low rates of violent crime.
Sweden has the highest rate of property crime, followed by the Netherlands, 
England/Wales and Denmark. The Netherlands’ high rate is mainly the result of the 
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many bicycle thefts that occur here. Low property crime ﬁ gures are typical of the 
Southern European countries and the new member states. The number of drug-
related crimes is particularly low in the Netherlands. This can be explained by the 
Netherlands’ policy of tolerance, whereby drug dealing is prosecuted, but possession 
of drugs for personal use is not. The scale of problematic drug use and the proportion 
of young people who have used marihuana or cannabis are also relatively low in the 
Netherlands. By contrast, however, the Netherlands is unmistakably a major centre 
of the international drugs trade.
The prison population in the Netherlands is not particularly large in comparison 
with other countries. The number of prisoners is just below the eu average. However, 
the Dutch prison population has grown rapidly since 1987. The us and the Baltic 
states are notable for their very large prison populations.
In the system analysis we focus on the repressiveness of the criminal justice system, 
that is, the extent to which countries are tough on crime. We measure ‘toughness’ 
by comparing the type and length of sentences and the staff and resources deployed 
in the ﬁ ght against crime. The Southern and Central European countries have rather 
repressive systems. The us and Latvia are the most repressive, with more than 
50 prison days per recorded offence.
To obtain a comprehensive snapshot of the way the entire criminal justice system 
functions, the number of convictions can be expressed as a proportion of the number 
of recorded offences. By this criterion, Greece has the highest score, at over 40%, 
followed by a number of new member states with scores between 15% and 25%. 
Finland and England/Wales have the highest rates among the eu-15 (15% to 20%). 
The Netherlands comes bottom of the table, on 7%. However, the latter number 
rises considerably if out-of-court settlements by the public prosecutor are counted as 
convictions.
Labour productivity in the criminal justice system can be expressed as a quotient 
of the number of convictions and the number of staff. Thus deﬁ ned, productivity is 
very high (at 5 to 8 convictions per full-time equivalent) in Finland, Sweden and Eng-
land/Wales. We should note, however, that in the case of Sweden multiple crimes are 
counted as as many convictions. Productivity is low (at less than one conviction per 
fte) in Ireland, the Southern European countries and in a number of new member 
states. The Netherlands scores1.7 convictions per fte. However, this number rises 
considerably if out-of-court settlements are taken into account. 
Staff numbers in the criminal justice system per 1000 offences vary sharply from 
country to country. They fall well below 50 in the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, 
Sweden, England/Wales and Canada. Cyprus lies at the other extreme, on 900. Greece, 
Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, many of the new member states and the us also have high 
scores (between 140 and 280 fte per 1000 offences). The Southern European countries 
and many new member states have low crime rates and high staff numbers. The reverse 
applies to Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Canada, England/Wales and the Netherlands.
Like Denmark, Ireland, Finland and Sweden, the Netherlands has a ratio of 
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prisoners to prison guards of 1:1. In the majority of countries the ratio is between 1:1 
and 3:1, but it is much higher in Slovakia and the us. Expenditure per prisoner is also 
very high in the Netherlands, at approximately 90,000 euros per prisoner, as against 
30,000 in the us. It is not clear whether the high stafﬁ ng levels and high expenditure 
per prisoner in the Netherlands should be seen more as a sign of inefﬁ ciency or as an 
indication of high quality.
Only a fairly small proportion of crimes (10% to 20%) are reported to and recorded by the 
police. Population surveys therefore give a clearer picture of crime rates. The key questions 
in such surveys concern the extent to which respondents have themselves fallen victim 
to crime. Strikingly, the Netherlands turns out to have the highest risk of victimization, 
mainly as a result of the high frequency of two types of offence: bicycle theft and car van-
dalism. The picture is clearly different when it comes to certain other types of crime.
There is strikingly little correlation between fear of crime and the actual risk 
of victimization. Respondents in Portugal, Poland and Australia often say to feel 
unsafe, even though the probability of falling victim to crime in those countries is 
very low, average and high respectively. The Dutch feel relatively safe, on the other 
hand, even though they have a relatively high risk of victimization.
Scores for conﬁ dence in the police and criminal justice system range from 2 to 
8 (out of 10). The highest marks go to Denmark (8), Finland (over 7) and Austria 
(almost 7). The Netherlands has an average score (5). The Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia and Slovakia score less than 4.
Contrary to expectations, there is a weak positive correlation between crime rate 
and conﬁ dence in the police and criminal justice system. The Northern and Western 
European countries, Australia and New Zealand typically have average to high crime 
rates, but in surveys respondents express average to high conﬁ dence in the system. 
The Southern European countries and, more especially, the new member states, 
combine low conﬁ dence with low crime rates. Table S.1 relates these surprising out-
comes to a number of other ﬁ ndings.
Table S.1 Connections identiﬁ ed in this report (schematic)
crime rate
repres-
siveness 
(severity 
of punish-
ment))
repres-
siveness 
(number of 
staff)
likelihood 
of punish-
ment productivity conﬁ dence
Northern and 
Western Europe, 
Australia, 
New Zealand
high low low low, except 
for Finland 
and Eng-
land/Wales
high high
Southern and 
Central Euro-
pean countries
low high high high, except 
for Portugal 
and Spain
low low
Source: SCP
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Countries in each group have similar levels of repressiveness (severity of punishment 
and size of resource inputs), likelihood of punishment and productivity. The low pro-
ductivity in countries with low crime rates is associated with high staff numbers in 
relation both to population size and crime ﬁ gures. Low conﬁ dence in the police and 
criminal justice system in these countries is probably connected with another inherent 
aspect of repressiveness: a strong focus on tackling crime and catching offenders might 
mean that there is less regard for the rights of offenders and the quality of evidence. 
There might also be a link between low pay in the public sector and low conﬁ dence 
in connection with corruption in some of these countries (see also Chapter 6). An 
alternative explanation could be that a lack of conﬁ dence moves people not to report 
crimes to the police. Indeed, the discrepancy between the number of crimes reported 
in population surveys and registered offences is relatively high in countries such as 
Poland, Portugal and Spain. However, this registration failure can only partly explain 
the differences between the country groups. Further research of an entirely different 
kind would be needed to shed more light on such relationships.
Public Administration (Chapter 6)
Declining conﬁ dence in government institutions and growing demands on the 
public ﬁ nances have prompted governments to initiate policies aimed at trimming 
the public sector and increasing its efﬁ ciency and effectiveness. The view that decen-
tralization may improve the functioning of the public sector is gaining support in 
many quarters. Decentralization is usually seen from a ﬁ nancial perspective, with a 
focus on devolving public resources. Three groups of countries may be distinguished 
here. Firstly, the Scandinavian countries, with a very strong local sector; second, a 
number of Central European countries, including France, with a medium-sized local 
sector, and ﬁ nally a number of countries with a small local sector, mainly Southern 
European countries. The degree of decentralization is also reﬂ ected in the distribu-
tion of public servants among different government tiers. Over the years, the statis-
tics show a shift in staff employed by central government to staff on the payroll of 
local and regional authorities. The Scandinavian countries and most of the federal 
countries have relatively small central governments. Belgium is an exception. In 
unitarian states such as France, the Netherlands and Italy, the proportion of public 
servants working in central government is signiﬁ cantly higher.
Outlays for public administration purposes (policy making, legislation and general 
management) vary between 1.3% (United Kingdom) and 4.8% (France) of gdp. Most 
countries spend between 2.5% and 3.5%, except for Ireland and Spain (somewhat less) 
and Sweden and Austria (somewhat more). The number of government employees 
per 1000 inhabitants ranges from 4 in Cyprus to 33 in the United States. In eu-15 
countries the ratio of public administration staff is relatively low in Greece, Italy and 
Ireland and high in Belgium, Denmark and France. The staff-ratio ends up between 
15 and 25 per 1000 inhabitants in the other eu-15 countries. 
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The ﬁ nancial reform agenda focuses on three major policy issues: (1) introducing 
greater ﬁ nancial responsibility for public sector managers, (2) working towards 
results-based budgets and (3) adopting multi-year budgets. 
More involvement of elected ofﬁ cials with the budget implies greater limits to dis-
cretionary powers of public managers. One indicator of the degree of parliamentary 
control over the budget and the ensuing restrictions for managers is the degree of 
detail to which the budget is appropriated. In some countries, parliamentary appro-
priation occurs at an aggregated level and it is possible to carry over unused budget 
resources at the end of the year, albeit sometimes only under certain conditions. 
This group includes Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
Diametrically opposed to this group is a cluster of countries with less management 
freedom, where there is no end of year ﬂ exibility and parliamentary appropriation is 
very detailed (the us, Slovenia, Spain). Another indicator of parliamentary control is 
the legislature’s inﬂ uence on the budget. In most countries studied, the budget sub-
mitted by the executive is approved without major amendments (amounting to less 
than 3% of the total budget) and in some countries parliament approves the budget 
without making any amendments.
Increasingly, governments focus on results of policy efforts as the basis for their 
budgeting. Also, a number of countries are moving towards accrual budgeting, a 
system showing costs and beneﬁ ts instead of cash ﬂ ows. Australia, New Zealand, 
Finland and Sweden have introduced full or partial accrual budgeting whereby per-
formance information is provided for all programmes. In the us, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Slovenia and Spain performance information is included in the budget 
documents, but they have opted (as yet) not to make the move towards accrual budg-
eting. Finally, Ireland, Portugal, Austria, the Czech Republic and Greece maintain 
the traditional line-item cash budget geared mainly to inputs, with little perform-
ance information.
The third trend in the modernisation of government ﬁ nances has been a move 
towards the adoption of multi-year budgets. Most countries add multi-year forecasts 
to their budgets to place their annual income and expenditures in a longer-term per-
spective. In most cases, these forecasts are purely informative. However, in Italy and 
the United States, parliament does have to approve the multi-year budget.
Nowadays, strategic human resources policy, competency management and equal 
opportunities policy are key concepts in the modernisation of human resources man-
agement. The Lisbon agenda aims to raise the employment rate of women from an 
average of 51% in 2000 to more than 60% by 2010. As yet, an average of 47% of staff 
employed in public administration and defence are women. The average is much 
higher in education (69%) and in the health care and social welfare sectors (80%). 
The development of a knowledge-based society also has implications for the 
services produced by the public sector. When ranking the e-performance of public 
administrations, the list is headed by the us and the other Anglo-Saxon countries. 
The Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands perform well too. 
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By the very nature of its products – shaping policy in a wide variety of areas, law 
making, maintaining public order, managing the government apparatus – no ‘natu-
ral’ performance indicators are available for the public administration as such. Argu-
ably, the functioning of government administrations can therefore be measured best 
by using subjective indicators. Such indicators reﬂ ect mainly trust and conﬁ dence 
in the Civil service. For the purpose of this report, four indicators of government 
quality have been selected: (1) the size of bureaucracy, (2) transparency and (3) 
effectiveness of government interventions, and (4) corruption. Bureaucracy seems 
to hinder economic activities more in Southern then in Northern European coun-
tries. Between 1995 and 2003, bureaucracy is perceived to have been on the increase, 
especially so in New Zealand but also in Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
Transparency of government is judged by survey respondents markedly more posi-
tive then bureaucracy. Within the eu-15 area, Northern countries generally perform 
well in this respect. The level of transparency has strongly improved between 1995 
and 2003. Effective implementation of decisions and regulations is found in the 
Scandinavian countries. Greece, Germany and Italy are seen as having some dif-
ﬁ culty in implementing government decisions. Effective implementation of govern-
mental decisions did not change much between 1998 and 2003. In the perception 
of respondents, corruption levels differ strongly in European countries. Especially 
Scandinavian countries are seen as less corrupt. The relatively poor scores of Italy 
and Greece are striking, as well as the poor scores of most new member states in 
Eastern Europe.
Conﬁ dence of the population in the Civil service differs strongly across countries. 
On average, conﬁ dence in the Civil service amounts to about 70% of conﬁ dence in 
other public sector institutions, like health care, safety, justice, education and social 
security. 
Tentatively, the effectiveness of public administrations can be assessed by relating 
expenditure on administrative services (per capita) to subjective statements of 
respondents in opinion surveys on (1) the quality of government performance and 
(2) conﬁ dence in government institutions. For the purposes of this report, subjective 
statements on the quality of the government are bundled into a composite index of 
perceived bureaucracy, transparency, effectiveness and corruption. It turns out that 
there is only a weak relation between expenditure per capita and government per-
formance as perceived by respondents. Low spending countries are seen as generally 
performing slightly below average, whereas high spending countries do slightly 
better. The most striking observation concerns Finland, which combines a fairly 
moderate spending level with a perceived high quality of government interventions. 
In general, a strong correlation exists between subjective quality of government 
expressed by the business community and conﬁ dence in the Civil service expressed 
by the population at large. 
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To summarize, from an eu-15 perspective it is possible to identify two clear extremes 
and a large middle group. The Nordic countries are highly territorially decentralized. 
Local authorities are sizeable and enjoy a large degree of autonomy. Financial manage-
ment and e-government are fairly well developed. A relatively large number of women 
work in the public administration. The performance of the government and Civil 
service is valued highly, both by the business community and the population. In terms 
of most indicators, the Netherlands and Luxembourg are in line with these countries, 
except in terms of the gender balance. The other outlier comprises a number of Medi-
terranean countries, particularly Italy, Greece and Portugal. Spain differs somewhat 
from these three. Local administrations operate on a much smaller scale, but no clear 
picture emerges as to their ﬁ nancial modernization processes. These countries also 
post low scores when it comes to e-government. Few women are employed in the public 
service, and the appreciation of administrative performance is below the European 
average. The third and largest group of countries are located somewhere in between 
and exhibit no systematically differing properties. This group includes the countries 
of Central Europe (Belgium, Austria, Germany, France) and the Anglo-Saxon countries 
(the United Kingdom and Ireland).
Public sector performance (Chapter 7) 
The concluding chapter of the report synthesizes ﬁ ndings presented in earlier 
chapters. It links the performance of the public service sector of welfare states to 
(1) institutions and (2) scarce resources allocated to (public) programmes. A typol-
ogy of the public service sector of the countries studied should tie in with structural 
characteristics of welfare arrangements, which – at least in part – determine the 
degree to which citizens enjoy basic rights such as to education, health care, law 
and order and quality services from a trustworthy public administration. Three sets 
of indicators are employed to group welfare states in terms of public services deliv-
ered: (1) resource inputs, (2) the way countries ﬁ nance the services concerned and (3) 
how services are delivered to citizens. The ﬁ rst set of indicators represents the input 
of scarce resources to produce public sector services. Since inputs are measured in 
absolute levels at comparable prices, this indicator reﬂ ects to a large degree income 
per capita in the countries covered in the report. The second set of indicators reveals 
the public versus private orientation of national institutions. The key factor here is 
the degree to which health care and education programmes are publicly or privately 
ﬁ nanced. Notably, this set of indicators also reﬂ ects the degree of repressiveness of 
law and order institutions. Countries with a stronger orientation towards private 
ﬁ nancing of health care and education tend to tackle law and order problems more 
rigorously. A ﬁ nal set of indicators reﬂ ects three policy dimensions: the type of 
welfare state, the degree of differentiation in the education system, and the type of 
criminal law system.
Combining the ﬁ rst and second sets of indicators, we ﬁ nd three country clusters: 
Poland, Lithuania and Greece are located in the private, low expenditure area; the us 
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in the private, high expenditure area and Denmark, Sweden, Luxembourg, Austria, 
Belgium and France are in the public, high expenditure area. When combining the 
second and third sets of indicators, the Scandinavian countries are found in one 
cluster, reﬂ ecting a publicly oriented welfare system, relatively low expenditure on 
the police and judiciary, a school system with little early differentiation between 
pupils and a Beveridge-type health care system. A second cluster comprises most of 
the countries of Western and Central Europe, with publicly-oriented systems, gener-
ally strongly differentiated school systems and Bismarck-type health care systems. 
A third cluster includes the non-European Anglo-Saxon countries, which combine 
a stronger privately-oriented system with a Beveridge-type health care system and a 
uniform education system. A ﬁ nal cluster holds the Southern European countries, 
with a Beveridge-type health care system and various types of education system.
To measure the quality of public sector services, separate scores for education, health 
care and the ﬁ ght against crime may be combined to create a single performance 
index for each country for which sufﬁ cient data are available. This particular index 
may be said to represent the allocation function of the government. The score of 
most countries deviates unambiguously from the average. Ireland and Finland score 
well above average, followed by a group of eu-15 countries, the Czech Republic, Slo-
vakia and Canada. Poland, Hungary and Portugal make up the rear. Ireland achieves 
its top position thanks to its very low crime rate, a good score for education and an 
average score for health. Finland scores very well on the quality of education and 
health services, but is beaten to the top position by Ireland because of its poor score 
on law and order.
At country level, a signiﬁ cant relationship is established between overall public serv-
ice sector performance and certain system characteristics, but the observed correla-
tion is rather weak. Income per capita still appears to have the strongest inﬂ uence 
on overall performance of the public service sector. Also, our results suggest that 
publicly-oriented systems perform on average better than privately-oriented systems. 
When overall performance in the policy areas of education, health care and law 
and order is linked to inputs (resources used), it appears that Ireland and Finland 
combine relatively limited expenditures (as a proportion of gdp) with high levels of 
performance. Spain, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary 
and Poland also use relatively few resources. However, the last two countries, in par-
ticular, are characterised by a relatively weak performance. Portugal is rather excep-
tional, with weak performance at average expenditure levels, as is the us, with fairly 
poor performance and extremely high spending, especially on health care. 
The performance of the public service sector can be put into broader perspective, and 
be related to the three conventional functions of the government: distribution, stabili-
zation and allocation. Here, the quality of public administration is added as a sepa-
rate function and relevant economic indicators have been selected with the Lisbon 
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Agenda in mind. Altogether, nineteen different criteria are involved in the analysis. 
However some of these criteria are closely correlated and most other criteria show 
a considerable degree of correlation. As a result 43 percent of total variance can be 
explained by one single factor or principal component. Only economic growth, 
poverty rate and crime are independent of this common factor. Altogether, 85% of 
total variance is explained by the ﬁ rst 5 components. In a plot of the country positions 
on the ﬁ rst and second component, summarizing characteristics of the performance 
of countries, a by now familiar grouping of countries emerges: Central , Southern, 
Western and Northern Europe and the Scandinavian countries.
The score on various government functions can be combined in one overall index of 
public sector performance. Figure S.1 shows the performance of twenty-two countries 
in terms of (1) stabilization and growth of the economy, (2) distribution of welfare, 
(3) allocation of public services and (4) quality of public administration. 
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The score for individual variables generally lies between 2 and 8. The variation in the 
overall score is considerably smaller, at 3.5 to 6.5. This is because no country posts 
high scores for all individual performance variables. Leaders like Denmark and Fin-
land score high for the quality of their public sector and for distribution, but low on 
allocation, particularly as a result of their high crime rates. Poland trails the rest of 
the ﬁ eld, but does well on criteria like economic growth, income distribution and 
preventing school drop-outs. Generally speaking, the new member states score badly 
for stability and allocation, the Anglo-Saxon countries do badly on distribution, and 
Poland in particular does badly in terms of the quality of its public administration.
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The overall performance of the public service sector can also be related to the 
conﬁ dence that the population vests in their national institutions. Italy, Greece 
and the Czech Republic score particularly low on public conﬁ dence. The Northern 
European countries, Austria, Ireland and Luxembourg book the highest scores. The 
Netherlands falls somewhere in the middle, together with the bulk of the Western 
European countries. There is a fairly strong correlation between public sector per-
formance and conﬁ dence in the government expressed by the public. Notable excep-
tions are the Czech Republic, with reasonable performance but low conﬁ dence, and 
Poland, where the reverse applies. 
Furthermore, the overall performance of the public service sector can be related to the 
resources absorbed by producers active in the public service sector. Roughly speaking,  
there is little connection between public sector performance and the level of govern- 
ment spending. By this measure, Finland is the most efﬁ cient in producing public ser- 
vices of high quality at moderately high costs, while – in terms of efﬁ cient production 
– Ireland scores slightly above average. Just behind these leaders we ﬁ nd Sweden, 
Denmark, Austria, Luxembourg and the Netherlands; the ﬁ rst three countries post 
relatively high government spending levels, while the last two have fairly average 
spending. Australia, Canada, Spain and the Czech Republic combine an average per-
formance score with fairly low government spending, while others (particularly Ger-
many, Belgium and France) occupy fairly average position in both respects. The us 
and the United Kingdom perform fairly poor at relatively low public spending levels. 
One of the most striking outcomes of the analysis in the present report is that the 
same clusters of countries repeatedly emerge in analyses of public sector perform-
ance, regardless of the policy area reviewed, or the level of analysis. Again and again, 
Northern European countries, Western European countries, Southern European 
countries, Central European countries, and Anglo-Saxon countries are demonstrated 
to form fairly consistent clusters. Table S.2 lists some of the main characteristics of 
these ﬁ ve groups of countries.
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Table S.2 Country clusters
Northern 
European1
Western 
European2
Southern 
European3
Central
European4
Anglo-
Saxon5
1. ageing medium medium high low low
2. prosperity (GDP per capita) medium medium low low high
3. economic growth medium low high high medium
4. public spending (% GDP) high medium low low low
5. size of public service sector 
    (staff)
high mixed low low/
medium
medium
6. private share of public
    service sector
low medium low/
medium
low medium/
high
7. educational differentiation low high/
medium
medium mixed low/
medium
8. educational performance medium/
high
medium/
high
low low/
medium
high
9. health care system Beveridge Bismarck Beveridge Bismarck Beveridge
10. health care performance high high medium/
high
low/
medium
medium/
high
11. repressiveness of criminal
      justice system.
low medium medium medium/
high
mixed
12. crime high medium low low mixed
13. quality of public admin
      istration
high medium low/
medium
low/
medium
medium/
high
14. aggregated conﬁ dence high medium/
high
low/
medium
low/
medium
medium*
1 Finland, Sweden, Denmark
2 Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, Netherlands; Luxembourg is a special case
3 Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy; Cyprus and Malta are special cases
4 Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland , Slovenia and Baltic States
5 United Kingdom, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand; Ireland is a special case
* Based on partial data.
Source: SCP
Country characteristics taken into account include demographic proﬁ le (1), institu-
tions (7, 9, 11), resource inputs (4, 5, 6) and performance of the public sector (2, 3, 
8, 10, 12, 13, 14). It should be noted that, though there is a considerable correlation 
between public sector performance in the different areas, it is by no means perfect. 
See the previous discussion of results shown in Figure S.1. 
In most respects, the Netherlands shares characteristics with other Western 
European countries. The Netherlands falls somewhere in the middle when it comes 
to the size of its public service sector. Public conﬁ dence in the public sector is fairly 
low. In our own ranking of public performance, the Netherlands comes sixth. In the 
World Competitiveness Yearbook, the Netherlands spent several years near the top 
of the rankings. The country was hit severely by the economic downturn after 2000 
and political upheaval in 2002-2003. It would appear that both factors contribute sig-
niﬁ cantly to explain the recent fall of the country to the middle of the ranks among 
eu-15 countries.
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Concluding comments
After mining some of the most outstanding sets of international comparative data 
on public sector performance, our main, sobering conclusion is that policymakers 
can draw no quick and easy lessons from our analyses of these data. This is not to 
say that international comparisons can shed no light on the cost effectiveness of 
government interventions in individual policy areas (see the relevant chapters in this 
report). We should note, though, that – at the present stage – it seems difﬁ cult to 
perform in-depth analyses, given the limited quality of and lack of detail in the data 
available. In particular, in many cases there is a lack of robust and comparable data 
on output of the agencies concerned and on outcomes of government policies pursued. 
Therefore, it is to be hoped that international organisations – notably Eurostat and 
the oecd – continue their efforts aimed to broaden the scope and enhance the quality 
of statistical work in progress. To this end, different quality and performance indi-
cators are currently formulated.
Having said that, the material brought together in the present report allows to 
draw a number of conclusions that should be relevant to policymakers and certainly 
merit further analysis.
Spending ratios are a case in point. Participants in national policy debates often 
point out that their country spends a smaller share of gdp on, for example, health 
care or education that other nations do, with the implied message that expenditure 
on the government programs involved should be raised. However, our report dem-
onstrates convincingly that there is no one-to-one relationship between resources 
made available to sectors like health care and education and the (overall) perform-
ance of the public sector. Put simply, in many cases more money does not guarantee 
more effective policy outcomes. Apart from differences in the efﬁ ciency with which 
public sector services are produced, there are several explanations for the weak link 
between public money and public performance. Firstly, demography is important. 
If the age group 0-14 is shrinking, less resources are needed for primary education 
without loss of quality. Similarly, ageing populations imply greater demand for 
nursing homes. Seen in that light, policymakers may be surprised that the report 
ﬁ nds no clear link between the relative size of age group 65 and over and the level of 
health care spending. Relative wage levels in the market sector and the public sector 
of the economy offer a second explanation for the weak link between money and 
policy outcomes. If wage levels in the labour intensive production of public services 
are relatively low, taxpayers get more and arguably better services, if a given share of 
gdp is available for (public) funding. Conversely, relatively high wage levels in the 
public sector reduce the volume and arguably the quality of public services that can 
be bought for the money available. A ﬁ nal explanation is that large bureaucracies 
often have trouble handling an outpour of new money. Part of additional resources 
will be used to improve working conditions and incomes, or simply be wasted.    
Clearly, public spending and private payments for public services should be 
lumped together to measure the total resources a nation devotes to health care, 
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education and other service sectors. This is yet another reason why public spending 
ratios should be interpreted with care. 
The report distinguishes between four types of education system and ranks coun-
tries in ﬁ ve groups on the basis of their health care system. It appears that there is no 
systematic relationship between country systems and spending levels and between 
country systems and performance.  
A fourth ﬁ nding of interest is that in many instances there is no one-to-one 
relationship between the quality of public sector services as perceived by citizens or 
the business community (subjective performance indicators) and quality measured 
by objective performance standards. In those cases where citizens underestimate 
public sector performance, policymakers may consider providing additional infor-
mation to the public at large, in order to redress misperceptions. Comparative 
performance data included in the present report may support designs of campaigns 
to better inform the public.
Some other examples of policy-relevant conclusions from the report include:
– Policies aimed to stimulate economic growth and policies to further equity are 
not mutually exclusive. The hypothesised negative correlation between the level of 
government spending and taxation on the one hand, and economic growth on the 
other hand, is much weaker than is often maintained.
– In education systems, early differentiation between pupils generally leads to 
poorer performance. However, the exception that proves the rule seems to be the 
Netherlands, which produces reasonable to good outcomes with a highly differ-
entiated education system in place.
– Radical systemic change will be needed in the Netherlands to reduce the number 
of early school leavers.
– High health spending provides no guarantee whatsoever of good system perfor-
mance. This is best illustrated by the us and Germany. The same can also be said 
of the privatization of health care.
– Repressive criminal justice systems correspond with lower crime rates than systems 
geared to the reintegration of offenders.
These and other conclusions have been examined in detail in the individual chapters.
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1 Introduction
Bob Kuhry and Flip de Kam
1.1 The Lisbon Agenda and the public sector
Improving the performance of the public sector is a goal that is high on the policy 
agenda in almost all industrialised countries. The present report reviews the perform-
ance of four public services: education, health care, law and order and public adminis-
tration in twenty-nine countries. Since public sector performance is linked closely to 
the overall economic performance of nations, it can be placed in a broader context. 
In 2000, by adopting the Lisbon Agenda, member states of the European Union 
(eu) set themselves the daunting task of making the Union the most competitive 
economic area in the world within the next ten years. Four years on, it seems increas-
ingly doubtful whether this ambitious mission can be successfully completed. In 
the ﬁ rst half of 2004, the world-wide economic recovery is as yet not reﬂ ected in 
impressive growth perspectives for the eu-area as a whole. Many observers maintain 
that institutional change is a prerequisite for the Union to catch up with the United 
States and the dynamic Asian economies. The usual culprits include inﬂ exible labour 
markets, low labour participation rates, high levels of government spending and 
taxation, low levels of public investment and lagging r&d-effort. Those who do not 
accept these explanations (in full), will nevertheless agree that public sector per-
formance is an important factor in the race to achieve the goals set out in the Lisbon 
Agenda. Most will also agree that countries can improve the functioning of their 
public sector by adopting best practices found in other countries. The present report 
is written with these purposes in mind. It compares the performance of the public 
sector in the 25 member states of the European Union and in four non-European 
Anglo-Saxon countries.
In all countries selected for this report, public expenditure as a proportion of 
Gross Domestic Product (gdp) has grown strongly throughout most of the twentieth 
century. Only in the 1990s, public spending ratios stabilised and, in many countries, 
fell in fact, sometimes signiﬁ cantly so. To illustrate, Figure 1.1 shows trends in 
public expenditure in the Netherlands, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom 
(uk) and the United States (us).
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Figure 1.1 Public expenditure as a percentage of GDP in six OECD-countries, 1900-2003 
Source: Musgrave and Musgrave (1984, fig. 7.1), with additional data from the OECD and Statistics Netherlands
The economic growth in the larger part of the twentieth century was accompanied 
by an even stronger increase of public expenditure. The stagﬂ ation of the 1970s and 
the deep recession of the early 1980s convinced many that excessively high public 
spending and taxation levels can hamper economic growth. As a result, many coun-
tries introduced policies geared to pruning the social security system and privatis-
ing nationalised industries. The United Kingdom under prime minister Margaret 
Thatcher led the turn-around towards smaller government and deregulation. The 
trend was reinforced by the spectacular collapse of the command economies of East-
ern Europe. The notion that government intervention in a broad range of policy areas 
is inevitable to correct for market failures, which predominated in the 1960s and 
1970s, came under increasing pressure from a countermovement that emphasised 
the negative side of government interventions: large bureaucracies, inefﬁ ciency and 
high tax levels with a possibly devastating effect on economic growth. 
The 1990s saw yet another trend, i.e. the rise of New Public Management, which 
aimed to rationalise public services. Osborne and Gaebler (1992) is often seen as the 
key publication here. The authors stress the basic principle that the ﬁ nancing, budg-
eting and organisation of public services should take explicit account of the products 
delivered (output) and the effects achieved (outcomes).
The economic recession of the recent past (2001-2003) pushed up public spending 
ratios once more (see Figure 1.1), prompting governments once again to reconsider 
the scale and organisation of the public sector of their economies. Furthermore, in 
the Netherlands and probably in a number of other eu-countries as well, there has 
been growing dissatisfaction with the standard of service provided by the public 
sector. Many members of the public regard service levels as inadequate. Waiting lists 
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for health care, delays and some severe accidents in the public transport system, 
staff shortages in education and declining clear-up rates in the police service domi-
nated public debate in the Netherlands (scp 2002b). But this is not only a Dutch 
issue. Many other European countries face related problems.
 
The present Government is committed to improving the performance of the public 
sector in the Netherlands. This commitment is formalised in the document sealing the 
current coalition agreement, which opens with the following statement (Balkenende 
2 2003):
‘The Dutch public is more aware than ever of the deﬁ ciencies in our society and the need to 
improve the quality of our democracy, public services, law and order, education and health 
care. At the same time, the economic and budgetary position of the country has suffered a 
dramatic deterioration… The government will strive to achieve a strong society, effective 
governance, improved democracy and a safe and secure society. To this end it will pursue 
policies to restore national competitiveness, control the proliferation of regulation and 
reduce bureaucracy, increase personal responsibility and give individuals a greater say, 
and guarantee law and order and security. The government cannot do this on its own. 
Solving the country’s problems will require each of us to contribute to the effort, according 
to our ability and means.’
The coalition agreement document emphasises individual responsibility, cutbacks 
in publicly ﬁ nanced social security, streamlining of the public sector and improving 
the efﬁ ciency and quality of public services. These themes have also been stressed by 
previous Governments, irrespective of the political parties participating in the coali-
tion.
This policy stance of re-assessing public sector involvement in decision-making 
by economic agents is to a large extent inspired by dissolving national borders 
and the globalisation of the economy, and more in particular the enlargement and 
gradual integration of European Union member states. These developments have 
increased competitive pressures, prompting the Netherlands – and other industrial-
ised countries as well – more than ever before to pursue effective policies to promote 
economic growth and make themselves more attractive as a place to do business. 
As a result of growing competition between countries, there seems to be a move 
towards international convergence: no single country can afford to diverge too far 
from the others in terms of a number of crucial parameters such as its tax burden, 
labour market participation rates, socio-economic institutions, and labour produc-
tivity. Moreover, in many ﬁ elds eu-countries have agreed on common goals and 
common arrangements, which may stimulate converging trends in policies pursued. 
Policymakers in individual countries are increasingly aware of the need to know how 
they are doing relative to the competition (and how the European Union is doing in 
relation to the rest of the world). Policymakers also want to consider what measures 
they might take to make their countries more competitive. These concerns have been 
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a major factor in the growing attention paid to international comparisons of public 
sector performance.
Although this report aims to compare the performance of the public sector in a 
range of countries, it is not our primary objective to show how individual countries 
‘score’ in terms of public sector effectiveness and efﬁ ciency. Rather, in describing 
institutional arrangements, resource inputs, programme outputs and policy out-
comes (results) in the selected countries, the report aims to focus on opportunities 
for policymakers to learn from ‘best practices’ in other countries.
National debates often take place within the ‘narrow conﬁ nes of democracy’. 
Despite globalisation and the creation of the European Union, there is therefore a 
tendency to make only cautious adjustments to the national systems that have devel-
oped over time, and make only cautious changes to it. Countries that in many ways are 
similar to our own, such as the other eu member states, have sometimes opted for 
entirely different policy solutions to address similar problems. Some dilemmas that 
have caused political controversy to drag on and on in the Netherlands have been 
solved in a radically different way in other countries, sometimes without much ado. 
To take an example, since the mid-1980s the Netherlands has taken steps towards 
introducing patient payments for health care services. The underlying idea was that 
out-of-pocket payments would stimulate individuals to have a good think before 
deciding to visit a doctor. The resulting lower consumption of health care provisions 
might help curb the growth in health care spending. Until now, in the end all such 
initiatives from policymakers came to nothing, because of ﬁ erce opposition on the 
grounds that patient payments may make health care less accessible to people on 
low incomes. Our neighbour Belgium, however, has had a system of substantial indi-
vidual contributions in place for a long time. It might be useful to examine whether 
the payment system of our southern neighbours has had any negative impact on the 
health state of the population in Belgium.
For decades, the Netherlands has also been embroiled in a heated debate about 
whether to introduce a uniform system of secondary education for all 12- to 16-year-
olds. The proponents argue that a uniform system improves the educational prospects 
of youngsters from the lower social classes. Opponents say a uniform system not 
only holds back gifted youngsters, who miss a stimulating educational setting, but 
also increases learning problems of less talented pupils, who would drop out in huge 
numbers if faced with a too demanding curriculum heavily based on theory. How-
ever, countries as diverse as Sweden and the us have had positive experiences with a 
uniform system of secondary education.
Thus it is clear that an international comparison can put the provision of public 
services in various countries into proper perspective, by indicating what factors may 
contribute to different outcomes. Such an analysis could provide a basis for making 
improvements in the productivity, quality and effectiveness of public services in indi-
vidual countries. However, measuring public performance is not an easy task. Annex 
1.1 discusses some issues that arise when attempting to measure public performance.
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The government performs a number of tasks which cannot simply be left to the 
market. They include the provision of ‘public goods’ and ‘private goods’ with major 
externalities (Musgrave and Musgrave 1984). The consumption of public goods is 
non-rival and non-exclusive. Examples include dikes and national defence. Major 
externalities are associated with the consumption of private goods such as education 
(well-informed public, productivity of the labour force), health care (to counter 
epidemics) and cigarettes (premature death).
The government therefore has a clear responsibility for important social func-
tions such as public administration, education, health care, social protection and 
social security. The government itself will not necessarily supply all services needed 
to fulﬁ l these functions. It can also task third parties with producing these services, 
such as private non-proﬁ t organisations (schools, hospitals) or privately owned for-
proﬁ t enterprises (building and maintenance of public infrastructure such as roads). 
Another way of safeguarding the public interest is to regulate markets via legisla-
tion. 
Box 1.1 Three deﬁ nitions of the public sector
The term ‘public sector’ is often used indiscriminately. Three deﬁ nitions can be found 
(see Kuhry and Van der Torre 2002; Kuhry 2003):
− Legal deﬁ nition: the public sector includes government organisations and organisa-
tions governed by public law.
− Financial deﬁ nition: besides the above organisations, the public sector includes private 
organisations largely funded by public means, including non-proﬁ t organisations pro-
viding education and health care.1
− Functional deﬁ nition: in this case the public sector includes all organisations in the 
ﬁ eld of public administration, social security, law and order, education, health care, 
and social and cultural services, irrespective of their funding source and the legal 
form of the supplier. The functionally deﬁ ned public sector is sometimes termed the 
‘quaternary sector’2 in policy debates in the Netherlands and Belgium.
In this report, the functional deﬁ nition is applied. Instead of the awkward term ‘qua-
ternary sector’ the term ‘public service sector’ will be used in this context (see further 
elaboration in Section 2.3). 
1 In the Netherlands, the term ‘collective sector’ is used in this connection. This concept 
differs from ‘general government’ as used in the National Accounts by the inclusion of 
‘corporations’ largely funded with public means.
2 ‘Quartaire sector’ in Dutch.
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1.2 Aim and scope of the report
The aim of this report is to trace differences in public sector performance in the Netherlands 
and other countries and to provide insight into factors that might explain these differences.
It should be stated at the outset that there are major differences between the 
countries included in the report, in terms not only of public sector performance, but 
also of per capita expenditure and the proportion of gdp spent on various services 
traditionally produced with signiﬁ cant or exclusive government involvement. Fur-
thermore, the countries with the highest spending levels are not necessarily the ones 
with the best public services.
For example, education spending ranges from 4 per cent of gdp in Greece and 
Luxembourg to more than 8 per cent in Denmark and Cyprus. At the same time, 
the proportion of the population aged 25-64 that has successfully completed higher 
education varies from 7 per cent in Austria, Portugal and Denmark, to almost 30 per 
cent in the us. 
The differences in the health care sector are even greater. The number of hospital 
admissions per 1000 inhabitants ranges from 100 in the Netherlands to 275 in Aus-
tria, and the number of gp (general practitioner) consultations from 2 per inhabitant 
in Sweden to 22 in Hungary. Spending on health care as a proportion of gdp ranges 
from 6 per cent in Ireland and Poland to almost 13 per cent in the us. But although 
the us leads the ﬁ eld in health care spending, it lags behind in terms of various 
effect indicators such as average life expectancy.
There are also major differences in the police service and judiciary. In Finland, 
these organisations employ around 2500 people per million inhabitants, while in 
Italy the corresponding ﬁ gure exceeds 8000. The number of recorded crimes varies 
from 20,000 or less per million inhabitants in Ireland, Slovakia and Cyprus, to over 
100,000 in Finland and Sweden. Despite low stafﬁ ng levels and high crime rates, 100 
offenders are convicted for every 1000 crimes in Finland, compared with only 10 in 
the Netherlands.
Such observed differences in productivity, quality and effectiveness of public 
services in the various countries logically lead to the question how they come about 
and how countries can learn from each other and thus improve their public sector 
performance. 
An attempt will be made to explain the differences in public sector performance 
between the twenty-nine countries included in the report, in the hope of highlight-
ing opportunities to improve productivity and effectiveness of public services. 
In view of the aim of this report, an attempot is made to answer the following 
research questions:
1 To what extent do countries differ in terms of public performance in the ﬁ elds of 
education, health care, law and order and public administration?
2 To what extent do differences exist between countries in terms of productivity, 
quality and effectiveness in the delivery of these public services?
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3 To what extent are public services taken up by target groups of government policy?
4 To what extent can the differences in public performance be ascribed to national 
institutions?
With these questions in mind, the following policy areas will be addressed in sub-
sequent chapters: education (Chapter 3), health care (Chapter 4), law and order 
(Chapter 5) and the public administration system (Chapter 6). This selection reﬂ ects 
current policy priorities in the Netherlands, which focus particularly on ﬁ ghting 
crime, and improving health care and education. Services produced have been 
grouped into clusters, such as public administration, defence, compulsory social 
insurance, primary education, secondary education, tertiary education, hospital 
care, nursing home care, outpatient care, the police, the judiciary and prisons. The 
choice of clusters depends to a large extent on the availability of comparative data.
Whenever possible, an attempt has been made to move from pure description 
to a more in-depth analysis by consulting available literature and experts, and using 
national data sources. As far as possible, differences in public performance have 
been related to the system for and organisation of the production of public services, 
taking into account policy aims, regulations, institutional characteristics, the 
method of funding, the composition of the population and other relevant external 
factors.
The ﬁ nal Chapter 7 undertakes to synthesise our ﬁ ndings, by: 
− doing a statistical analysis of output and outcome versus resources used for all 
policy areas considered, by analogy with a recent study by the European Central 
Bank (Afonso et al. 2003);
− making an attempt to deﬁ ne a typology of countries based on the organisation of 
their public services. The next question to consider is whether these institutional 
characteristics correlate with public performance.
Countries
System descriptions and the analysis cover twenty-nine countries divided into three 
groups: the ﬁ fteen countries that were members of the European Union at the end of 
2003 (eu-15), the ten eu member states that joined the Union on May 1, 2004 (New 
Entrants) and four Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the 
us). The full list of countries is in Table 1.1. The abbreviations used in all tables and 
ﬁ gures of this report are based on the iso 3166 standard.
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Table 1.1  Countries included in this report
 formerly EU-15  new EU member states  non-EU Anglo-Saxon countries
Belgium (BE) Czech Rep. (CZ) Australia (AU)
Denmark (DK) Estonia (EE) Canada (CA)
Germany (DE) Cyprus (CY) New Zealand (NZ)
Greece (GR) Latvia (LV) United States (US)
Spain (ES) Lithuania (LT)
France (FR) Hungary (HU)
Ireland (IE) Malta (MT)
Italy (IT) Poland (PL)
Luxembourg (LU) Slovenia (SI)
Netherlands (NL) Slovak Rep. (SK)
Austria (AT)
Portugal (PT)
Finland FI)
Sweden (SE)
United Kingdom (UK)
The Anglo-Saxon countries have been included because they are economically highly 
advanced countries with relatively low tax burdens. Most probably, this has implica-
tions for the business climate, but also for the standard of public services. 
Data
It is important to consider developments over time to gain an idea of the stability of 
the data, of emerging trends and possibly converging national policies. In principle, 
the report covers the period 1995-2002. However, it was clear from the outset that 
2002 ﬁ gures would not be available for all subjects addressed in the report. Although 
it can be useful to trace long-term developments, it was decided not to delve into 
the past in all areas. Data are often simply not available, and those that are cannot 
always be readily compared. This applies, for example, to education, where, due to 
differences in deﬁ nition, pre-1995 oecd-ﬁ gures are not comparable with ﬁ gures for 
more recent years.
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Box 1.2 Data required to measure public sector performance
Measuring public sector performance requires that the following data be available:
1 Data on the production of public services, using indicators that give a good idea of 
the output delivered.
2 Data on the productivity of public organisations, whereby production (output) is 
related to the resources used (inputs) – such as staff, equipment, capital – and the 
expenditure involved.
3 Data on the quality and effectiveness of public services, some based on objective 
measurement and others on subjective assessment (opinion polls).
4 Data on the take-up of public services by target groups of government policy.
Issues that arise when measuring public sector performance are spelled out in 
greater detail in Annex 1.1 to this Chapter. Annex 1.2 introduces the participants in 
the project group which prepared the present report. Annex 1.3 speciﬁ es the mem-
bers of the advisory board.
1.3 Outline of the report
Chapter 2 deals with relevant demographic and economic characteristics of the 
countries selected for this report. Next, the chapter reviews the level of government 
spending and the size of the public service sector sector and investigates perform-
ance indicators for macroeconomic policy.
Some important policy areas are examined in separate chapters: education (3), 
health care (4), law and order (5) and public administration (6). Generally speaking, 
these chapters are similarly structured: an introduction outlines the importance of 
the sector, and is followed by sections describing system characteristics, resources 
used, consumption and production of services, their quality and the productivity 
and effectiveness of services provided. However, some of the chapters have a slightly 
different structure.
Chapter 7 summarises the report’s ﬁ ndings, makes an attempt at synthesising 
these ﬁ ndings, and reﬂ ects on the study.
Finally, the report contains ﬁ ve technical annexes, of which the last three are only 
available on the internet (www.scp.nl)3. 
3 Annex A describes in a broad sense the available data. Annex B addresses methodological 
questions (the use of purchasing power parities, the computation of country averages and 
aggregation techniques for indicators). Annex C gives details on the sources of individual 
tables and indicates which missing numbers have been estimated by what method. Annex D 
summarizes national sources consulted for compiling data on the resources used by the 
administration of justice. Annex E gives for every individual ﬁ gure the numerical values of 
the country scores behind histograms, line diagrams and scatterplots. 
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Annex 1.1: Measuring public sector performance
Any production process involves the resources deployed (=input), the process itself 
(=throughput), the product (=output) and effect (= ﬁ nal outcome) (Haselbekke et al. 
1990).
The relationship between resources deployed and output delivered provides an 
insight into productivity, and the relationship between the output delivered and the 
objectives achieved reﬂ ects the effectiveness of the production process (see Figure 1.2).
resources
deployed
objectives
achieved
output
delivred
productivity effectiveness
Figure 1.2 Input and output of public services
In the private sector, the production volume can be derived from the market value of 
the goods in question. Time series can be obtained by adjusting the result using a 
relevant price index to get value indicators.
Since services produced by the public sector are not generally traded in markets, 
their market value is usually unknown. In most cases, therefore, physical production 
indicators are used. This term refers to various types of indicator that can be used as a 
direct or indirect measure of production. They include:
1 performance indicators, which refer to the ﬁ nal product;
2 consumption indicators, which refer to the consumers of the services;
3 process indicators, which refer to the activities performed or interim products 
produced.
Performance indicators refer to the ﬁ nal product of service providers. As such, they are 
best suited for assessing the efﬁ ciency of services. Examples include the number of 
patients treated successfully, the number of pupils or students ﬁ nishing their studies 
successfully in education and the number of concert performances.
Consumption indicators refer not so much to production in itself, as to the number 
of people consuming the products. They are therefore suitable for analysing and 
forecasting the demand for services. Examples include the number of hospital 
patients, the pupil numbers in schools and audience numbers at concerts. In many 
cases, consumption indicators can be used to reasonable or good effect as measures 
of production. If the number of hospital admissions or school pupils is chosen as the 
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measure of production, it is assumed that the likelihood of recovery and examina-
tion pass rate are constant.
Process indicators can refer to tasks performed, and thus are a measure of the efforts 
of the staff concerned. Examples include the number of operations performed in 
hospitals, or the number of lessons taught in schools. In some cases, process indicators 
can be used as an indicator of production. In the case of home care, for example, pro-
duction can be measured in terms of number of staff contact hours. This assumes 
that staff perform a constant amount of work per contact hour.
These indicators refer to the delivery of private goods and services to end users. It 
is often impossible to create an adequate performance indicator for purely public 
goods, which cannot be related to individual consumers. For example, it is not easy 
to identify the performance delivered by services like the public administration and 
defence. However, the resources deployed (staff, money) can be compared with total 
domestic production. This indicates what proportion of its production capacity a 
country sacriﬁ ces to maintain the services in question.
Total productivity refers to the relationship between the volume of production and the 
volume of resources deployed. Labour productivity concerns the relationship between 
production and the number of staff deployed. Actual cost per unit product is also impor-
tant. This number is obtained by adjusting the total costs using a generic price index, 
and dividing the result by the production volume. The price index for household con-
sumption, gdp or national spending can be used. This key ﬁ gure shows the trend in 
the cost price of public services relative to a standard package of goods and services.
Heterogeneity often hampers measurement of production, when certain producers 
produce several products or types of product. In health care, for instance, we can 
look either at a patient’s required level of care or diagnosis category, in the police 
service we can look at types of crime, or in education at target groups.
In such cases it is paramount to ﬁ nd a single production measure to allow com-
parison with the resources used. This presents no problem in the private sector, 
because individual products can be weighted according to their value, the market 
price. This is not possible in most public services and individual production categories 
have to be weighted and aggregated on the basis of the resources used (preferably inte-
grated costs, or staff numbers in the absence of anything better) per unit product. In 
theory, therefore, it is perfectly possible to make adjustments for the heterogeneity 
of products. But this requires detailed production data to be available, and the analyst 
should be able to make sensible assumptions about the factors used for weighting.
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One of the biggest problems associated with measuring the performance of public 
service providers lies in the fact that the quality of the products tends to be inad-
equately reﬂ ected in product indicators based on quantitative measurements.
Quality is a vague and complex concept that refers to the extent to which the charac-
teristics of a product meet given requirements. It is useful to distinguish between:
1 objective and subjective measures of quality, and
2 system, process and product quality.
Objective measures of the quality of services might include the percentage of 
trains that run on time, the average call-out time for the ﬁ re service, the percentage 
of lessons cancelled in schools, the percentage of incorrect administrative deci-
sions, the percentage of complaints upheld etc. However, many relevant aspects of 
quality cannot be measured, such as medical staff’s manner towards patients and 
the correct following of procedures. Subjective quality assessments of products or 
the production process by users, supervisors (inspectors) or staff can provide extra 
information.
Besides the quality of the product itself, the quality of the production process 
can also be relevant. One can indirectly test the quality of products by establishing 
whether the production process meets certain requirements (adequately trained 
staff, adherence to procedures, measures to assure quality testing). Secondly, certain 
aspects of the production process not directly related to the end product might be 
very important to the user. Clean toilets and good ﬁ re safety in schools, though 
not part of the actual education product (the acquisition of knowledge and skills), 
are nevertheless important conditions. System quality refers to the convergence of 
demand and supply. Imbalance of demand and supply can create waiting lists or 
inefﬁ ciency.
If quality is not adequately reﬂ ected in the measure of production, developments 
such as smaller class sizes in education and more staff in nursing homes can lead to 
a fall in observed productivity. Similarly, better educated and therefore more expensive 
teachers, or fewer residents per room in nursing homes can result in an increase 
in the cost price. On the other hand, the effects of such intended boosts to quality 
are often difﬁ cult to measure. Even when adequate measurement is possible (e.g. 
the average delay to train services or waiting lists for medical treatment), it often 
proves impossible to incorporate the outcomes satisfactorily in a workable product 
indicator. One therefore often has to make do with additional quality indicators in 
combination with production ﬁ gures corrected for quality.
The last Social and Cultural Report (scp 2002b) reviewed the concept of quality in 
some detail and looked at empirical data on the quality of public services. The key 
element of the exercise was to focus on answers from the public (subjective measure-
ment) obtained through public opinion polls, which included questions concerning 
education, health care, law and order and the public administration. Another recent 
source of information is the Local Services Benchmark produced by the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (2002). There are also a relatively large number of international 
comparative studies of respondents’ opinions concerning public services, including 
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the Eurobarometer, the European Values Study, the World Values Study, the European 
Social Survey and the World Competitiveness Yearbook.
It is often much more difﬁ cult to relate production processes directly to effects (outcomes) 
than to output. It is therefore useful to distinguish between objectives that can be 
measured objectively via the ﬁ nal product, and deeper, underlying social objectives. 
Direct objectives of education, for example, include achieving as many ﬁ nal exami-
nation passes as possible, the objectives of curative care might include successful 
completion of treatment, and those of the police service, solving crime. The better 
a product indicator reﬂ ects a direct goal of the production process, the more appli-
cable it will generally be. In hospitals, for example, analyses often lose their focus 
because admissions, patient days and so on are often used as indicators rather than 
the number of successful treatments. The same applies to analyses of education, 
where pupil numbers are often used as product indicators instead of their school 
results. Examples of deeper, underlying aims include producing well-informed 
citizens and ensuring there is a well-educated supply of labour (education), helping 
people live a long and healthy life (health care) and ﬁ ghting crime (police). This type 
of objective, which concerns the indirect effects of services, is also examined exten-
sively in this report.
The term effect indicator generally refers to key ﬁ gures that describe the extent to 
which these underlying objectives are achieved. The degree to which this is the case, 
the effectiveness, is often determined not only by the production process, but also by 
external factors. The more neutral term goal achievement indicator is therefore often 
more appropriate in this context (see, for example, Ministry of Finance 1994).
It is also useful to relate production to the target group. For instance, the number 
of diplomas awarded in tertiary education can be related to the age at which such 
qualiﬁ cations are normally obtained. Such relationships can be regarded as the reach 
of a particular type of public service.
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Annex 1.2 Participants in the project
The Social and Cultural Planning Ofﬁ ce (scp) of the Netherlands has a long tradi-
tion in studying trends in the consumption, costs and productivity of public services 
in the Netherlands. scp work covers services in the ﬁ eld of public administration, 
education, health care, the police and the judiciary, social security, culture/recrea-
tion/sport and public transport. From the outset, the idea has been to conduct both 
wide-ranging and in-depth analyses. Recent publications covering a broad spectrum 
of services include the Memorandum Quartaire Sector 2002-2006 (‘Memorandum on the 
Quaternary Sector 2002-2006’; scp 2002a) and De vierde sector (‘The Fourth Sector’; 
Kuhry and Van der Torre 2002). Both reports contain a chapter with international 
comparisons of public services in the 15 eu-member states. The report Maten voor 
Gemeenten 2004 (‘Measures for Municipalities 2004’, Kuhry and Veldheer 2004) focuses 
on the performance of local authorities. In-depth studies have mainly focused on 
analysing productivity and developing models for forecasting demand for public 
services.4
The scp has also done some work on international comparisons. The theme of 
the Social and Cultural Report 2000 (scp 2000) was the Netherlands’ position in relation 
to the other eu member states, in terms of the performance in areas like education, 
health care, the judiciary and the criminal justice system, social security and public 
administration. 
On worlds of welfare (Wildeboer Schut et al. 2001) looks at the organisation and 
operation of the socio-economic system in eleven oecd-countries. The report 
attempts to develop a typology of welfare states on the basis of their institutional 
characteristics, identifying three empirical types of welfare state: liberal, social-
democratic and corporatist. It then tests whether these three different types have 
produced different outcomes in terms of the traditional aims of the welfare state: to 
provide protection from loss of income, combat poverty and limit social inequality.
Recently, the scp published Social Europe in collaboration with cpb Netherlands 
Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (cpb/scp 2003). The report examines social 
policy in the 15 eu member states, addressing subjects like public opinion, labour 
market participation, poverty, labour market policy and the organisation of the 
social security system. The authors of Social Europe observe that Western European 
welfare states are under pressure from a number of trends: ageing populations, 
immigration, the rapid penetration of information and communications technology, 
4 Examples include the scp reports Doelmatig Dienstverlenen (‘Efﬁ cient Service Provision’, 
Goudriaan et al. 1989), Trends in onderwijsdeelname (‘Trends in educational participation’, 
Kuhry 1998), Public Provision and Performance (Blank et al. 2000), Een model voor de stra-
frechtelijke keten (‘A Model for the Criminal Justice System’; Van der Torre and Van Tulder 
2001), De vraag naar kinderopvang (‘Demand for Childcare’; scp/seo 2001) and various 
publications on the demand for health care (see, for example, Woittiez et al. 2003).
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individualisation and growing policy competition. Given the growing diversity 
within the eu, not least because of the accession of ten new members, it is recom-
mended that open co-ordination be given preference over harmonised social policy.
A second partner involved in the current research project is the Dutch Ministry of the 
Interior and Kingdom Relations (bzk). A number of years ago, bzk commissioned 
two research institutes to produce an international comparative study: Arbeidsvolume 
publieke sector in internationaal perspectief (‘Employment in the Public Sector in Interna-
tional Perspective’ ioo/iva 1998). The key question addressed in the study was how 
staff numbers in the Dutch public sector compared with those in Belgium, Germany, 
Denmark and Sweden. bzk hopes that the outcomes of the present study can be 
used to improve quality and performance of the public sector, here and in other eu 
member states.
A number of experts from other organisations have been involved in the study. They 
include researchers from the Dutch Ministry of Justice, who have a longstanding record 
of producing international comparisons of crime statistics and the performance of 
criminal justice systems (see, for example, Ministry of Justice 2000, wodc 2003 and 
Smit 2003). Researchers from the Public Management Institute (Katholieke Univer-
siteit Leuven, Belgium) were also involved. The Institute has a long history of per-
forming management analyses of public sector organisations, and specialises in the 
study of performance indicators and public sector reform. Its research often has an 
international dimension (see, for example, Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004).
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Annex 1.3 Members of advisory committee
Prof. Dr. Mr. C.A. de Kam  (Economics Department, Groningen University, chair)
Drs. F. J. M. Van Dongen  (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations)
Dr. H. de Groot  (International Board of Auditors for nato)
Dr. F. Bos  (Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis)
Dr. S.E.P. Raes  (Ministry of Economic Affairs)
Drs. M.R. Leijten  (Cabinet Ofﬁ ce)
Drs. B. Akkerboom  (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations)
H. S. K. Boerboom  (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations)
Drs. P.J.H.M. van Montfort  (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations)
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2 Demography and the economy
Bob Kuhry, Ab van der Torre and Rolph Heesakker
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents some key demographic and macroeconomic data for the 
29 countries covered by the report. Macroeconomic data includes several indicators 
to measure economic performance and the size of the public sector. The chapter has 
three sections:
– Section 2.2 (key data) reviews fundamentals, such as population size (by age groups) 
and Gross Domestic Product (gdp). These are important to standardise other 
data, such as the number of doctors per capita, or health care spending as a per-
centage of gdp. 
– Section 2.3 (public sector) examines total public expenditure and employment in 
the public sector. To sharpen the focus of the analysis, it is useful to distinguish 
between the concepts of public administration, government, the public sector in a 
legal or ﬁ nancial sense and the public service sector (public sector in a functional 
sense, see Box 1.1). The concept of the public service sector is highly relevant, 
since the measurement of resources spent on health care, education and public 
safety may produce radically different outcomes when private expenditure and 
public outlays are lumped together. 
– Section 2.4 (macro-economic performance) presents indicators for economic 
growth, unemployment, inﬂ ation, budget deﬁ cits and the poverty rate. Most of 
these indicators relate to criteria included in the European Stability and Growth 
Pact and the Lisbon Agenda. 
2.2 Key data
This Section summarises key demographic and economic data. They are examined 
for two reasons:
– Firstly, because they are used in later chapters of the report to standardise per-
formance and expenditure indicators, since the raw data can be misleading, given 
the very different size and income level between countries. Standardised data like 
expenditure per capita or as a proportion of gdp are much more revealing.
– Secondly, these data provide a broad outline of the socio-economic system of coun-
tries and can therefore serve to explain differences in performance of or spending 
levels for particular services. For instance, a relatively high level of health care 
spending can be a result of a high proportion of elderly people in the population. It 
may also be assumed that the number of years young people spend in education will 
be related to the level of prosperity or unemployment in a given country.
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Population
Demography has major implications for a country’s economic and social development. 
Most relevant are population size, the current age-proﬁ le of the population and 
long-term demographic trends. Population size determines variables such as per 
capita expenditure, doctors per head of population, and so on. The age proﬁ le of the 
population is important, among other things, for the economic growth potential of 
a country: youngsters under the age of 15 and elderly people over the age of 64 do not 
generally participate in the production of goods and services. It is therefore useful 
to divide the population into three age groups: young people (0-14), the elderly (65+) 
and the potential labour force (15-64).1 Certain public spending programmes are 
also tied to age: young people are the main target group of education, the elderly 
take up pension payments and make disproportionate use of health care facilities. 
Long-term demographic trends determine the growth of the overall population and 
the share of each of the three age groups distinguished above. Changes in the size 
of total population and the share of major age groups are the result of the birth rate 
(fertility), mortality (life expectancy) and international migration.
Countries covered in the report vary markedly in terms of total population size. 
By far the largest is the United States (us), with a population of around 300 million 
in 2003. Eight of the countries included in the analysis have a population of between 
20 and 80 million (see Figure 2.1): Australia, Canada, Poland, Spain, Italy, France, 
the United Kingdom (uk) and Germany. There are eighteen countries with a popula-
tion of 10 million or less. Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg actually have fewer than 
a million inhabitants. With its population of 16 million, the Netherlands is always 
keen to stress that it is the ‘biggest of the small countries’. The eu-15 have a total 
population of 375 million, and the new member states count 75 million inhabitants, 
more than half of whom (39 million) live in Poland.
1  Drawing the line at 15 might seem a little dated, given the fact that nowadays the majority 
of young people are in full-time education until the age of 18. However, because the 
traditional age 15 limit is used in setting policy goals under the Lisbon Agenda, we have 
stuck to it in this report.
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Figure 2.1 Total population, 2003 (million inhabitants)
Source: US Bureau of Census
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Figure 2.2 Average annual growth rate of population, 1995-2003
Source: US Bureau of Census (SCP revision)
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Figure 2.2 looks at trends in population size over the period 1995-2003. The non-eu 
Anglo-Saxon countries, and eu member states Ireland and Luxembourg, saw their 
population rise by around 1% a year. Growth in the Netherlands, Cyprus and Malta 
was around 0.5%. In most of these countries, high net immigration is the main 
explanatory factor. The other eu countries and new member states Slovenia and 
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Slovakia post a population growth rate between 0.1% and 0.5%. The majority of 
these countries have an ageing population as a result of the declining birth rate 
during the past few decades, coupled with a gradual rise in life expectancy. Most of 
the former Eastern bloc countries have a declining (Hungary, the Czech Republic 
and the Baltic States) or more or less stable (Poland) population. Estonia and Lithua-
nia have actually seen their populations fall by more than 0.5%. A similar trend is 
occurring in the Russian Federation. The contracting of the population in these 
countries can be attributed mainly to falling birth rates, prompted by the disappear-
ance of childcare services and growing ﬁ nancial uncertainty as a result of rising 
unemployment and a high divorce rate (De Jong and Broekman 1999). Life expect-
ancy is also poor (see also Section 4.7). This applies particularly to men, whose life 
expectancy in these countries is an average ten years lower than it is for women. 
The cause lies mainly in lifestyle (unhealthy diet, smoking, alcohol consumption), 
and also in violence, accidents and suicide (Van Hoorn and Broekman 1999). In this 
respect, the Baltic states are faring worse than the other new accession States.
Figure 2.3 shows the percentage of young and elderly people (‘dependency ratios’) 
in each country.
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Population of the countries situated in the top left panel of Figure 2.3 have aged most 
(i.e. have less youngsters than elderly people): Italy, Greece, Spain and Germany. The 
other extreme (more youngsters than elderly people) lies in the bottom right panel: 
the non-eu Anglo-Saxon countries, Ireland and Cyprus.
The combined dependency ratios of the young and the elderly determines demo-
graphic pressure, given the fact that people in these age groups do not generally partici-
pate in the labour market. The complementary group – the 15- to 64-year-olds – are 
known as the potential labour force. A line corresponding to a demographic pressure 
of 33% has been drawn in the ﬁ gure. A country’s position perpendicular to this main 
axis reﬂ ects its relative demographic pressure. In a number of new member states 
and – to a lesser degree – in the Netherlands, the demographic pressure is relatively 
weak, while in countries like Belgium, Sweden, France, the United Kingdom and 
Denmark it is relatively strong.
Forecasts suggest that the ‘dejuvenation’ of the populations of the Baltic and 
Central European states will continue for several decades, while ageing will continue 
throughout Europe well into the 21st century. The total population will continue 
to grow for a few decades in Northern and Western Europe, but will in fact decline 
slightly in Central Europe, and fairly heavily in the Baltic states (Van Hoorn, 
Van der Gaag and Huisman 1999).
Economy
Gross Domestic Product (gdp) measures the size of the economy. It is a fairly rough 
measure since, in the absence of market prices, production in the public sector is 
valued at the costs of the resource inputs, and household production is not included. 
To allow international comparison, gdp in national currencies has to be converted 
to a standard unit. To this end, the us dollar is often used, but this report expresses 
gdp in euros.
As is customary in international comparisons, national currencies are not con-
verted using exchange rates, but ‘purchasing power parities’ (ppp). To determine 
ppp, international bodies such as Eurostat, the oecd and the World Bank regularly 
establish what a certain representative basket of products costs in different coun-
tries.2 Amounts in national currencies are then converted to euros, using the ratio 
of the cost of the basket in euros in the Netherlands to the cost of the same basket 
in the local currency. ppp allow calculating the purchasing power sacriﬁ ced for the 
goods and services included in the particular ‘basket’ used. For comparisons over 
time, the amounts taken into account must also be corrected for inﬂ ation.3
2  A well-known but highly simplistic variation on this is based on the price of a Big Mac 
in the national currencies of the countries concerned.
3 This is determined by inﬂ ation in the country whose currency has been chosen as the 
standard – the Netherlands in this case – because the difference between the inﬂ ation 
rate in the standard country and the other countries has already been accounted for in 
purchasing power parity.
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Annex B.1 discusses some of the ﬁ ner details of converting currencies using pur-
chasing power parities, and explains why the amounts are expressed not in nominal 
euros but in Dutch euros.
In this report, gdp is often used to standardise amounts spent (e.g. education 
spending or health care spending as a proportion of gdp). In that case, it is not 
necessary to convert national currencies to Dutch euros. However, problems associ-
ated with international comparisons of national currency amounts crop up, once one 
wants to calculate necessary to country averages.
gdp is also often standardised, relative to the size of the population. gdp per capita 
gives an impression of a country’s level of prosperity (Figure 2.4). To compare the 
prosperity of nations, conversion of gdp per capita in a single currency via purchas-
ing power parities is essential.
Luxembourg is the most prosperous of the 29 countries, with gdp per capita at 
almost 60,000 euros. The eu-15 average is 25,000 euros per head. The us and Ireland 
stand well above that, at 35,000 and 33,000 euros respectively. At 27,000 euros, the 
Netherlands is in the upper reaches of the middle section. A number of Southern 
European countries (Greece and Portugal) and all new member states come in with 
a relatively low score (below 20,000 euros). Poland and the Baltic states have the 
lowest gdp per capita, at around 10,000 euros.
The eu-15 average is just over 70% of gdp per capita in the us. Around half of the 
30%-gap can be explained by the higher labour participation rate and number of 
hours worked per employee in the us: in terms of gdp per hour worked – a measure 
of labour productivity – France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg are actu-
ally ahead of the us (cpb/scp 2003).
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Figure 2.4 GDP per capita, 2002 (1000 NL€, purchasing power parities)
Source: Eurostat, OECD (New Zealand), World Bank (PPP) SCP revision
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gdp has its disadvantages as a measure of prosperity. Firstly, it might be that a 
proportion of value added within national borders is remitted to third countries 
in the form of company proﬁ ts. Secondly, some of the value added is consumed by 
the government. Thirdly, the value of household production is not included in gdp. 
Finally, the welfare aspect of leisure time is disregarded. Figure 2.5 therefore shows 
an alternative measure of prosperity: standardised disposable income per house-
hold, which to some extent compensates for these shortcomings. Standardisation is 
needed because of the economies of scale at work in households (two single people 
living alone need more money than a cohabiting couple, on housing for example) 
and because children are not as expensive to maintain as adults.4
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Figure 2.5 Mean equivalised net income, 2000 (1000 NL€)
Source: Eurostat, Luxembourg Income Study (New member states, non-EU countries) SCP revision
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The pattern in Figure 2.5 is fairly consistent with that in Figure 2.4, in that the us, 
Canada and Luxembourg have a high income and the new eu member states and a 
number of Southern European countries record low income levels. However, stand-
ardised disposable household income is also relatively low in Sweden and Finland 
(as a result of the high proportion accounted for by the public sector) and in Ireland 
(because of the high proportion of company proﬁ ts not directly showing up in family 
budgets5).
4  Eurostat’s standardisation formula has been used here: Ih* = Ih / (0,5 + 0,5 v + 0,3 k), 
where Ih is household income, Ih* is standardised household income, v is the number 
of adults and k is the number of children.
5  Despite all the literature on the ‘Irish miracle’, we have been unable to ﬁ nd any further 
analysis of this question. These could be resources used for reinvestment in the com-
pany or dividends for foreign investors.
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2.3 Public sector
This section focuses on total public spending and the use of resources by the entire 
public sector. The separate subsectors are discussed in the subsequent chapters. 
The confrontation between total resources spent and total performance delivered is 
postponed to the ﬁ nal chapter. 
Public expenditure
The public spending ratio (Figure 2.6) is a measure of the burden placed upon the 
economy by the public sector. It ranges from 57% in Sweden to 35% in Ireland. With 
a score of 47%, the Netherlands was near the eu-15 average. Values above 50% are 
found for Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, France, Austria and Slovakia. Ireland, the Czech 
Republic, Lithuania, Australia and the us have public spending ratios below 40%.
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Figure 2.6  Public expenditure, 2002 (percentage of GDP)
Source: Eurostat, OECD (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and non-EU) SCP revision
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In most countries, the public spending ratio fell between 1995 and 2001 (Figure 2.7). 
The trend in the Netherlands is reasonably consistent with the average for the eu-
15 and the new member states. Since 2000 the share of public spending in gdp has 
slightly increased again in the Netherlands, as a consequence of ‘investments’ in 
education, health care and public safety.
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Figure 2.7 Public expenditure, 1995-2003 (percentage of GDP)
Source: OECD, Eurostat (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), World Bank (Czech Republic, Malta, Poland) SCP revision
Figure 2.8 divides public expenditures into ﬁ ve categories:
− Collective consumption, which includes purely collective services provided by the 
government (public administration, defence, police and infrastructure)
− Individual consumption, which includes individual services to members of the 
public (including education and health care)
− Individual transfers in the form of social security beneﬁ ts and social assistance
− Interest paid on the national debt
− A heterogeneous category of ‘other’ expenditures.
Data shown are for the last year for which data are available (2002 in some countries, 
2001 in others).
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Figure 2.8 Public expenditure, 2002 (percentage of gdp)
Source: Eurostat, OECD(Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and non-EU) SCP revision
Along with the Scandinavian countries, Belgium, France and Portugal, the Netherlands 
spends ample resources (24% of gdp) on collective and individual consumption. 
Sweden tops the list with 28% of gdp, while Greece brings up the rear with 16%. The 
Netherlands spends more on collective consumption (11% of gdp) than any other of 
the 29 countries covered in this report.
By contrast, the Netherlands, Ireland and the non-eu Anglo-Saxon countries 
record the lowest social security spending. In 2002, the Netherlands transferred 12% 
of its gdp to beneﬁ t recipients, even somewhat less than the corresponding ﬁ gure 
for the us. In contrast, in Germany and France social security programmes absorbed 
19% and 18% of gdp, respectively. The relatively low share of social security expen-
ditures in the Netherlands can be explained to some extent by the relatively small 
number of senior citizens. Outlays on the state old age pension programme (6% 
of gdp) are signiﬁ cantly below the eu-15 average of 10%. On the other hand, the 
Netherlands has a relatively large number of people claiming disability beneﬁ ts with 
costs of the programmes concerned at 2.7% of gdp, one-and-a-half time the eu-15 
average of 1.8%. Another signiﬁ cant explanation is the recent privatisation of sick-
ness beneﬁ ts, the costs of which run at around 1% of gdp. The picture of relatively 
low social security expenditure in the Netherlands would be even more pronounced 
after correcting for the fact that, unlike many other countries, the Netherlands taxes 
the social security beneﬁ ts in full (see Einerhand et al. 1995; Adema 2001). However, 
it is important to note that expenditure on rent subsidies, subsidised jobs and the 
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health care sector have not been taken into account. Applying a broader category 
‘social expenditure’ (see for example cpb/scp 2003), the Netherlands’ position moves 
towards the eu-15 average.
In terms of interest paid on public debt, Belgium, Greece, Italy and Canada top 
the table, at around 6% of gdp. At 3% of gdp, the Netherlands is close to a middle 
position. Interest payments are relatively low (around 2% of gdp or less) in Ireland, 
the United Kingdom, Australia, Finland and the Czech Republic. This is a negligible 
item in Luxembourg’s budget. Of course spending on interest depends on the size of 
the national debt, which in most of the ﬁ rst group of countries mentioned is 100% of 
gdp or more. Again the Netherlands falls somewhere in the middle, with national 
debt running at 55% of gdp.
The decline in the public expenditure ratio that occurred in most countries 
between 1995 and 2002 is partly explained by lower interest payments. Most countries 
saw their debt ratio drop, combined with a sharp fall in interest rates. In the case of 
the Netherlands, transfer payments also fell sharply, from 18% of gdp in 1990, to 15% 
in 1995 and 11.5% presently, partly as a consequence of much lower unemployment.
Consumptive government expenditure as a proportion of gdp can be interpreted 
as a measure of operating costs of the public sector. In most countries, this ratio 
remained more or less stable between 1995 and 2002. For certain purposes, however, 
it is not enough simply to compare levels of government expenditure. If, for example, 
one wants to relate expenditure to performance or to the effects of services like 
education and health care, it is necessary to take account of all resources deployed, 
including private funding. The same applies to analyses of demand or need for 
certain services. It may be assumed that the demand for (or use of) services across 
countries is fairly stable (given gdp per capita), but countries will differ in the mix of 
public and private ﬁ nancing of those services, reﬂ ecting voter preferences and the prevail-
ing ideology. It is therefore useful to add private spending to consumptive govern-
ment expenditure on services such as health and education. The result is shown 
in Figure 2.9: private expenditure on education and health care has been lumped 
together with all public consumption spending and is then expressed as a percent-
age of gdp.6 
6  A similar correction is also possible for transfer payments. For instance, one could add 
private spending on sickness beneﬁ t insurance to public expenditure. This would make 
spending on transfers in the Netherlands more comparable over time and with other 
countries (see also the oecd’s analyses on total (public plus private) social security 
expenditure, Society at a Glance 2002, 56-57). However, such a correction is not 
relevant in the context of this report.
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Figure 2.9 Total public expenditure plus private expenditure health and education, 2000 
 (percentage of GDP)
Source: Eurostat, OECD (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and non-EU) SCP revision
In the non-eu Anglo-Saxon countries, in particular, with a relatively low level of 
government expenditure, the correction for private expenditure has signiﬁ cant 
impacts. The most striking example is the us, where health care expenditure is 
not only relatively high (12.7%), but of which 55% is in fact paid for from private 
resources.
Public service sector
The Social and Cultural Planning Ofﬁ ce has for many years used the Dutch term ‘quar-
taire sector’ (in this report not translated as ‘quaternary sector’, but as ‘public service 
sector’). This sector is deﬁ nes as the collection of services related to the traditional 
functions of government: public administration, defence, infrastructure, education, 
health care, social services etc. This deﬁ nition is in line with the cofog classiﬁ ca-
tion. It takes into account both public producers and private producers, whether 
paid from the public purse or not. Roughly speaking, the public service sector cor-
responds to nace economic activity classes 75 to 92.7 The available international 
data do not allow to present the total costs of the public service sector thus deﬁ ned. 
Instead, Figure 2.10 shows the value added in the public service sector, estimated on 
the basis of the costs incurred (wage costs plus capital costs). Material expenditure 
7  This is the operational deﬁ nition used in this paper, given the lack of detailed data on 
all countries involved. In Dutch applications, branches such as distribution of pharma-
ceuticals, public transport and sheltered employment are also included.
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– goods and services used as input by public service sector producers but produced 
by other sectors – is not taken into account.8
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Figure 2.10 Value added in public service sector, 2001 (percentage of total value added)
Source: OECD, Eurostat (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovenia) SCP revision
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Figure 2.6 illustrates that public spending as a proportion of gdp ranges from around 
35% in Ireland and the us to 57% in Sweden (factor 1.6). After a simple correction for 
private expenditure on education and health care (Figure 2.9), the spread between 
spending ratios is somewhat smaller, at least in relative terms: us 41% to Sweden 
62% (factor 1.5). Concentrating on consumptive public spending (Figure 2.8) the dif-
ference between Sweden and the us is even more pronounced: 16% as opposed to 
28% (factor 1.8). However, as Figure 2.10 makes clear, the value added in the public 
service sector differs very little: 19.5% in the us, against 20.5% in Sweden (factor 
1.05). This low public spending on goods and services by the us government, that 
eu countries tend to ﬁ nance largely from tax revenues, are compensated by much 
higher private spending. Value added in the public service sector shows signiﬁ cant 
variation between countries. Denmark is at the top of the list with 24% of gdp, fol-
lowed by Belgium 
8  scp publications on this subject (see for example Kuhry and Van der Torre 2002; Kuhry 
and Veldheer 2004) compare the integrated costs of public service services with produc-
tion volume as measured on the basis of physical product indicators (pupil numbers, 
patient numbers, number of crimes solved etc.), but this approach cannot be applied 
systematically here as we do not have sufﬁ cient data on the other countries.
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and France. The Netherlands, along with Germany, Sweden and Portugal are highly 
placed in the mid-section, while Luxembourg, Latvia and Poland post low scores 
(around 15% of gdp).
Figure 2.11 presents a similar picture for employment in the public service sector. 
The share of this sector in total employment is generally higher than its share in gdp 
(aggregate value added). There are two reasons for this: (1) Public services tend to be 
relatively labour-intensive, and (2) in the public service sector there is little or no 
ofﬁ cial operating surplus, since many producers do not try to make a proﬁ t. Employ-
ment in the public service sector ranges from 18% in Poland to 35% in Denmark. The 
Netherlands (27%) has a high medium score. The high score for the us is very striking 
(32%).
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Figure 2.11 Employment in public service sector, 2001 (percentage of total employment)
Source: OECD, ILO (new member states, excluding Hungary and Poland) SCP revision
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In the National Accounts, the activity class “public administration and defence” has 
a rather broad deﬁ nition. For the analyses in Chapter 6, it is useful to deﬁ ne the 
term ‘public administration’ more precisely. With this aim, Figure 2.12 classiﬁ es 
employment in the ‘public administration and defence’ sector in greater detail, 
distinguishing between public administration in the strict sense, defence and the 
police/judiciary. Available data were insufﬁ cient to show employment ﬁ gures for 
individual services like tax collection and the administration of social security 
schemes separately.
Employment in the public administration and defence sector, expressed as a 
percentage of total employment, ranges from 11% in Belgium to 3% in New Zealand. 
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France, Portugal and the us also score fairly high (8% or more). At 6%, the Nether-
lands are positioned somewhere in the middle. Ireland and Poland bring up the rear, 
with some 4%.
Employment in the public administration in the strict sense also varies strongly: 
from 8.5% in Belgium to 1.5% in New Zealand. Again, the us (6%) is near the top of 
the table, while the Netherlands (4.5%) takes a middle position.
Greece (3%) and Cyprus (5%) in particular devote signiﬁ cant resources to national 
defence – due in part, to the tensions with neighbouring Turkey. In terms of personnel, 
employment in the armed forces of the us (0.8%) is not exceptionally high.9 Employ-
ment in the police service and the judiciary is examined at greater length in Chapter 5.
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Figure 2.12 Public administration and defence as percentage of total employment, 2000
Source: OECD, ILO, NATO (European Sourcebook, US Sourcebook, AIV) SCP revision
2.4 Macro-economic performance
This section looks at a number of macro-economic indicators: economic growth, 
income inequality, the poverty rate, unemployment, labour market participation, 
inﬂ ation and the budget deﬁ cit. These indicators indirectly reﬂ ect the macro-eco-
nomic performance of governments. The literature distinguishes three economic 
functions of government: allocation, stabilisation and distribution (Musgrave and 
Musgrave, 1984). 
9  This is no longer the case, however, if we also look at expenditure. Military expenditure 
as a percentage of gdp for the us is far above average with 3,1 percent.
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Speciﬁ c objectives for economic policies have been set out in key European Union 
documents: the Stability and Growth Pact (ec 1997) and the Lisbon Agenda (ec 2000). 
The Stability and Growth Pact, for example, speciﬁ es a target of 2% or less for inﬂ a-
tion, and for the budget deﬁ cit which should not exceed 3% of gdp. The Lisbon Agenda 
reﬂ ects the European Union’s desire to become the most dynamic and competitive 
economy in the world. Besides targets associated with establishing a knowledge-based 
economy, the Agenda also identiﬁ es a number of socio-economic goals. The target 
labour market participation rate is 70% or more of the potential labour force. The 
Lisbon Agenda also stresses the desirability of reducing unemployment from on 
average 10% to 4%, and reduce the number of poor households from 18% to no more 
than 10% of all households. Most of these goals are in the domain of the government’s 
stabilisation function, whereas the poverty target is explicitly associated with its 
distribution function. 
Performance of national governments in terms of allocation is evaluated in the 
chapters on education (3), health care (4), the police/judiciary (5) and public admin-
istration (6).10
Stability and growth
Figure 2.13 shows real growth of Gross Domestic Product, that is nominal growth 
corrected for inﬂ ation.
The eu has set out no speciﬁ c targets for economic growth. This indicator is 
strongly inﬂ uenced by exogenous factors such as the state of the global economy.
The performance indicators reviewed in this section include economic growth, 
but not gdp per capita. This choice is based on the fact that the absolute prosperity 
of a country is mainly determined by events in the past, and not by recent govern-
ment policy. Other measures such as unemployment, inﬂ ation and public the sector 
deﬁ cit ﬂ uctuate much more rapidly and are inﬂ uenced fairly immediately by recent 
policy action and developments.
Average economic growth in the eu-15 from 1995 to 2003 was around 2%. It was 
signiﬁ cantly higher (4% or more) in Ireland, Luxembourg, the Baltic states and 
Hungary. A number of Southern European countries (Greece, Spain and Portugal), 
Finland and most of the other new member states score relatively high (over 2%). 
Like the Netherlands, most Anglo-Saxon countries have a fairly average score. 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy and the Czech Republic saw slow growth, 
and New Zealand’s economy grew by only 1% over this period.
10  More in general, the allocation function of government deals with the provision of 
collective or semi-collective goods and services such as infrastructure and public safety, 
promoting consumption of goods and services with positive externalities (education 
and health care) and curbing consumption of goods and services with negative exter-
nalities (environmental pollution).
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Figure 2.13 Average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita, 1995-2003
Source: OECD, Eurostat (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), World Bank (Czech Republic, Malta, Poland, price indices) SCP revision
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Comparing Figures 2.4 and 2.13, it is clear that in Europe gdp per capita has con-
verged to a certain level. Countries with a relatively low gdp per capita have gener-
ally witnessed relatively strong economic growth. This applies both to a number of 
Southern European countries and to many of the new member states as well. In the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the recent expansion follows a period of 
sharp decline after the fall of the Iron Curtain.11
Some of this growth will be down to rationalisation in the public sector, the priva-
tisation of former state industries, the introduction of market forces and fewer restrictions 
on movements of capital and persons. The favourable investment climate result-
ing from relatively low wage costs and a well-educated workforce has undoubtedly 
also helped. In its Four Futures of Europe, the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis (cpb) assumes that the new member states and the other countries of East-
ern Europe will continue to see relatively strong economic growth.
Figure 2.14 shows the average economic growth rate for groups of countries over 
the period 1995-2003. It illustrates once more the relatively rapid economic growth 
in (most of) the new member states and in the Netherlands, sometimes ascribed to 
the virtues of the ‘polder model’. The initial euphoria over ‘the Dutch miracle’ has 
by now vanished since as from 2001 the Netherlands has lost a lot of the ground it 
gained during the second half of the 1990s. 
11  The Czech Republic is the exception here, with relatively low growth associated with a 
monetary crisis in 1997 (gvg 2003). Other reasons proffered include badly organised 
privatisation processes and the loss of heavy industry.
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This is not the place to speculate about the background and causes of this portentous 
development. However, European countries often seem to go through a cycle of rela-
tively strong growth followed and/or preceded by periods of strong decline. This has 
happened in Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom in the past.
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Figure 2.14 Development of real GDP per capita in indices (1995 = 100)
Source: OECD, Eurostat (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), World Bank (Czech Republic, Malta, Poland, price indices) SCP revision.
The unemployment rate is considered to be an important indicator of economic per-
formance (Figure 2.15). It tends to rise during economic downturns and fall in peri-
ods of economic recovery, and is therefore linked to economic growth (albeit with 
some delay). In 2003, Poland and Slovakia had the highest unemployment rate, at over 
15%. The Baltic states also had 10% unemployment or more. Spain heads the eu-
15, at around 11%. The average for the eu was some 8% in 2003. The Anglo-Saxon 
countries had unemployment running at 5% to 7%, while Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg and Cyprus had less than 5% unemployment. At around 3%, the Neth-
erlands was still doing quite well in 2003.12
The Netherlands’ relatively favourable position is reafﬁ rmed in Figure 2.16, which 
shows trends in unemployment rates. In the non-eu Anglo-Saxon countries the situ-
ation deteriorated slightly in 2000-2002. In the Netherlands, the turnaround in the 
economy can be seen most clearly in the years 2002-2003. 
12  However, the Netherlands applies a rather strict deﬁ nition of unemployment. Only 
people who are actively seeking work for more than 12 hours a week are counted. The 
percentage of people on unemployment beneﬁ t or social assistance is signiﬁ cantly 
higher.
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The most striking development is the sharp rise in unemployment in the new member 
states, which began in 1999. This contrasts starkly with strong economic growth (Figure 
2.14) and decreasing inﬂ ation (Figure 2.19) in these countries. The shift to a market econ-
omy in these countries apparently led to the loss of jobs in less viable sectors.
In the period 1995-2001 the average rate of unemployment in the eu fell from 
around 10% to 7%. However, progress towards the Lisbon Agenda target of 4% has 
been severely hampered by the current economic downturn.
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Figure 2.15 Unemployment rate, 2003
Source: Eurostat, OECD (Australia, Canada, New Zealand) SCP revision
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Figure 2.16 Development of unemployment rate,1995-2003
Source: Eurostat, OECD (Australia, Canada, New Zealand) SCP revision
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An indicator like the unemployment rate has its limitations. There are other reasons 
why people withdraw from the labour market, such as a reduced chance of ﬁ nding 
work (‘discouraged worker effect’), disability and early retirement. Over the past 
quarter century, in the Netherlands the disability programme of social security has 
been used on a massive scale as an exit-route for less productive workers. Employers ben-
eﬁ ted, because it allowed them to shed excess staff. Employees beneﬁ ted, because 
disability beneﬁ ts are rather more generous than unemployment beneﬁ ts. 
The labour market participation rate is therefore a more comprehensive economic 
indicator. Figure 2.17 shows the number of working persons as a percentage of the 
potential labour force. 
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Figure 2.17 Labour participation, 2002 (percentages)
Source: OECD
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The Lisbon Agenda stipulates that the average labour market participation rate in 
the eu should be raised to 70%. Separate targets of 60% and 50% have been set for 
women and the elderly (here deﬁ ned as 55- to 64-year-olds) respectively.
Only the Anglo-Saxon countries (including the United Kingdom), the Scandinavian 
countries and the Netherlands are currently on target with respect to the average 
participation rate. Most Southern European countries (Greece, Italy and Spain) and a 
number of new European Union member states (Poland, Hungary, the Slovak Republic) 
are below 60%. When it comes to labour market participation among women, the 
Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries have the highest rates. The Netherlands 
and Portugal have also made the 60% target. In this respect, the Netherlands has 
made a remarkable advance: in 1985 the labour market participation rate of Dutch 
women was still only 35%, putting the country somewhere near the bottom of the 
table. The rate in Southern European countries is still low (40% to 45%). In terms of 
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labour market participation among the elderly, Sweden is well ahead of the rest of 
the ﬁ eld, on 67%. Its Scandinavian neighbours and the Anglo-Saxon countries are 
also among the leaders. At 38%, the Netherlands falls in the middle, while Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Austria and three of the new member states post a score below 30%.
So the Netherlands does fairly well in terms of the general and women’s labour 
market participation rates. In this sense, it has already met the Lisbon targets. 
However, the country compares less well if one also takes into account the number 
of hours worked. Figures from Eurostat (NewCronos) and the oecd (2004ba) show 
that the average number of hours per worker per week in the new member states 
is around 40, and between 36 and 40 in the eu-15. The number of hours worked 
in Denmark and Sweden stands at about 35. The Netherlands lags well behind, on 
31 hours. This is due particularly to the small number of hours worked by female 
employees (24, as opposed to 30 to 40 in other European countries). The number of 
hours worked in the us is substantially higher than in Europe (in the order of 42 hours 
per week), and the difference is even greater after corrections for annual leave 
entitlement and compulsory holidays (Osberg 2001).
From the perspective of social participation, to participate in the labour market 
seems more important than the exact number of hours one works. Economic per-
formance depends much more on the total number of hours workers put in. And in 
this sense the Netherlands lag far behind.
Figures 2.18 and 2.19 concern a very important criterion of economic stability: inﬂ a-
tion. High inﬂ ation undermines conﬁ dence of economic agents and can cause a 
problematic decline in income for pensioners and individuals of independent means. 
Deﬂ ation or a very low or rate of inﬂ ation can also hamper economic growth, as 
households are less inclined to buy consumer durables and entrepreneurs hesitate to 
order investment goods.
Most eu-15 countries score reasonably well on this criterion, with inﬂ ation rates 
of around 1.5% to 3%. Greece is the only country with a notable higher inﬂ ation of 
about 5%. The non European Anglo-Saxon countries all ﬁ nd themselves around the 
eu-15 average of 2%. Excluding Cyprus and Malta, all new member states display 
a far more unfavourable average inﬂ ation rate, with Hungary as far up as 13%. In 
Figure 2.19 however it is showed that all countries are converging over time towards 
the European average.
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Figure 2.18 Mean annual inflation in consumer prices, 2003 (percentages)
Source: OECD, Eurostat (Australia, Canada, New Zealand), World Bank (Cyprus, Latvia, Malta) SCP revision
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Figure 2.19 Mean annual inflation in consumer prices, 1995-2003 (percentages)
Source: OECD, Eurostat (Australia, Canada, New Zealand), World Bank (Cyprus, Latvia, Malta); SCP revision
Figures 2.20 and 2.21 look at another criterion of economic stability: the balance of 
the government budget. This is calculated as the difference between receipts and 
expenditures of the public sector.
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Figure 2.20 General government surplus/deficit, 2002 (percentages)
Source: Eurostat, OECD (non-EU Anglo-Saxon) SCP revision
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In 2002, ten countries report a budget surplus, whereas sixteen had a deﬁ cit. No 
ﬁ gures were available for the other three countries. The Stability and Growth Pact 
imposes a cap: the deﬁ cit should not exceed 3% of gdp. The average deﬁ cit in the eu-15 
is 2%. Germany and France have a deﬁ cit higher than 3%. The Northern European 
countries and Luxembourg typically have a substantial surplus. Some of the new 
member states, particularly the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia have relatively 
high deﬁ cits (7% to 10% of gdp). Most Anglo-Saxon countries are in surplus, 
although in 2002 the us had a deﬁ cit of over 3%, now approaching 5% of gdp.
Changes in the budget balance after 2000 are striking (Figure 2.21) Before the 
turn of the century deﬁ cits fell and were sometimes even turned into surpluses, 
but after that the economic downturn took its toll. It now appears that in 2003 the 
Netherlands may also have exceeded the critical 3% limit to the budget deﬁ cit. The 
average deﬁ cit of the new member states ﬂ uctuated around 3% to 4% of gdp over the 
entire period.
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Figure 2.21 General government financial balance, 1995-2003 (percentages)
Source: Eurostat, OECD (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) SCP revision
Income distribution
The indicators discussed in the preceding paragraphs are associated with govern-
ment targets for stabilisation and growth. This paragraph reviews government 
targets for (personal income) distribution. Two criteria will be examined: income 
inequality and poverty.
Income inequality is measured using the ‘gini coefﬁ cient’.13 A high gini coefﬁ cient 
implies that incomes are distributed very unequal, while a low score indicates rela-
tively small income differences. The us has by far the greatest level of inequality 
(Figure 2.22). The non-eu Anglo-Saxon countries, the United Kingdom, several 
Southern European countries and several new member states also have high gini-
scores. The Northern European countries, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia have relatively small income differences. Denmark has 
the smallest gini.
13  The gini coefﬁ cient lies between 0 (no inequality) and 1 (total inequality) and can be 
deﬁ ned as half the relative mean difference between all incomes.
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Figure 2.22 Income inequality, 2000 (GINI coefficients x 100)
Source: Eurostat, Luxembourg Income Study (Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Non-EU Anglo-Saxon) SCP revision
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Over the period of 1995 to 2000 (Figure 2.23), income inequality has declined slightly 
in the eu-15. In the us, it appears to be still increasing (this has been the case ever 
since income inequality in the country was ﬁ rst measured in 1967). Income inequality 
seems to have stabilized in the Netherlands in recent years.
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Figure 2.23 Developments in income inequality, 1995-2000 (GINI coefficients x 100)
Source: Eurostat, Luxembourg Income Study (Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Non-EU Anglo-Saxon),
 SCP (Netherlands) SCP revision
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One phenomenon closely linked with income inequality is the number of households 
living in poverty. To determine the number of poor, policy analysts can use an abso-
lute poverty line based in some way or other on identiﬁ cation of basic human needs, 
or a relative poverty line which takes into account the level of prosperity in the coun-
try concerned (see Vrooman and Snel 1999 for an in-depth discussion). Here, we have 
decided to use the poverty deﬁ nition included in the Lisbon Agenda: a household is 
poor if its income is less than 60% of the median equivalized household income. The 
poverty rate indicates the percentage of households with an income below this limit 
(see Figure 2.24). The idea behind the relative poverty line is that ‘a person must be 
able to appear in public without shame’, an ideal ﬁ rst expressed by Adam Smith.
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Figure 2.24 Poverty rate, 2000 (percentage of incomes less then 60% of median 
 equivalized income)
Source: Eurostat, Luxembourg Income Study (Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Non-EU Anglo-Saxon) SCP revision
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The eu-15 average for the poverty rate is around 15.5%, as against an agreed Lisbon 
target of 10%. Only the Scandinavian countries, Germany, the Netherlands, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia more or less make the target. Belgium, Luxembourg 
and Austria also have a fairly low poverty rate. A number of Southern European coun-
tries, Estonia and the Anglo-Saxon countries record a poverty rate in excess of 18%.
It is striking that, although the Netherlands has a rather equal distribution of 
personal incomes and a low percentage of poor households, it spends no more on 
social security than the us, the country at the other end of the spectrum, with its 
notoriously high level of income inequality and its high poverty rate. Apparently, 
the inequality in the us can be explained to a large extent by differences in earned 
income. Possibly the progressiveness of the tax system plays a role here, as do the 
incomes of the self-employed and minimum wage schemes.
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Conﬂ icting aims?
The Lisbon agenda seems to formulate targets that are difﬁ cult to combine. It is 
generally assumed that government objectives concerning efﬁ ciency and equity are 
in conﬂ ict (Okun 1975). At the micro level, generous beneﬁ ts aimed at combating 
poverty and thus contributing to reduce income inequality, are believed to discourage 
individuals from providing for themselves by participating in the labour market. At 
the macro level, a system with generous social security beneﬁ ts pushes up the general 
tax burden, which may undermine the competitiveness of the economy.
This widely shared view may be due to revision, at least to some modiﬁ cation. An 
analysis of the performance of eu countries (cpb/scp 2003) found that countries 
with small income inequality, such as Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and also the 
Netherlands, have a high rate of labour market participation. The reverse was found 
to apply to the countries of Southern Europe.
When the non-eu Anglo-Saxon countries are included, the picture becomes more 
complex (see Figure 2.25). We ﬁ nd that labour market participation is high in coun-
tries with high income inequality like the us, the United Kingdom and the other 
Anglo-Saxon countries. The same applies to Portugal, the Southern European country 
with the greatest income inequality. At the other end of the spectrum, labour market 
participation is also high in a number of Scandinavian countries and in the Nether-
lands, which are notable for their fairly equal distribution of income. It is no coinci-
dence that these are precisely the countries that have a relatively high proportion of 
part-time workers and a relatively short ofﬁ cial working week. These countries delib-
erately pursued a policy of reducing the working week in order to combat unemploy-
ment and relative high tax levels may have inﬂ uenced the choice of workers between 
(taxed) work and (untaxed) leisure time.
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Figure 2.25 Scatterplot of labour participation versus income inequality, 2000
Source: OECD (labour participation); Eurostat, Luxembourg Income Study (GINI) SCP revision
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This section has reviewed several indicators for economic performance. Although 
some of these indicators are interrelated to a certain degree (for example, gdp 
growth and unemployment), the resulting picture still shows signifi cant variation. 
For example, countries with strong economic growth do not always have low infl a-
tion or low unemployment. So is it possible to rank countries by economic success, 
based on a composite performance criterion? Five criteria have been selected here:
− the growth rate of gdp (g)
− the unemployment rate (u)
− the rate of infl ation (i)
− the budget defi cit/surplus as a percentage of gdp (d)
− the poverty rate (p)
The fi rst four are concerned with economic stability, the fi fth with distribution. We 
have excluded a number of indicators strongly related to the criteria already selected 
(labour market participation, income inequality). An initial analysis shows that the 
correlations between the fi ve characteristics listed between the 29 countries are 
rather low. To do a multivariate analysis would therefore be rather pointless. It is 
also diffi cult to establish the relative importance of each criterion, on the basis of 
economic theory. We have therefore simply calculated total scores for all fi ve criteria. 
To correct for differences in scale and the variability of variables, we have used 
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normalised scores.14 The idea here is that variables with a high relative standard 
deviation are either more diffi cult to control (for the government) or that there is less 
consensus over their desired value. To give an example: hyperinfl ation happens more 
commonly worldwide than a sharp fall in gdp, and is certainly less harmful.
The scatterplot in Figure 2.26 confronts the score for the four stability criteria and the 
score on the fi ght against poverty. In this fi gure, a high mark corresponds to low 
poverty. The fi gures for infl ation and economic growth are not based on 2000, but 
on the average for the period 1995-2002.
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Figure 2.26 Economic performance, 2000
Source: US Bureau of Census; OECD; Eurostat; World Bank (SCP revision)
relative poverty
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The Central European countries show moderate economic stability (particularly in terms 
of infl ation, unemployment and the budget defi cit), but also a low poverty rate. The 
Western and Northern European countries are generally characterised by a fairly positive 
score for both criteria. The Southern European countries as a rule score fairly negatively 
on both criteria. The Anglo-Saxon countries, including the United Kingdom, have mod-
erate economic stability and a high poverty rate. The Netherlands posts a reasonable 
14 Calculated as z* = 5 + 1,5*(x-m)/s, where m is the mean and s the standard deviation of 
x. See Annex B.3 for further details.
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score for economic stability and has a good score for its poverty rate. Again, Luxembourg 
and Ireland stand out for their extremely good economic performance.
It would be interesting to transform the poverty rate and the four stability criteria 
to a single measure of economic performance, so the countries could be ranked in 
one list. However, we would then have to weight the importance of the stabilisation 
function and the distribution function. This is a political rather than an economic 
matter. Figure 2.26 confi rms the proposition that equity and effi ciency are not neces-
sarily incompatible.
Although a certain level of resources has to be put into education, health care, public 
safety and the infrastructure to enable economic development, a high level of public 
spending (above a certain threshold) can in fact reduce the potential for economic 
growth. This has been shown in both theoretical and empirical analyses (see for 
example ‘Four Futures of Europe’ by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis, and Gwartney et al. 1998).
Our data also show a weak negative correlation between resources used and the 
weighted score for growth and stability. This is illustrated in Figure 2.27.
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Figure 2.27 Relationship between government expenditure and economic stability, 2000
Source: SCP
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Figure 2.28 shows the results for the economic indicators in relation to the criteria 
in the Lisbon Agenda and the European Stability and Growth Pact. Where no clear 
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criterion emerges, we have applied the general approach adopted in these two agree-
ments: take the best (or next best) situation as a target for all countries15. By that 
measure, only Luxembourg has a positive score. The Scandinavian countries, the 
Netherlands and Austria do reasonably well. Some of the Southern European countries 
(Greece, Italy and Portugal), a number of new member states (Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia), and also the us and France are a long way off target.
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Figure 2.28 Performance of countries with respect to Lisbon targets and European Stability
 and Growth Pact (average unscaled z-scores)
Source: SCP
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15  The criteria employed are: 3 percent economic growth, 2 percent infl ation, 4 percent 
unemployment, budget balance, poverty rate 10.
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3 Education
Bob Kuhry, Lex Herweijer and Rolph Heesakker 
3.1 Introduction
Education plays a key role in society. As former Dutch Minister of Education and 
Science Jos van Kemenade (1981: 1) put it: ‘Education is a natural thing in our society. 
It is seen almost unanimously as an essential prerequisite for the continuation and 
development of our society. It has become one of the key means by which knowledge, 
power and work are distributed in a modern society, and for individual citizens it is 
an essential … means of access to participation in that society…’.
Education is above all an individual good. Its benefi ts can be regarded from the 
point of view either of consumption, or of investment. The former concerns the 
pleasure derived from the learning process itself, the latter regards education as an 
investment in our own human capital (see Blaug 1970, Becker 1975 and Hartog and 
Ritzen 1986). This investment produces skills that give the individual a better chance 
of fi nding more interesting and better paid work. Besides these individual benefi ts, 
however, education also has important external effects: it helps socialise and inform 
people, provides a skilled labour force and fosters social cohesion. The benefi t to 
society is therefore more than the sum of the benefi t to individuals. Therefore, Indi-
viduals would not be prompted to invest enough in education from the point of view 
of society (see also cpb 2002: 64-71 and oecd 2003a: 156-167).
Another argument for government intervention concerns social justice. People on 
a low or average income cannot be expected to pay the cost price of primary and sec-
ondary education for their children, or to incur debt for that purpose. Social justice 
implies that all children must have the most equal opportunities possible, irrespective 
of their parents’ income.
A third and very timely reason for government intervention, which by the way is 
not directly related to market imperfections, is the country’s position internationally. 
Progressive European integration and the increasing globalisation of economic proc-
esses has caused a lot of attention to be focused on the implications of education and 
educational attainment for a country’s competitiveness. Although it seems obvious 
that a well-educated population is essential for economic growth, it is in fact no easy 
matter to fi nd empirical evidence to back this up. oecd (2000b) presents an interest-
ing analysis that would seem to confi rm that, alongside trade exposure, human capital 
can go a long way towards explaining differences in economic growth.
There are not only many reasons why government should intervene, there are also 
many ways in which the government can do so: regulation, funding the activities of 
third parties, or service provision by government organisations, for example. One 
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important means of intervention is the establishment of a statutory school age. In 
most countries children are obliged to attend school between the ages of six and 
fi fteen. In some, including the Netherlands, children reach statutory school age at 
fi ve, while in others, like Sweden, they are not obliged to start school until they are 
seven. In most countries, 16-year-olds are obliged to attend school, and sometimes 
17- and 18-year-olds still have a partial obligation. Some governments encourage older 
children to stay in education by offering means-tested exemptions from school fees, or 
by putting in place a student fi nancing system. Primary and secondary education are 
usually largely paid for from the public purse, and in many countries higher education 
is also publicly funded. Education can be produced either privately (for-profi t or non-
profi t) or publicly. In both public and private production, quality is assured by means 
of minimum standards concerning the subjects offered and teachers’ qualifi cations, 
and by the certifi cation of schools and establishment of school inspection services.
Figure 3.1 looks at an important indicator of government intervention – the share 
of public fi nancing in total education expenditure. It distinguishes between primary 
and secondary education on the one hand, and tertiary education on the other.
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Figure 3.1 Education: share of public expenditure, 2000 (percentages)
Source: OECD (Education at a Glance 2003)
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In primary and secondary education the share of public fi nancing generally lies 
somewhere between 90% and 100%. The Netherlands takes an average position in 
this respect. Germany takes an exceptionally low position in the case of primary and 
secondary education, with a collective share of only 80%. This is connected with 
the major role German industry plays in the country’s dual system of vocational 
education, which it also helps to fund (oecd 2003ca: 214). The variation is much 
greater in the case of tertiary education, ranging from 34% to 100%. The Scandina-
76 Education
vian countries, Germany, Austria, Greece, Portugal and Slovakia lead the fi eld, with 
scores above 90%. The United Kingdom and the other Anglo-Saxon countries come 
bottom, and the Netherlands somewhere in the middle, on around 80%, along with 
three of the former Eastern bloc countries (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary).
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 look at the legal and fi nancial status of educational institutions. 
They distinguish between public institutions, private institutions funded to a major 
extent by the government and independent private institutions. This is roughly com-
patible with the commonly used classifi cation of legal status: public, private non-
profi t and commercial (see for example Salamon et al. 1999). It should be noted that 
commercial institutions may also receive government subsidies. There are also many 
non-profi t institutions that do not depend on subsidies, although they are fairly rare 
in the compulsory education sector.
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Figure 3.2 Lower secondary education: students by legal status of schools, 2001
Source: OECD (Education at a Glance 2003)
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In most countries, public institutions set the tone in lower secondary education. The 
main exceptions are the Netherlands and Belgium, where government-funded private 
education dominates. The same applies – albeit to a lesser extent – in Denmark, 
Spain, France and Australia. The leading role of private non-profi t institutions in the 
Netherlands is connected with the division of civil society along religious and ideo-
logical lines in the past, which resulted in the emergence of Catholic and Protestant 
schools. Partly as a result of this, the Netherlands has the largest non-profi t sector in 
the world (Burger and Dekker 2001). Private schools that do not receive government 
funding account for a signifi cant share of lower secondary education in Portugal and 
most of the Anglo-Saxon countries. Education at a Glance includes similar fi gures for 
primary and upper secondary education. They are not examined here, however, as 
they barely differ from the fi gures presented in Figure 3.2.
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As we see in Figure 3.3, the characteristics of tertiary education are different.1 Here, 
too, public institutions tend to be the norm and the Netherlands and Belgium are 
again an exception, with private non-profi t institutions dominating the tertiary 
sector. The same applies to the United Kingdom, where all higher education institu-
tions have been designated private non-profi t since the early 1990s. However, they 
are largely dependent on public funding. Private, fi nancially independent institu-
tions are found only in the United States, Poland, Portugal and – to a lesser extent – in 
a number of Mediterranean countries. In the United States, this is down to the long 
tradition of privately funding non-profi t universities through legacies and endow-
ments and relatively high fees.
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Figure 3.3 Tertiary education: students by legal status of institution, 2001
Source: OECD (Education at a Glance 2003)
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Kwong (2000) points out that there is a global trend towards more market forces 
in education. This involves cutting production costs, phasing out products for which 
there is no demand, producing only popular products, advertising education products 
and services, outsourcing activities such as administration and canteen facilities, 
even the governing board in some cases, obtaining subsidies from private companies 
(such as computers from Apple or ibm) and engaging in non-education market 
activities. These developments are not being imposed from above; this is a bottom-up 
process. However, decentralisation and education budget cuts have prompted many
1  Strictly speaking, we are talking here about tertiary type A education. In other words, 
relatively long, theoretically oriented courses.
78 Education
institutions to take this course. Private commercial institutions have also been estab-
lished, most of them for-profi t universities. Initiatives have also been introduced in the 
Netherlands to allow more market forces into education, but this has been driven more 
by a desire to offer the public more choice. Kalma (2002) refers to this as ‘quasi-market 
forces’. One important factor in this trend has been the publication of information on 
the quality of institutions, to which the Education Inspectorate has devoted a great 
deal of time and effort in recent years (scp 2000; Inspectie van het Onderwijs 2002).
Which produce the best results: public schools or private schools? This is a 
pertinent question, because if private schools systematically produce better results, 
one might consider privatising all public schools and introducing a voucher system 
(Milton Friedman 1955, 1962; Coleman and Hoffer 1987; Cohn 1997). Vouchers give 
pupils the right to attend the private school of their choice, using funding provided 
from the public purse. Countries like the Netherlands and Belgium have in fact had 
such a system since the early 20th century. 
Witte (1997) attempts to answer the question of which type of school produces 
the best results using research based on a large-scale American study : the High 
School and Beyond Study, which includes data on over 1000 public and private schools, 
following 72 pupils in each school. He concludes that the study allows no defi nitive 
conclusions to be drawn, once one has corrected for variables such as parents’ 
education and social class. Levin (2002) presents a broad-ranging review of largely 
American research into the difference in performance between Protestant and, more 
especially, Catholic schools on the one hand, and state schools on the other. Pupils 
at Protestant schools appear to achieve better results at school, and the debate now 
focuses on the question of whether this is down to the schools themselves, or to dif-
ferences in the attributes of their pupil populations. Different authors draw different 
conclusions. Levin analysed Dutch primary education himself, taking great care to 
correct for differences in the composition of the pupil population and other relevant 
background characteristics. Catholic schools, in particular, would appear to produce 
signifi cantly better educational performances than state schools. The differences 
between Protestant and state schools point in a similar direction, but are not gener-
ally signifi cant.
Dronkers and Robert (2003) studied differences in performance between public 
and private secondary schools in 19 oecd member states. They analysed differences in 
reading and maths skills at age 15. They divide private schools into largely publicly-
funded and largely privately-funded. This distinction would appear to be signifi cant. 
Largely publicly-funded private schools would seem to be more effective in terms of 
teaching reading skills than public schools, even after correction for differences in 
social background and the composition of the pupil population.2 
2  Besides the background of individual pupils, this study also takes account of the composition 
of the pupil population by social background. Both affect the performance of individual 
pupils. In terms of maths skills, this study found no difference between public and private 
schools after correction for the background and composition of the pupil population.
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The higher level of performance in largely privately-funded private schools can be 
correlated with the privileged social status of their pupil populations. In this sense, 
therefore, they are no more effective than public schools. 
3.2 Education systems3
Transitions and selection: integrated and ‘categorical’ systems
There are three phases in education: a primary phase, a secondary phase and a 
higher or tertiary phase. Primary education focuses on basic skills and is a common 
system; apart from special provision for children with disabilities, there is no 
differentiation between types of school. In the secondary phase, differences are 
introduced between higher and lower forms, and between general and vocational 
education. The age at which this differentiation occurs varies (see Figure 3.4). In 
some countries, it happens at a relatively late stage, because the transition to sec-
ondary education as such is fairly late. In other countries the transition occurs at 
a younger age, but there is still common, more or less uniform, provision for all 
children during the fi rst phase of secondary education. Finally, there are countries 
where children choose between various types of secondary school at a relatively early 
age (European Commission 2000; see also the inca website (www.inca.org.uk)).
The distinction here is between more integrated and more categorical, stratifi ed 
systems. The issue of the desirability of integrated secondary education has long 
dominated the education debate in many countries, including the Netherlands. One 
important argument in favour has been the assumed positive effect of integrated 
secondary schooling in terms of creating equal opportunities for children from dif-
ferent social backgrounds.
3 This section is based partly on the education chapter in the Social and Cultural Report 2000 
(scp 2000).
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Figure 3.4 System types 
Source: Eurydice, INCA; SCP revision 
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The Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Luxembourg, the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia are in the category where children make the transition to secondary educa-
tion somewhere between the ages of ten and twelve, at which point they also have 
to choose between several levels. German children can choose from the Hauptschule, 
the Realschule and the Gymnasium, Austrian children from the Hauptschule and the 
allgemeinbildende höhere Schule. The Netherlands offers vmbo, havo and vwo at this age 
(which prepare pupils for secondary vocational education, higher professional edu-
cation and university respectively).
There is a trend towards integration in these countries. Broad-based community 
schools in the Netherlands have transitional classes where the selection of pupils 
can be postponed, and a common curriculum – known as basisvorming (basic second-
ary education) – was introduced for the fi rst three years of secondary education in 
the early 1990s. Nevertheless, it would be going too far to characterise the fi rst phase 
of Dutch secondary education as integrated. The transitional period, in which pupils 
are in fact already grouped according to ability, is too short, and the different levels 
of basisvorming offered too various (see Bronneman-Helmers et al. 2002). Further-
more, some elements of the new system are already being withdrawn. Problems 
including overloaded curricula and the fact that the subject matter has proved too 
theoretical for weaker pupils (Inspectie van het onderwijs 1999) led to temporary 
measures in 2001 to withdraw some elements of basisvorming. Work is currently in 
progress on a fi nal review of the new system, which will see less time devoted to the 
common part of the curriculum and the period of basisvorming reduced from three to 
two years (tk 2001). The merger of vbo and mavo (junior vocational education with 
a more practical or theoretical focus respectively) to form vmbo with a range of dif-
ferent learning pathways has been labelled a failure by many of those involved in the 
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public debate. This is because of the negative impact of weak, unmotivated pupils 
and of pupils with extra needs on the atmosphere in vmbo schools.
In Germany the choice between various forms of secondary education is preceded 
by an Orientierungsstufe (orientation stage), but this ends at around the age of twelve. 
Germany also has a form of integrated secondary education in the shape of the Gesa-
mtschule, which has a market share of almost 10% (oecd 1998a: 200).
The organisation of secondary education in Flanders falls midway between the 
fi rst and second categories. The fi rst two years of secondary school are integrated, 
after which pupils choose between a vocationally oriented or more general form of 
education. One important detail, however, is that both pathways last six years and 
give access to all forms of follow-up education.
In the second group of countries children make the transition to secondary edu-
cation around the age of eleven, but the fi rst phase of secondary education is (largely) 
integrated.4 Pupils do not choose between a higher or lower form of education. How-
ever, schools are more free to select pupils than in group three. France, Italy, Spain, 
Greece, Ireland and the United Kingdom fall in this group, as do Australia and the 
new member states Lithuania, Cyprus and Malta.
In France children move at the age of around eleven to a collège, where they remain 
for four years. In Greece and Italy they move to a gymnasion or a scuola media (for three 
years).
In the United Kingdom, too, the fi rst phase of secondary education is largely inte-
grated. Although there are selective grammar schools and privately-funded ‘public 
schools’, the majority of children move to an integrated comprehensive school at age 
eleven.
In the third group of countries, youngsters do not move to secondary education 
until they are fi fteen or sixteen. The entire compulsory period of schooling – primary 
education and in fact the fi rst phase of secondary education – takes the form of a 
single type of education for all children between the ages of six and 15 or 16, lasting 
nine or ten years. Only once they have completed compulsory schooling do pupils 
move on to another phase of education. Besides the Scandinavian countries (Sweden 
with its Grundskolan, Denmark with Folkeskole, Finland with Peruskoula, Norway with 
Grunnskole and Iceland with Grunskoli), Portugal, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia 
also have this system.
The choice of uniform provision for all youngsters was prompted largely by a 
desire to provide equal opportunities and education of a high standard for as many 
children as possible. Until recently, Spain had a system of integrated education for 
all children aged six to 14, but it reformed its education system in the 1990s. Spanish 
children now move to the fi rst phase of integrated secondary education at age twelve, 
putting Spain in the second group.
4  In France, pupils can opt for a vocational programme in the last two years of the four-
year collège course.
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The fourth group comprises a number of Anglo-Saxon countries: the United States, 
Canada and New Zealand. These countries have integrated lower and upper second-
ary education. Elementary school is followed by junior and senior high school. Only 
at about the age of 18 do youngsters choose between vocational or theoretical (terti-
ary) education (nces 2001).
Education for children with special needs
Many countries make special provision for children with health problems or learn-
ing diffi culties. Many countries distinguish between three categories in allocating 
extra funding for this purpose: pupils with impairments (A), pupils with learning 
diffi culties and behavioural problems (B) and children who are at a disadvantage 
because of their social or cultural background (C) (oecd 2001).
A comparison reveals that the size of the different categories that qualify for extra 
support varies from country to country. The proportion of pupils in primary and 
secondary schools who qualify for special education varies sharply. Figure 3.5 shows 
the percentage of special needs children in a number of European countries and the 
us. The fi gures are broken down into the three categories mentioned above.
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Figure 3.5 Percentage of pupils in primary and secondary education receiving 
 additional resources, by category of need, 1999
Source: OECD (2000a: 191; 2001: 179) 
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The fi gure shows that the proportion of pupils in compulsory education receiving 
special provision in the countries concerned varies from 2% to 35%, with the us 
leading the fi eld, followed at some distance by Ireland, the Netherlands, Finland and 
Hungary.
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The high percentages of special needs pupils in those countries (with the exception 
of Finland) can be explained mainly by the existence of special schemes for pupils 
from a different social or cultural background. In the Netherlands, primary schools 
receive extra staff funding for some one in four pupils because their parents are 
poorly educated and/or come from an ethnic minority (this is known as ‘weighted 
funding’). In secondary education there is a scheme for pupils from a number of 
cultural minorities and for non-native Dutch speakers. In 1999, secondary schools 
received extra facilities under this scheme for almost 9% of their pupils. In almost 
all countries 1% to 3% of pupils receive special provision because of a disability; this 
fi gure is higher only in the us, the Czech Republic and Hungary. The proportion of 
pupils qualifying for special provision in connection with behavioural problems and 
learning diffi culties – the pupils on which this section focuses – varies sharply.
In all countries, extra provision is linked to extra resources over and above those 
available for regular education. Special provision takes various forms: extra staff 
(smaller classes), specialised staff (e.g. peripatetic counsellors, special needs teach-
ers, psychologists), special materials or alterations to the school building.
The last bar in the fi gure shows the great differences between countries in terms of 
the way they provide for special needs pupils. Some attend special schools, others 
special classes in normal schools, while others are provided for entirely within the 
regular education system. In some countries two different education systems exist in 
parallel. In the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and the Czech Republic, 4% to 5% 
of pupils go to a special school. In other countries integration is almost complete, so 
that virtually all children attend regular schools which have the necessary expertise 
in-house. Spain, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, New Zealand and the usa operate 
on the basis of this principle. A third group of countries has a wide range of provi-
sion, from separate schools or special classes to cooperation and exchange between 
schools. In countries in this category – Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom and Ireland – a considerable proportion of pupils qualify for extra 
support.
In many European countries, there is a trend towards sending pupils with slight 
disabilities or with learning diffi culties and behavioural problems to regular schools. 
Countries like the Netherlands which, until recently, had pursued a two-track policy, 
are switching to a multi-track policy like that in the third group. In the fully inte-
grated systems, there is a trend whereby a number of schools function as expert 
centres, a development which is also occurring in the third group.
The position of vocational education in the system
All European countries offer some kind of vocational secondary education for 
youngsters who either do not aspire to or do not have the capacity or opportunity to 
progress to higher education via general secondary education. The choice between 
general and vocational secondary education is commonly made in the second phase 
of secondary school.
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For many years the Netherlands offered vocational education in the fi rst phase of 
secondary school. This used to be known as lbo (junior vocational secondary educa-
tion). With the introduction of basisvorming and vbo (pre-vocational education), the 
vocational nature of that type of education was watered down so that here, too, the 
focus of vocational education has shifted to the second phase of secondary school. 
The diversity and size of the vocational education system at secondary level varies 
from country to country. The proportion of pupils in upper secondary education 
taking a vocational course is an indication of the size of the system. It ranges from 
15% to 80% (see Figure 3.6).
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Figure 3.6 Share of vocational education in upper secondary enrolment, 2001 (percentages)
Source: OECD (Education at a glance 2003)
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Leading the fi eld in 2000 were the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Austria (on around 
80%). The share of vocational education is also fairly high, at around 65%, in Aus-
tralia, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom 
and Poland. In the Scandinavian countries and France it is some 50%, and substan-
tially lower in Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece, at around 30%. Canada comes 
bottom, on 15%. Precise fi gures are not available for the us, but it seems they are 
likely to differ little from those in Canada (around 8% of the population has an 
‘associate’ degree (nces 2001)). In at least two countries, Australia and Sweden, 
general and vocational education are taught in the same institutes.
The strong position of vocational education in Germany and Austria is related to 
the extensive dual system there, which combines study with work experience in a 
company. In both countries, this system has traditionally dominated the secondary 
education system in terms of numbers (the same applies to non-eu member Swit-
zerland).5 In Denmark, too, the dual system is important. The Dutch apprenticeship 
system is fairly well-developed, but still lags behind its full-time counterpart. In 
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countries like Italy, France and the United Kingdom, the dual system is much less 
advanced (oecd 1998a).
The relatively low youth unemployment fi gures in Germany and Austria suggest 
that training in the dual system is a good way of integrating youngsters into the labour 
market (oecd 1998b: 53). The system depends on the willingness of employers to 
offer work experience places and on young people’s interest in work experience. This 
depends heavily on the economy. In times of recession, companies are less keen to 
offer work experience places, and many youngsters have to make do with less attractive and 
less suitable positions, often with smaller companies. Many will be forced to settle 
for classroom-based vocational education (Van Lieshout 1996). When the economy 
recovers, less attractive positions become more diffi cult to fi ll. This sensitivity to 
economic trends is a drawback of the dual system. 
Higher education
University is the traditional form of higher education. As a result of pressure from 
the growing demand for higher education and for a highly-educated workforce, 
many countries now also offer non-university forms of higher education. Initially, 
the supply was fragmented, but it has become gradually more structured over the 
years. Most countries have followed one of two paths. In some countries, the two 
forms of higher education – academic and professional – exist in parallel, while in 
others the two systems are more integrated (Scott 1995). Binary systems in which 
academic and professional higher education exist more or less in parallel are found 
in Germany (with its universities and Fachhochschulen), the Netherlands (with research 
universities and universities of professional education, or hogescholen), Denmark and, 
until recently, Austria (Müller and Wolbers 1999). France is a unique case. Alongside 
academic degrees, the French higher education system also offers professionally-ori-
ented degrees, but they are awarded by prestigious grandes ecoles which select the 
most talented students and train them for top jobs.
Other countries have opted to integrate academic and professional courses, which 
are taught in the same institutions. Sweden and the United Kingdom have had such 
a system since 1992 (Scott 1995). There is a wide degree of variation within the inte-
grated systems of both these countries.
Non-university higher education is poorly developed in the Mediterranean coun-
tries, particularly Italy (Müller and Wolbers 1999, Scott 1995). The same applies to 
Canada and the United States (nces 2001).
5  Almost half of the 16- or 17-year-olds in Austria are in the dual system (oecd 1998a: 
89-91) while in Germany some 40% of pupils opt to continue in the dual system after 
completing the lower phase of secondary education (oecd 1998a: 201).
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In accordance with the isced-97 classifi cation, oecd publications distinguish 
between type A and type B tertiary education. The fi rst involves long theoretically-
oriented courses, the second shorter skills-oriented courses (lasting three years 
or less). In practice, however, there is a great deal of variation and the differences 
between countries are diffi cult to encapsulate in such a classifi cation system. One 
consequence of this classifi cation system has been to disregard the distinction 
between Dutch academic higher education and higher professional education, 
despite the fact that the former is largely theoretical and the latter largely focused on 
the acquisition of skills. This is because of the fairly long duration of professional 
courses and the (at least theoretical) possibility of moving on to ‘advanced stud-
ies’. As a result, both forms are classifi ed as ‘tertiary type A’, which would give an 
outsider the mistaken impression that there was no professionally-oriented higher 
education in the Netherlands, and that this country differed in this respect from 
most of its neighbours. We prefer to distinguish between academic and professional 
tertiary education. This distinction exists in all countries, although the professional 
version is offered on only a limited scale in a number of Anglo-Saxon countries (the 
us, Canada and Australia).
Using the characteristics mentioned in this section, six groups can be identifi ed, 
ranging from strongly differentiated (1A) to virtually uniform (4B).
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Table 3.1 System types ranked by degree of differentiation
 system type  countries
Type 1A (differentiated lower secondary educa-
tion, separate special needs education and 
separate secondary and tertiary vocational/pro-
fessional education)
Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Czech Republic, 
Hungary 
Type 1B (differentiated lower secondary educa-
tion, followed by separate secondary and tertiary 
vocational/professional education)
Luxembourg, Austria, Slovakia
Type 2 (uniform lower secondary education, 
followed by separate secondary and tertiary 
vocational/professional education)
France, Greece, Spain, UK, Ireland, ,Italy, Cyprus, 
Lithuania, Malta, Australia
Type 3 (integrated primary and lower secondary 
education, followed by separate secondary and 
tertiary vocational/professional education)
Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Portugal, Estonia, Latvia, 
Poland, Slovenia
Type 4A (uniform secondary education, tertiary 
professional education)
New Zealand
Type 4B (uniform secondary education, barely 
any speciﬁ c vocational/professional education)
Canada, US
Source: SCP
The classifi cation into four groups was discussed above. The fi rst group can be 
divided into two, on the basis of whether the country has an extensive special 
schools system. The countries in group 1A, which includes the Netherlands, have the 
most differentiated education systems. The fourth group can be further divided into 
whether or not they have an extensive separate system of higher professional educa-
tion. The countries in group 4B, which includes the us, have the least differentiated 
education systems. However, the us, in particular, is known for the major differences 
in quality between schools, a form of differentiation that is not considered here.
3.3 Use of resources
Figure 3.7 looks at total education expenditure expressed as a proportion of gdp. It 
refers to 1995 and 2000. The oecd has not yet published more recent fi gures.
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Figure 3.7 Total expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP
Source: Eurostat (New Cronos) with additional data from the OECD (Education at a glance 2003)
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In 2000, Denmark, Sweden and Cyprus had the highest fi gures (around 8%). Next 
followed Sweden, the United States, Canada, Lithuania and Estonia. The Netherlands 
came just up to average. Greece, Luxembourg and the Slovak Republic spent only 4%. 
Education spending as a share of gdp fell quite sharply between 1995 and 2000 in Slo-
vakia, Ireland, Lithuania and Finland, while it rose sharply in the United States, Cyprus 
and New Zealand. We should note, however, that this was a period of rapid economic 
growth. There is in fact no country where education spending fell in real terms.
Figure 3.8 shows developments in public expenditure over time. Private spending 
is not taken into account because reliable fi gures on this are available only for 1999 
and 2000. The average share fell both in the eu-15 and in the accession countries. 
Given the strong growth in gdp over this period, this does not in fact indicate a fall 
in education expenditure, although it did not keep pace with the rise in gdp. Over 
the entire 1995-1999 period the Netherlands fell below both the eu-15 average and 
the average for the accession countries. There was a relatively rapid fall in Dutch 
spending at the beginning of this period. However, in 1999, a rise set in, while the 
eu-15 and new member states’ averages continued their downward trend. Although 
the fi gures for 2001 are incomplete, it would appear that the Netherlands has now 
caught up in terms of education expenditure.
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Figure 3.8 Public expenditure on education as percentage of GDP, 1995-2001
Source: Eurostat (New Cronos) SCP revision
Figure 3.9 shows the number of teachers in the different countries. The eu-15 average 
is 27 per 1000 inhabitants. The fi gure ranges from 21 in Spain to 47 in Lithuania. 
The Northern European countries, the other Baltic states, the United Kingdom and 
the us also have particularly high numbers of teachers. The Netherlands falls in the 
middle. Spain, Greece, Germany, Cyprus and Poland come bottom of the table.
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Figure 3.9 Employment in education (persons per 1000 population), 2001
Source: OECD, ILO (Sweden, new member states excluding Hungary and Poland) SCP revision
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Figure 3.10 looks at teachers’ pay, expressed as a ratio of gdp per capita. This both 
explains differences in the cost of education and gives an indication of how attractive the 
teaching profession is and also perhaps – indirectly – gives some idea of the quality 
of teachers.
In some countries there appears to be no difference in salary between the three 
levels of education (primary, lower secondary and upper secondary). However, 
this may just imply that the fi gures are not differentiated. The Netherlands stands 
out for the major disparity between the salaries in upper secondary education and 
those in the other sectors. In terms of upper secondary education salaries, the 
Netherlands is among the leaders, alongside Belgium, Germany, Spain and New 
Zealand. Its score is fairly average for the other levels. Hungary and Slovakia are 
the only countries where teachers’ salaries are clearly lower than gdp per capita. 
In Slovakia it is in fact only just over half of gdp per capita. The fact that gdp per 
capita is also low in these countries puts teachers in a particularly weak position in 
terms of purchasing power.
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Figure 3.10 Ratio of teachers’ salaries (2001) to GDP per capita (after 15 years’ 
 experience)
Source: OECD (Education at a glance 2003) 
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We have attempted to fi nd an explanation for education expenditure per capita, 
using prosperity (gdp per capita), percentage of young people (aged 4-19), number of 
expected school years (see Figure 3.12) and teachers’ salaries (based on the data 
in Figure 3.10) as independent variables. The variance explained is in the order of 
90%. Prosperity has the highest share and is highly signifi cant. It is followed by 
number of expected school years with an almost equal, but barely signifi cant share. 
Surprisingly, the other two variables hardly make a contribution. These results can 
be partly explained by the fact that gdp per capita represents the volume effect as 
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well as the price effect of prosperity. Apparently, this variable refl ects the salary 
effect much better than the salary variable itself. 
3.4 Enrolment and graduation
Although pupils are not the actual product of education, they are a fairly good proxy. 
This is because schools generally have to meet fairly strict conditions in terms of the 
nature, amount and depth of teaching they provide. Progress at school and, in par-
ticular, exam passes are a better measure of educational performance, although they 
have to be corrected for the initial abilities of the pupils concerned. Theoretically, the 
sum of the knowledge and skills acquired by the individual pupils would be the best 
measure. However, no data are available on this, and such information is unlikely to 
be made available nationally or internationally in the future.
It has been suggested that the number of hours of lessons be used as a measure of 
production (un 2003). However, we consider this to be more a measure of input than 
of output. Education is not always provided according to the traditional model of 
classroom teaching. Furthermore, no data are yet available on this indicator.
International data that have been tested for comparability are scarce. Such data 
are however presented in Education at a Glance (see for example oecd 2003ca). This 
chapter therefore draws frequently on this source both for data and for analysis.
In our analysis of performance in education, we consider only pupil numbers 
(enrolment) and number of qualifi cations awarded (graduation). Both are related to 
the size of the group in question (e.g. 5- to 11-year-olds, 12- to 17-year-olds or 18- to 
24-year-olds in primary, secondary and tertiary education respectively). This gives an 
indication not so much of absolute production as of the reach of education. However, 
one cannot compare absolute numbers for enrolment and graduation in countries 
with vastly differing population sizes.
Figure 3.11 looks at enrolment rates by age group, distinguishing between ages 15-
19, 20-29 and 30-39. Data refer to full time education as well as part time education 
leading to equivalent certifi cates. Below the age of 15 children are obliged to attend 
school, so enrolment should in theory be 100%. The percentages were calculated by 
dividing the number of enrolled students in the age category in question by the size 
of that age group in the population.
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Figure 3.11 Enrolment rates in full-time plus part-time education, by age category, 2001
Source: OECD (Education at a Glance 2003)
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In the 15 to 19 age group, enrolment varies from 72% (Italy) to 91% (Belgium). The 
Netherlands comes near the top, as do France and Germany. The relatively high score 
of the three new eu member states for which fi gures are available (the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland) and the rather low score in most Anglo-Saxon countries 
(including the us), Austria and Luxembourg are particularly striking. In the 20-29 age 
group the Scandinavian countries (Finland, Sweden and Denmark) score highest, 
with over 30% enrolment. The mid-section includes the Netherlands, Belgium, Ger-
many, Spain and Poland. Interestingly, the Anglo-Saxon countries also fall in this 
band. The other countries have enrolment rates between 10% and 20%. Luxembourg 
has a very low score, at only 6%. In the 30-39 age group Finland, Sweden, New Zealand, 
the United Kingdom and Australia lead the fi eld on 10% or more. The central band 
includes Belgium, Denmark and the other Anglo-Saxon countries (5% to 7%). Enrol-
ment among the over-30s is very low in the other countries, including the Netherlands.
Generally speaking, we can say that Belgium, the Scandinavian countries and Aus-
tralia score high for both full-time and part-time education. In the other Anglo-Saxon 
countries, relatively low enrolment in the lower age groups is compensated for later.
Enrolment rates can be measured against another benchmark: the number of 
years people spend in education during their lives. The oecd has calculated this by 
adding up the enrolment rates in each individual year of life in the year 2000. The 
organisation refers to the result as ‘school expectancy’ (see Figure 3.12).6 Enrolment 
among the under-5s has been disregarded in this process.
6 Like the ‘entry rates’ discussed below, this is a transversal measure, which is converted 
into an expectancy fi gure for a single cohort. Although distortions can occur in this 
process, it does provide an illustrative example.
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As a result of the occurrence of non-compulsory nursery education and the strong 
increase in the enrolment of young adults, school expectancy substantially exceeds 
the period of compulsory education, which in most countries lasts from age fi ve, six 
or seven to age 15 or 16 (ec 2000c).
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Figure 3.12 Expected school years all levels, 2001
Source: OECD (Education at a Glance 2003)
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The fi gure distinguishes between full-time and part-time education. In full-time 
education, expectancy ranges from 14 years (in Portugal) to 19 years (in Finland). It 
is below average in the United Kingdom, Portugal, Poland and Hungary. In the other 
countries, including the Netherlands, school expectancy lies between 15 and 17 years. 
Denmark and Germany come just behind the leaders, on 17-18 years.
Part-time education relates to schooling with similar qualifi cations as full-time 
education. Part-time education plays a major role in Belgium, Portugal, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom and, most especially, Australia. The same is true to a lesser extent 
in Poland, New Zealand and the United States. In Portugal, the United Kingdom 
and Australia in particular, the relatively short time spent in full-time education is 
compensated for (indeed more than compensated for in some cases) by enrolment 
in part-time education. In the other countries, including the Netherlands, part-time 
education plays a much less important role. There is a certain correlation between 
Figures 3.11 and 3.12, in the sense that high enrolment in the older age groups 
(according to Figure 3.11) would appear to correlate with a relatively major role for 
part-time education (according to Figure 3.12).
Figure 3.13 looks at entry rates for tertiary education. They have been calculated 
by the oecd in a manner similar to the school expectancy fi gures in Figure 3.12, as 
the sum for all ages of the proportion of each age group entering tertiary education 
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in the year in question. Here, too, a certain degree of distortion can occur, because 
transversal data for a single calendar year have been converted to the probability 
of entry in a single cohort. Furthermore, it is important to avoid duplications, by 
ensuring that people who temporarily suspend their studies, or who move to another 
course or institution are not counted twice. In the Netherlands, the rules applied 
provide a reasonable guarantee that there will be no duplication in the separate fi g-
ures for university and professional education. However, people who start out in one 
form of higher education and then move to the other are counted twice.
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Figure 3.13 Net entry rates tertiary education, 2001
Source: OECD (Education at a Glance 2003)
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In accordance with the isced-97 classifi cation, this fi gure distinguishes between two 
forms of tertiary education (A and B). The fi rst involves relatively long, theoretically-
based programme and the second relatively short skills-based programmes. As 
stated in section 3.2, higher professional education in the Netherlands is classifi ed 
as type A because of the length of the programme.
Figure 3.13 shows that slightly more than 50% of young adults in the Netherlands 
have entered or will at some time enter tertiary education. Thirty per cent of them 
come from pre-university education (vwo), another thirty per cent from senior general 
secondary education (havo) and twenty per cent directly from senior secondary 
vocational education (mbo). The rest are individuals who had not been in full-time 
education in the previous year (Biemans and Kuhry 2002).
With an entry rate of 50% for tertiary type A education, the Netherlands comes 
somewhere in the middle of the ranks. Heading the fi eld are Finland, Sweden, Poland, 
Australia and New Zealand, with entry rates of 65% or more. A number of other 
countries – Belgium, Spain, the United Kingdom, Hungary and the United States – do 
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better than the Netherlands in terms of their totals for types A and B. However, 
people who start both tertiary type A and tertiary type B education will have been 
counted twice. This is particularly clear in the case of New Zealand, whose total 
entry rate exceeds 100%. On this basis, only Germany, Austria, Italy, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia have a worse score than the Netherlands.
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Figure 3.14 Expected years in tertiary education versus GDP per capita, 2001
Source: OECD (Education at a Glance 2003)
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As Figure 3.14 shows, there is a weak positive correlation between gdp per capita 
and the number of years young people are likely to spend in tertiary education. This 
last indicator is a weighted average of the expectancy fi gures for people who will 
enter tertiary education at some stage and people who will not (and therefore score 
zero for expected years in tertiary education). The us and the new member states 
(and, to a lesser extent, a number of Mediterranean countries) represent the two 
extremes. The Netherlands falls in the middle. There is in fact a chicken-and-egg 
situation here. The more people have higher qualifi cations, the greater the boost to 
economic growth (see Section 3.1), but people in poor countries have less money to 
spend on higher education.
Differences between countries in the rates of change also have an impact (see 
Figure 3.15). With a growth in its higher education enrolment rate of 17% over the 
period 1995-2000, the Netherlands falls in the middle. Growth has been most rapid 
in a number of countries that started from a relatively disadvantaged position: the
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new member states, Greece and Austria7. Germany, France and Australia had a growth 
rate below 10%. According to nces, the growth fi gure for the us was around 5%.
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Figure 3.15 Change in enrolment rates all tertiary education, 2001 (1995 = 100)
Source: OECD (Education at a Glance 2003); CBS (Netherlands) and NCES 2001 (US) SCP revision 
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One explanation of the rapid growth in enrolment in tertiary education over the 
past few decades lies in the fact that women have caught up with men. According to 
Education at a Glance 2003 women are now in fact ahead in all countries. Their lead is 
most pronounced in New Zealand, the Scandinavian countries and the United King-
dom.
A more concrete performance indicator for education than enrolment is the 
results students attain, which can for example be measured via the number of fi nal 
qualifi cations awarded. To allow comparison between countries, these fi gures need 
to be standardised – divided by the size of the relevant age group. Given the variety 
of courses a single individual can accumulate, we look here only at the percentage of 
the population acquiring a qualifi cation at upper secondary or tertiary level.
The indicators obtained are hybrid, because they can be seen either as a measure 
of the performance of the education system or as a measure of system quality: the 
proportion of youngsters able to attain a certain level of education.
The Dutch education system includes four upper secondary qualifi cations: the 
havo diploma (senior general secondary education), the vwo diploma (pre-university 
education), the secondary vocational diploma and the apprenticeship diploma. 
7  According to Kaiser and Wach (2003) the enrolment in tertiary education quadrupled 
since 1990 and more than tripled in the period since 1995.
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Three series of international fi gures are available on this, but unfortunately they do 
not produce an unambiguous outcome, and they are not available for all countries.
1 In the Lisbon Agenda, the eu specifi ed a target for reducing the number of early 
school leavers. All school leavers are to have at least a basic qualiﬁ cation; in other 
words they must have competed a general or vocational course at upper second-
ary level. Since this was agreed, the eu has been keeping track of the proportion 
of school leavers who do not meet this objective. This indicator is defi ned as the 
percentage of people aged 18-24 who are no longer in education and have no upper 
secondary qualifi cation. The complement to this (the number of young people 
who are still in education or have an upper secondary qualifi cation) in 2002 is 
shown in the fi rst bar in Figure 3.16.
2 The second bar refers to a graduation indicator calculated by the oecd. It is cal-
culated by converting the number of graduates into a graduation rate by dividing it 
by the size of the age group in question.8 In this process, duplication in the form 
of people who accumulate several qualifi cations one after the other (e.g. a havo 
diploma then a vwo diploma) was corrected for as much as possible.
3 The third bar refers to an entirely different statistic: the percentage of the popula-
tion aged 25-34 with an upper secondary or tertiary qualifi cation. This fi gure also 
comes from the oecd.
The three indicators are not equal. In theory, the fi rst should produce a higher 
outcome, because some people who are still in education will fail to complete the 
programme. The third indicator should be lowest, because general educational 
attainment in all countries is gradually rising; educational attainment among 25- 
to 34-year-olds will therefore be lower than that eventually reached by the present 
18- to 24-year-olds.
8  This can be approximated fairly well by dividing the total number of qualifi ed school 
leavers by the average size of the most affected age groups. However, the oecd 
managed to gather data on qualifi cations by age, which allowed it to perform a precise 
calculation.
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Figure 3.16 Upper secondary graduates (2001) as a percentage of population
Source: OECD (Education at a glance 2003); Eurostat (Non-early school leavers); CBS (Netherlands) SCP revision
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Since the information on the three indicators is rather inconsistent for a number of 
countries, it is diffi cult to draw any defi nitive conclusions on the basis of the fi gure. 
The differences in Poland and Portugal can be explained by the rapid growth in 
enrolment over the past ten years. In other cases, including the relatively low graduation 
rates in Greece, Sweden and Slovakia, they must be caused by statistical anomalies.
Nevertheless, we can draw some conclusions. In countries like Malta and Portugal, 
no more than half of youngsters graduate with an upper secondary qualifi cation. 
Spain also has a fairly low score. In countries as diverse as Denmark, Germany and 
the Czech Republic the proportion is around the 90% mark. On around 70% to 80%, 
the Netherlands falls somewhere in the middle. Most of the new member states and 
the Anglo-Saxon countries score reasonably well to well on this criterion.
Graduation rates for tertiary education calculated in a similar way are shown in 
Figure 3.17. Again, a distinction is drawn between type A and B tertiary education. 
The fi gure also includes information on the percentage of the population aged 25-34 
with a tertiary qualifi cation.
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Figure 3.17 Graduation rates for tertiary education, 2001
Source: OECD (Education at a glance 2003); CBS (Netherlands) SCP revision
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Since some students acquire a type B qualifi cation before acquiring a type A quali-
fi cation, the percentages cannot simply be added. If we look only at type A courses, 
we fi nd that Finland, Australia and New Zealand have graduation rates above 40%. 
The Netherlands, Denmark, Spain, Poland and the us have graduation rates of 30% 
to 40%. Germany, Italy, Austria and the Czech Republic are at the other end of the 
spectrum, with rates of between 10% and 20%. Many countries have a much larger 
tertiary type B sector. Although they cannot simply be added to the type A courses 
because of the risk of duplication, it is likely that this would put the Netherlands 
further behind countries like Finland, the United Kingdom and New Zealand and 
allow a number of other countries (France, Ireland and Sweden) to overtake us. If we 
correct for this, the Netherlands falls to a position in the middle of the table. Data on 
educational attainment among 25- to 34-year-olds confi rm this, albeit that Poland 
(along with the other new member states, Italy, Portugal and Austria) still lags far 
behind in this comparison. However, most of the countries near the bottom of the 
table have seen strong growth in enrolment in tertiary education (see for example 
Figure 3.15), so in this sense too there has been a considerable degree of convergence.
In the Lisbon Agenda another target is specifi ed: the desirability of raising enrol-
ment in technical disciplines, mathematics and natural sciences. The number of 
people with such qualifi cations would be a measure of a country’s capacity for technical 
and industrial innovation. As Table A3.1 in Education at a Glance 2003 shows, the 
Netherlands with a share of 18% score well below the oecd average of 26%. 
100 Education
3.5 Cost price and productivity
The previous have examined various aspects of service provision in education: the 
resources used (costs and staff) and performance (enrolment and graduation rates). 
This section looks at these two aspects in conjunction.
Total education expenditure per capita (see Figure 3.7) is a fairly coarse indicator, 
as it takes no account of the size of the relevant age group (5- to 24-year-olds, say) in 
relation to the rest of the population. The cost price per student tells us a lot more 
(see Figure 3.18). The fi gure shows separate data for primary, secondary and tertiary 
education.
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Figure 3.18 Total expenditure per student, 2000 (in NL euro, purchasing power parities)
Source: OECD (Education at a Glance 2003) excluding R&D expenditure 
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In terms of its spending per pupil in primary education (nl€ 4000) the Netherlands 
comes behind only the non-European Anglo-Saxon countries, Sweden, Denmark, 
Austria and Italy. The level of spending in Greece, Ireland and in the new member 
states, in particular, is substantially lower than in the Netherlands.
As far as spending per secondary pupil is concerned, the Netherlands falls some-
where in the middle, on around 5500 euros. Spending in Austria, France and the 
United States is much higher, while in Greece, Ireland and the new member states it 
is considerably lower.
Higher education expenditure ranges from 2000 to 16,000 euros per student. 
Heading the fi eld is the United States, followed at a distance by Canada, Australia and 
Ireland on 8000 to 10,000 euros per student. With a cost price of 7000 euros, the 
Netherlands comes about tenth. The lowest expenditure per student is found in Greece 
and Poland. Educational expenditure in the Netherlands in fact rose substantially in 
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2001 (see Figure 3.8). This suggests that the Netherlands is likely to rise further in 
the rankings.
The relationship between expenditure per student and gdp per capita is also 
interesting. There is a positive correlation in all types of education, but it is most 
pronounced in the tertiary phase (see Figure 3.19).
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Figure 3.19 Tertiary education: expenditure per student versus GDP per capita, 2000
Source: OECD (expenditure); Eurostat (GDP per capita) SCP revision  
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The more prosperous a country, the more it spends on each student in tertiary educa-
tion. The United States heads the table, and two groups come bottom: a number of 
Mediterranean countries and the new member states. The explanation for a major 
proportion of the correlation observed is in fact quite trivial: in countries with a 
lower gdp per capita, lecturers’ salaries are lower and standards for facilities and 
premises are lower. This might be a refl ection of lower quality, though this is not 
necessarily the case. Figure 3.14 illustrates the relationship between gdp per capita 
and higher education in a more unambiguous way.
In terms of spending per pupil/student, the Netherlands occupies an average posi-
tion. Not so long ago, the Netherlands scored below the eu-15 average for education 
spending as a proportion of gdp (see Figure 3.7). This led a number of Dutch institu-
tions to conclude that the country was at a disadvantage, and urgent measures were 
needed to address the situation. However, the Netherlands has more or less caught up 
since, largely thanks to the rise in expenditure in 2000 and 2001 (see also Figure 3.8). 
Nowadays the Netherlands’ spending is slightly on the low side only in the second-
ary education sector.
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Figures 3.20 and 3.21 examine student/teacher ratios. The former shows the class size 
in primary schools, the second the student/teacher ratio in secondary schools. The 
way secondary education is organised makes the term ‘class size’ less appropriate in 
some countries, including the Netherlands.
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Figure 3.20 Average class size in primary education, 2001
Source: OECD (Education at a Glance 2003)
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The fi gures show that the Netherlands has an exceptionally high student/teacher 
ratio in both primary and secondary education, at 24:1 and 17:1 respectively. In pri-
mary education, only Ireland and Australia have larger classes sizes, and in second-
ary education only Canada has a higher student/teacher ratio. Luxembourg is at the 
other end of the spectrum, with scores of 16:1 and 9:1.
The Netherlands has in fact recently taken steps to reduce primary school class 
sizes, raising spending per pupil substantially over the period 1998-2002. The extra 
money is intended to enhance the quality of the education provided. Evidently, the 
fi rst-order effect has been to raise costs per pupil and reduce the student/teacher 
ratio. Whether the intended improvement in quality will also be achieved is less cer-
tain. The policy was inspired partly by the positive results of the star experiment in 
the us, which found that better results are achieved in classes of 12-15 than in classes 
of 22-25. In comparison with this, the Netherlands’ target of reducing class sizes 
from 23 to 20 is very modest. Research into the link between class size and educa-
tional attainment in Dutch primary education has not in fact found positive effects 
in smaller classes (Levin 2002). On the contrary: in some years large class sizes have 
a positive impact on attainment. According to fi ndings by the Dutch Education 
Inspectorate (Inspectie van het Onderwijs 2003), there is more to be gained from 
using resources to make sure there are ‘more hands on deck’ in the classroom rather 
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than to reduce class sizes. However, the star experiment found no effect of class 
assistants. The common sense on the reduction of class size is that it has a small 
impact at a high price (Webbink and Hassink 2002).
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Figure 3.21 Student/teacher ratio in secondary education, 2001
Source: OECD (Education at a Glance 2003)
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To a certain extent, data on costs per pupil/student (Figure 3.18) and on the student/
teacher ratio (Figures 3.20 and 3.21) are rough measures of the productivity of the 
different countries’ education systems. Against this yardstick, the Netherlands does 
fairly well: in secondary education, in particular, costs per student are low and the 
Netherlands comes near the top in terms of class size in both primary and second-
ary education. However, low spending per pupil and large class sizes are said to be 
symptomatic of poor quality. Measures of quality and effectiveness therefore also 
have to be taken into account, and these are examined in the next section.
3.6 Quality and effectiveness
The performance indicators in Section 3.4 (enrolment and graduation) provide a 
quantitative impression of production. However two important factors – the quality 
of the production process and the product itself – have been largely overlooked so far.
One possible measure of the quality of the production process is the extent to 
which teachers meet the qualifi cation requirements. Education at a Glance 2003 (Chart 
D7.2) gives information on this subject for a few countries. Ireland, the Netherlands 
and Denmark do best, with over 90% of full-time teachers holding all the necessary 
qualifi cations. Countries like Portugal, Sweden and Italy do much worse.
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Another quality indicator is the probability that students will complete their course 
successfully. Conversely, the percentage of students who leave secondary school 
without taking the upper secondary-level fi nal examination is a negative indicator. 
This subject has already been examined in connection with Figure 3.16. Figure 3.22 
shows the percentage of the intake into tertiary type A education that make the 
fi nishing post. This is referred to as the ‘survival rate’. The country average is 67%, 
and the Netherlands comes close to this, with 69%. Spain, Ireland, Finland, the 
United Kingdom and Poland score relatively high (75% or over), while Belgium, 
France and Austria score relatively low (around 60%) and Sweden and Italy very low 
(between 40% and 50%). This is the price Sweden pays for its very high intake into 
higher education. Belgium’s relatively low survival rate may also be associated with 
its fl exible admissions policy.
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Figure 3.22 Survival rates in tertiary type A education, 2000
Source: OECD (Education at a Glance 2003)
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Figure 3.23 looks at a subjective measure of quality: public confi dence in the education 
system. The fi gure refers to opinions in all European countries. Confi dence is high 
in Finland, Malta, Ireland, Austria, Poland and Slovenia. It is low in Greece, Italy, the 
Czech Republic and Portugal. In this respect, the Netherlands falls in the middle. 
Notably, confi dence in the education systems shows very little, if any, correlation 
with the type of system, the level of education spending or the achievement of pupils.
nces 2001 presents similar data for the us. Here, public confi dence is measured 
on the scale ‘a great deal/quite a lot/some/very little’, and the outcomes are 16%, 21%, 
40% and 20%. Although the fi rst two categories are identical to those in the European 
data, it is likely that only the score for the fi rst answer is applicable. Furthermore, 
the response ‘very little’ can probably be interpreted as the sum of ‘none at all’ and 
‘not very much’. On this basis, the us would appear to have a fairly average score, 
albeit higher than the Netherlands.
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Figure 3.23 Confidence in the education system, 2000
Source: European Values Study
It might be useful to look here at some Dutch data on public opinions on the quality 
of education presented in scp 2002b. In the Netherlands, around 65% of respondents 
said they thought the quality of education was either good or very good. There was 
very little difference between the scores for the different types of education.
Notably, parents with children in primary school gave a signifi cantly more positive 
response than other members of the public (79% as opposed to 64%). So quality 
judgments are affected not only by one’s own experience, but also by hearsay. There 
was little difference when it came to secondary education (65% and 63%). In addition, 
20% to 40% of respondents felt that the quality of education had declined over the 
past fi ve years, while a much smaller group felt it had improved. These opinions 
would appear to be at odds with actual developments, given the fact that substantial 
extra resources have been invested in education in recent years, including for class-
size reduction in primary schools and it facilities in secondary schools.
Other fi gures for the us (nces 2001, Table 22) would not, incidentally, appear to 
confi rm our earlier conclusions. People were asked to rate primary and secondary 
schools on a scale of 0 to 4. The average score nationally was 2. People were a little 
kinder in their judgment of schools in their local area (2.5). So it would seem that 
the grass is not always greener on the other side. At any rate, Americans would seem 
to be much less positive about the quality of their schools than the Dutch (though 
it should be pointed out that they were asked in an entirely different way). This is 
not consistent with the confi dence data, where the us seems to do better than the 
Netherlands. There is no difference to speak of between the parents of school-age 
children and other citizens in the us.
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The results of international comparative tests of educational achievement – the 
oecd’s pisa indicators – are also highly informative.9 They can be seen as an indica-
tor of the effectiveness of education and as such they complement the information 
on educational attainment discussed below. 
The tests examine reading skills, mathematical skills and scientifi c literacy in 
15-year-olds (Figures 3.24 to 3.26). The Netherlands is not included in oecd report-
ing on this subject, incidentally (Education at a Glance 2003: 62-90), because the 
sample size is said to be too small. However, the National Institute for Educational 
Measurement (cito, Wijnstra 2000), which has examined the data for the Nether-
lands, concludes that they are representative. These data have therefore been added 
to the three fi gures.
According to these tests, the Netherlands scores high on all three skills examined. 
Finland and Canada also have high scores. The United States falls in the middle, 
while Luxembourg, a number of Mediterranean countries and the new member 
states have relatively low scores. 
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Figure 3.24 Reading skills, 15-year-olds, 2001
Sources: OECD (Education at a Glance 2003); CITO (Netherlands) 
9  pisa stands for Programme for International Student Assessment.
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Figure 3.25 Mathematical skills, 15-year-olds, 2000
Source: OECD (Education at a Glance 2003); CITO (Netherlands)
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Figure 3.26 Percentiles for scientific literacy, 15-year-olds, 2000
Source: OECD (Education at a Glance 2003); CITO (Netherlands)
The Netherlands’ relatively high score is confi rmed by a reading skills study con-
ducted among 10-year-olds (fourth-grade students). The source is the pirls survey, 
which is also reported in oecd 2003ca (p. 138). Sweden comes top, followed by the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The Slovak Republic, Greece and France trail 
the rest of the fi eld.
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Information is also available on the quantity and quality of academic research con-
ducted in the countries concerned. These fi gures indirectly give some indication of 
the quality and effectiveness of university education.
Figure 3.27 refers to the number of academic papers published per 100,000 inhab-
itants. The average for the eu-15 is about 100. The Netherlands is among the leaders, 
on 140, alongside the Scandinavian countries and the United Kingdom. Sweden tops 
the table, incidentally, with 190. The us comes close to the eu-15 average. Luxem-
bourg, a number of Mediterranean countries and the new member states for which 
information is available have low scores. Luxembourg scores below, and Poland 
around, the 25 mark.10
One way of measuring the quality of academic papers is to look at the number of 
citations by other academics. Figure 3.28 presents fi gures on this subject. Roughly 
speaking, the picture (albeit far from complete) is consistent with that in the previous 
fi gure: the countries that publish the most articles also have the most citations. 
Here, too, the Netherlands cuts a good fi gure, as do the Scandinavian countries and 
the United Kingdom. The us would not appear to dominate (despite its size). This 
contrasts somewhat with the image of stimulating environments and high perform-
ance drive at American universities, and of top-quality research institutions (see for 
example nrc Handelsblad’s magazine supplement m of September 2003). In the us 
there are apparently major differences in quality, with many mediocre universities 
existing alongside the country’s renowned ‘centres of excellence’.
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Figure 3.27 Scientific papers, 1999 (per 100,000 inhabitants) 
Source: CWTS 2000
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10 In the case of Luxembourg, it can probably be assumed that many academics work in 
one of the neighbouring countries.
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Figure 3.28 Highly cited papers, 2000 (per 100,000 inhabitants)
Source: Eurostat (NewCronos)
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One important outcome of the education process is educational attainment in the 
potential labour force. Since a substantial proportion of people below the age of 
25 are in education, the oecd compiles fi gures only on the 25 to 64 age group.
Figures 3.29 and 3.30 refer to the percentage of the population that have com-
pleted a course at upper secondary or tertiary level. The former shows that the 
country average is around 62%. The Netherlands has an above-average fi gure (65%), 
although it still comes in twelfth position, behind the Scandinavian countries, Ger-
many, Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Canada, New Zealand and the 
United States. This last country leads the fi eld, on 88%. Low scores, between 40% 
and 50% are found in Poland, Greece, Italy and Spain. Portugal is a lonely straggler, 
on only 20%.
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Figure 3.29 Percentage of population (25-64) that has attained upper secondary or 
 tertiary education, 2001
Source: OECD (Education at a Glance 2002) 
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Figure 3.30 shows that educational attainment is relatively high among young people, 
and that it gradually declines in older age groups. This is of course associated with 
the educational expansion that occurred in the second half of the 20th century. The 
proportion of 25- to 34-year-olds with at least an upper secondary qualifi cation is 71% 
on average. The fi gure also shows that the Netherlands scores slightly above the eu-15 
average and the average of the new member states (which is reduced quite substantially 
by Poland’s low score), but considerably lower than the non-eu Anglo-Saxon countries.
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Figure 3.30 Percentage of population that has attained upper secondary or tertiary 
 education by age group, 2001
Source: OECD (Education at a Glance 2003) 
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Figure 3.31 shows the percentage of the population with a tertiary qualifi cation. The 
fi gures are broken down into type A and B courses.
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Figure 3.31 Percentage of population (25-64-year-olds) that has attained tertiary 
 education, 2001
Source: OECD (Education at a Glance 2003)
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The Netherlands has the second highest score (21%) for tertiary type A education, 
behind the United States (28%). However, as we have already discussed in conjunc-
tion with Figure 3.13, the picture is somewhat fl attering, for two reasons: fi rstly, Dutch 
higher professional education rates as tertiary type A, and secondly the Netherlands 
has few courses that are classed as tertiary type B (shorter skills-oriented courses). 
If we add people with type B qualifi cations to those with type A, an entirely different 
picture emerges. Now, on 24%, the Netherlands ranks in the middle of the table, 
well behind leaders Ireland, the us and Canada, on 35% to 40%. Belgium, the 
Scandinavian countries and Australia and the Netherlands also do better than the 
Netherlands. Greece (17%), Austria (14%), the new member states (10% to 15%), Italy 
(10%) and Portugal (9%) do substantially worse.
Figure 3.32 looks at the relationship between educational attainment and age 
group. Like Figure 3.30, it shows that, as a result of the expansion in education, the 
population has become rapidly better educated over the past half century. It also 
shows that the non-eu Anglo-Saxon countries have always been ahead, while the 
Netherlands is more or less at the eu-15 average. In contrast to their performance 
in terms of upper secondary qualifi cations, the new member states lag behind here. 
There is also little progression (i.e. relatively little difference between age groups) 
there, although Figure 3.15 shows that they have caught up to a considerable extent 
over the past few years. The effects of this are not yet visible in Figure 3.32. According 
to Figure 3.15, the Netherlands can also expect to see some more growth (leading to 
an attainment rate in excess of 30%).
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Figure 3.32 Percentage of population (25-64-year-olds) that has attained tertiary 
 type A or B education, 2001
Source: OECD (Education at a Glance 2003) 
One of the problems associated with comparing educational attainment in different 
countries is uncertainty about the actual level of programmes which are offi cially 
regarded as equivalent.
Data on functional literacy among adults, gathered in an international comparative 
study of twelve countries (the ials project) give us more interesting information. 
Unfortunately, the fi gures date from the mid-1990s. Dutch adults score fairly high on 
the various scales of functional literacy, though not so high as Swedish adults, who 
top all three rankings (Houtkoop 1999). Canada and Germany also come near the 
top. The United States, Australia, New Zealand and Flanders form the mid-section. 
The us score is lower than one might expect on the basis of the high level of edu-
cational attainment in its population, mainly as a result of the poor scores of those 
with primary and secondary qualifi cations. In Canada, too, there are major differ-
ences in skills.
The United Kingdom, Ireland and Poland come last. As in Sweden, the differences 
between those with lower and higher educational attainment in the Netherlands are 
small. This is due not so much to high scores among the less well educated as to the 
relatively poor scores of the highly educated.
3.7 Further analysis of effectiveness
As in the other chapters, we have attempted to encapsulate the overall effectiveness 
of education systems in a single measure, comprising the elements listed in Box 3.1.
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Box 3.1
A) Achievement tests
 – Reading skills
 – Mathematical skills
 – Scientiﬁ c literacy
B) Educational attainment, 25-34 age group
 – Lower secondary or none (negative weight)
 – Higher
To correct for differences in scale and the variability of variables, we took normalised 
scores11. The normalised scores for the indicators were then rescaled and added, 
with the indicators in group A being weighted one-sixth, and those in group B by 
a quarter. This leads to equal weights for both groups. The composite scores are 
shown in Figure 3.33.
BE DK DE GR ES FR IE IT N
L AT PT FI SE UK C
Z
HU P
L AU CA N
Z
US
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
educational achievement educational attainment
Figure 3.33 Composite effectiveness score
Source: SCP 
11 Calculated as z = 5+1.5*(x-m)/s, where z is the normalized score, m the average and s 
the standard deviation from original score x. See Annex B.3 for a more detailed 
explanation of the procedure.
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The leaders are Canada and Finland, which have high scores both for the test 
results (achievement) and for educational attainment. They are followed by the other 
Anglo-Saxon countries, Ireland and the Netherlands. The Dutch are in a somewhat 
exceptional position, in that they combine a high score for achievement with a fairly 
mediocre score for attainment. The Southern European countries, particularly 
Greece, Italy and Portugal, and also Poland, have low scores. Both the high achieve-
ment score and mediocre attainment score for the Netherlands can be put into per-
spective.
To begin with the former: the oecd excluded some of the Dutch outcomes from 
Education at a Glance, and included others only with reservations. This is because of 
the low response rate. Further analyses in the Netherlands would appear to sug-
gest that the sample, although small, is reasonably representative (Wijnstra 2000). 
Furthermore, the Netherlands’ good results are confi rmed by two other surveys 
discussed here: pirls and ials. We will return to the attainment score later.
The oecd’s analysis of the variation in scores on the reading skills test among 15-
year-olds (Education at a Glance 2003: 91-98) provides more insight into the effects 
of school systems. It distinguishes between variation within schools and variation 
and between schools. Unfortunately, the Netherlands is not included in this analysis.
As is to be expected in an undifferentiated school system, between-school vari-
ation is very low in Sweden and Finland, and fairly low in Spain, Canada, Ireland, 
Denmark, New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom. It is very high in coun-
tries with a highly differentiated school system such as Belgium, Germany, Hungary, 
Austria and Poland. The Netherlands presumably also belongs in this group. The us 
is in the middle group. The absence of offi cial differentiation in the us education 
system is offset by differences in quality between schools. Within-school variation is 
the complement of between-school variation, and is highest in the countries with an 
undifferentiated school system (the Anglo-Saxon and Northern European countries) 
and lowest in the countries of group 1 (Hungary, Poland, Italy, the Czech Republic, 
Austria, Germany and Belgium). The Netherlands undoubtedly belongs in the latter 
group.
These scores are closely related to the types of system distinguished in Section 3.2: 
the countries in group 1 (highly differentiated system: the Netherlands, Germany, 
Austria, Belgium, and also the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) are charac-
terised by high between-school and low within-school variation. The reverse applies 
to the countries in the other groups, particularly group 3 (the Northern European 
countries).
However, these outcomes represent no more than a quantifi cation of the formal 
differences between education systems. An analysis of inequality of opportunity 
in the different systems provides more insight into the effectiveness of education 
in different countries. Reducing inequality of educational opportunity for children 
from different social and ethnic backgrounds is one of the main aims of Dutch 
education policy. This is presumably also true of other countries. Ideally, not only 
should the average literacy score be high, there should also be few differences 
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between pupils according to their socioeconomic status. The reading skills fi gures 
suggest that these two aims are not mutually exclusive (Figure 3.34).
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Figure 3.34 Average level of reading skills (vertical axis) versus difference in reading 
 skills, by socioeconomic status, (horizontal axis)a
a Difference in reading skills between children from the highest and lowest quartile of the distribution by 
 socioeconomic status.
Source: OECD (2002)
In fact, the reverse is more likely to be the case: in countries like Finland, Canada, 
and also the Netherlands, reading skills are not only good, the differences between 
children from different social backgrounds are relatively small. On the other hand, a 
low score is often associated with fairly large differences between children that cor-
relate with socioeconomic status. This applies, for example, to Luxembourg, Ger-
many and several Central European countries. The United Kingdom and Belgium are 
characterised by fairly high inequality of opportunity (combined with a good to fairly 
average literacy score) and Spain and Italy by fairly low inequality of opportunity (and 
an average literacy score). There would therefore appear to be no trade-off between 
equality of opportunity and quality. Well-functioning education systems are also 
better at reducing differences associated with social background. This is confi rmed 
by the signifi cant negative correlation between the two elements, refl ected in the 
estimated regression line.
It is interesting to consider whether we can link the characteristics of education 
systems to average test scores and inequality of opportunity. By way of illustration, 
Figure 3.34 categorises countries not in the usual groups (eu-15, new member states and 
non-eu countries) but according to the classifi cation of four main types of education 
system, in accordance with Table 3.1. The results of this analysis are clearly ambigu-
ous. Group 1 (countries with maximum differentiation) includes both the Nether-
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lands, with a high average score and low inequality of opportunity, and countries 
where the reverse applies (Germany and Luxembourg). Group 3, which is characterised 
by minimal differentiation, includes countries that do well on both (Sweden and, more 
especially, Finland) and one country with fairly bad scores, Portugal. On balance, 
however, a pattern does emerge: most countries in group 1 do badly in terms of 
educational opportunity and fairly badly to badly in terms of educational achieve-
ment. The countries in groups 3 and 4 generally have reasonable to good results for both 
characteristics, and those in group 2 are distributed widely around the average for both. 
Although further research is needed in order to draw defi nite conclusions, these 
results indicate that broad-based, undifferentiated educational systems generally 
perform better. However, the Netherlands is the exception that proves the rule with a 
strongly differentiated educational system and reasonable to good results.
Figure 3.35 links the composite effectiveness score to a subjective measure of 
quality: public confi dence in the education system. There are no data for the non-eu 
Anglo-Saxon countries. It will come as no surprise that there is a pronounced posi-
tive correlation between these two characteristics, with Finland and Ireland (and, to a 
slightly lesser degree, the Netherlands) at the positive end of the spectrum and a group 
of Southern European countries at the other end. The positions of the Czech Republic 
and Poland are striking: the Czech education system is reasonably effective, but the 
Czechs have very little confi dence in it, while the reverse applies to Poland.
There is very little connection between system characteristics and confi dence: group 1 
contains countries with both high (Austria) and low confi dence (Czech Republic). The 
same applies to groups 2 (Ireland versus Italy) and 3 (Finland versus Portugal).
Figure 3.36 looks at the relationship between effectiveness and education spending 
(in euros).
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Figure 3.36 Cost-effectiveness of education
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On the curve (frontier) we fi nd Poland, with very low costs and poor results, Hungary 
and the Czech Republic with moderate costs and moderate effects, New Zealand 
which achieves good results at relatively low costs, and Finland and Canada with 
fairly high costs but very good results. The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and 
Ireland also strike a good balance between costs and effects. The us, Sweden and 
Denmark also achieve reasonable effects, but at relatively high costs. Portugal, 
Greece and Italy have fairly low expenditure, but produce very poor results. Educa-
tion expenditure can also be expressed in relative terms, as a percentage of gdp. 
This does not affect the fi gure very much. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary 
shift to the right and Ireland and the US to the left. This is partly due to the higher 
salary level in more wealthy countries.
As we have said, the Netherlands has only a mediocre score for educational attain-
ment. There are two reasons for this:
– Firstly, the proportion of people aged 25-34 year with no basic qualifi cation is 
fairly high, at 25%. A number of countries have a rate around 10%: Denmark, Ger-
many, Finland, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Canada and the us.
– Secondly, the number of people with a tertiary level qualifi cation is around the 
average, at 30% to 35%. The Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries do better 
in this respect. The Netherlands’ mediocre performance is partly due to the low 
numbers of short (type B) tertiary courses and to the relatively low enrolment rate 
in higher education among people over the age of 30.
It was agreed in the Lisbon Agenda that the number of early school leavers should be 
reduced to 10% by 2010. By then, 80% of 25- to 64-year-olds should have attained at 
least upper secondary education.12 It is doubtful whether either of these targets will 
actually be achieved. Despite the rise in overall educational attainment over the past 
half century, there are signs that many countries are reaching saturation point. The 
Netherlands, for example, has a persistent problem group of around 17% – a fi gure 
that is rising, if anything – comprising unqualifi ed school leavers and problem pupils 
for whom upper secondary education is simply an unattainable goal (see Herweijer 
and Kuhry 2003). A further 8% begin upper secondary education but fail to complete 
it. Against this background, it is diffi cult to understand why some other countries 
do not face these problems on this scale. Maybe it is because they have less stringent 
standards for fi nal qualifi cations. But it might also be down to the unfavourable 
impact of some features of the Dutch system: the early radical differentiation that 
might lead to stigmatisation and the bad timing of the lower secondary phase. This 
can lead to undesirable behavioural effects and give those with a fi nal qualifi cation 
of this type a bad image. If lower secondary education were to last three years or –as 
is the case in some countries- would start at the age of eleven, pupils would have 
the opportunity to make the switch to secondary vocational education earlier, and 
12 Other objectives, such as those connected with lifelong learning and the reduction of 
differences in higher education enrolment rates between men and women do not fall 
within the scope of this chapter.
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would experience a greater incentive to complete it. 
The moral of this story is that the Netherlands will not succeed in bringing about 
a substantial reduction in the number of early school leavers without either changing 
its system or setting more fl exible attainment targets.
The Netherlands is also unlikely to achieve the target for secondary and higher 
qualifi cations (80% of 25- to 64-year-olds). In 2001, the fi gure still fell well short of 
the target, at 65%. To a large extent, the educational attainment of 25- to 64-year-olds 
in 2010 has already been determined. From about the age of 35, educational attain-
ment among Dutch adults increases very little, if at all. In theory, enrolment in adult 
education should lead to a further rise in educational attainment, but in practice it is 
mainly the highly educated who take adult education courses, despite all the efforts 
to attract adults with no qualifi cations or skills. Generally speaking, adult education 
tends to enhance educational differences between adults rather than reduce them. 
This means that any rise in educational attainment in the population aged 25 to 64 
will have to be achieved as younger birth cohorts gradually replace older ones. This 
takes decades, and certainly cannot be achieved within 10 years. Furthermore, even the 
youngest generation does not meet the 80% target. Add to that doubts about the con-
tinuation of educational expansion, and this target begins to look highly unfeasible.
Another point of debate is the extent to which the term ‘basic qualifi cation’ is 
appropriate. If we look at the Dutch unemployment fi gures (cbs 2003b), we fi nd that 
unemployment is high among the unqualifi ed, low among people with a secondary 
vocational or tertiary qualifi cation, and average among those with a lower secondary 
or upper secondary general qualifi cation. Among the younger generations, many of 
those with secondary general education began a professional or tertiary course but 
failed to complete it. Figure 3.22 shows that this applies to a third of all entrants in 
tertiary education. A sharp division between the lower and upper secondary level 
is somewhat artifi cial. Priority should be given to the reduction of the number of 
people who drop out of professional and tertiary education. This can be achieved 
by a close monitoring and early referal of students. Attempts to achieve ‘continu-
ous learning pathways’ have received a great deal of attention in the Netherlands in 
recent years (see for example th&ma 2003). However, one might also question the 
value to society of pushing the majority of people with a secondary vocational quali-
fi cation through to a tertiary professional course: a country needs skilled workers as 
well as managers. Much higher enrolment in higher education might ultimately lead 
to declining standards.
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4 Health care 
Evert Pommer, Ab van der Torre and Bob Kuhry
4.1 Introduction
In modern welfare states, health care is an essential public service. Public opinion 
surveys in the Netherlands reveal that respondents now attach greater importance to 
good health than ever before, and over time health care spending has risen sharply. 
In tandem, over the past fi fty years the average life expectancy has risen enormously. 
At the same time, increasing costs (as a percentage of gdp) threatened the fi nancial 
sustainability of the health care system. Managing rising costs of health care is the 
greatest challenge currently facing eu member states. Countries of the eu meet the 
demand for health care in a variety of ways. National systems differ in terms of the 
extent to which services are provided publicly or privately, the degree to which the 
costs are covered by taxes, social insurance contributions or private payments, and 
the extent to which markets for cure and care are driven by supply or demand. This 
chapter assesses how the organisation of health care systems and present spending 
levels impact on services provided and the health of the population.
4.1.1 Policy goals
Government goals of health care policies are not always clearly and unambiguously 
defi ned in various oecd reports on the subject. An ec report on trends and chal-
lenges in health care (Council of the eu 2003) makes an important initial attempt at 
defi ning key objectives. The primary objective of health care services is of course to 
maintain and improve the population’s health. In addition, the ec report identifi es 
universal accessibility, high levels of quality and a fi nancially sustainable system as 
key policy objectives. Nowadays, managing fi nancial stability is one of the biggest 
challenges facing governments. Several trends threaten to undermine the fi nancial 
basis of health care systems. Firstly, individuals cherish higher expectations and are 
more and more aware of the possibilities offered by medical technology. Also, as 
a result of rising incomes clients are better able to buy medical services. Secondly, 
medical technology is progressing rapidly, making existing treatments not only 
more effi cient, but also making new and better treatments available. The net effect 
is to push up costs. Thirdly, the population of the eu is ageing. Demographic projec-
tions forecast a 30% rise in the proportion of gdp spent on health care for the eu-15 
(oecd 2003da). Finally, there is a strong correlation between the level of prosperity
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and health expenditure at country level.1 As the population at large grows richer, 
consumers are willing to spend a greater part of their income on health.
eu countries are pursuing various strategies in an attempt to keep their health 
systems fi nancially stable. Strategies include promoting greater effi ciency and intro-
ducing a greater role for market forces in health care. One important instrument 
wielded by many countries is to introduce fi nancial incentives for consumers, both 
directly, in the form of out-of-pocket payments, and indirectly, in the form of restric-
tions on insurance coverage. Strengthening fi nancial incentives for consumers can 
jeopardise the universal accessibility of health care services, if there is no adequate 
compensation for certain low-income, vulnerable groups. Income solidarity and risk 
solidarity remain therefore important in guaranteeing universal accessibility to health 
care services.
Universal accessibility is largely secured in all oecd countries, with the exception 
of the United States. As part of its policy on social inclusion (council of the eu 2001), 
one of the European Union’s main objectives is to maintain accessibility for vulner-
able groups.2 oecd countries meet the principle of ‘equal treatment for equal need’ 
to a high degree in primary health care (general practice). However, there are indica-
tions that there is a tendency towards ‘pro-rich distribution’ in secondary health 
care (specialists). The ‘unequal treatment’ of income groups in secondary health 
care would appear to be associated not so much with the characteristics of the health 
care system per se, as with greater demand from those better educated. This means 
that steps to guarantee universal accessibility must be taken not only within the 
health care system and in terms of fi nancial incentives, but also in enabling various 
population groups to articulate their demand for health and health care. This would 
give accessibility a broader signifi cance, whereby the term would refer not only to 
the ‘equal treatment of equal need’ but also to the degree to which people can make 
their demands known.
Quality issues have recently come to the forefront. Both the public and govern-
ments want to see high-quality care.3 However, the term ‘quality’ is open to interpre-
tation. Roughly speaking, product quality, process quality and system quality may be 
distinguished. Product quality is related to treatment (micro level), process quality is 
linked to producers and institutions (meso level) and system quality to the level of a 
region or a country (macro level). The quality of a care product concerns the degree 
to which a treatment solves a health problem. The oecd is currently compiling a set 
1  At country level, income elasticity is around 1; see for an overview and more detailed 
explanation of differences in micro and macro relations between income and health 
expenditure Gerdtham and Jönsson (2000).
2  This objective is somewhat problematic, as there are strong indications that vulnerable 
groups are more likely than average to have risky lifestyles and, therefore, are them-
selves partially responsible for their health problems (Council of the eu 2003).
3  The standard of services provided by institutions can be guaranteed by means of inter-
nal quality control and external supervision.
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of indicators to break down product quality into more specifi c components, such as 
the time patients with certain forms of cancer live in good health after treatment. 
Besides the quality of the treatment, process quality – the way in which the treat-
ment is applied and the quality of the resources used – is also important.4 Finally, 
system quality – the way in which the health care system meets the demand of the 
population – is of paramount importance. Long waiting lists and large travel dis-
tances to the nearest hospital can for instance be seen as negative characteristics of a 
country’s health care system.
The joined demands of fi nancial sustainability, accessibility and quality can 
be incompatible, making some kind of trade-off necessary. For instance, public 
demand for higher quality health care can confl ict with the fi nancial sustainability 
of the system. However, if quality demands are not suffi ciently met by the public 
system, this can cause clients to seek the quality they require in the private sector, 
thus jeopardising universal accessibility. This dilemma requires subtle use of pric-
ing – in terms of out-of-pocket payments or waiting times – to distinguish between 
essential and non-essential medical care. However, if the main concern is the fi nan-
cial sustainability of the system, higher quality health care will have to be provided 
outside the public sector, which again threatens to undermine the principle of univer-
sal accessibility. For instance, stronger price incentives can put risk and income soli-
darity – and therefore also accessibility – under pressure, inducing individuals with 
insuffi cient income or great health risks to consume less care than similar groups 
of people who are better off. This dilemma will present major policy challenges over 
the coming years.
One current issue is the extent to which the government should leave the allocation 
of resources to the market, safeguarding the public interest via regulation. Fairness 
can also be guaranteed in a system of private health insurance for cure and a public 
insurance system for care, with income-dependent subsidies and/or out-of-pocket 
payments. Risk selection by insurance companies can be combated by adequate 
regulation, and consumption can be curbed by stimulating price incentives on the demand 
side (out-of-pocket payments) and removing income incentives on the supply side (by 
putting doctors on the payroll or paying them a fi xed amount per patient rather than per 
visit or operation). Of course these ‘solutions’ also have their downside, which can hamper 
progress towards other objectives, such as accessibility (particularly among vulnerable 
groups) and quality (through the growth of waiting lists).
4  Process quality is not always easy to measure. For instance, ‘more nursing staff ’ can be 
regarded either as a gain in quality or as a loss of productivity. It is of course diffi cult to 
determine whether higher staffi ng levels benefi t patients (better care) or staff (less 
pressure of work) more.
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4.1.2 Health care and the public interest
Health care is linked to the public interest in two ways. Firstly, some properties of 
health care as an economic good imply that several standard conditions for a free 
market are not met. Secondly, fairness issues are involved in terms of equal access to 
the health care system for all sectors of the population.
Health care is a unique economic good for a number of reasons (Hurley, 2000; 
Barr, 1993). Firstly, the demand for health care is a derived demand. The demand is 
not actually for medical care in itself – people would rather avoid it. What they want 
is good health. Health care is one means of maintaining or improving health. The 
person demanding care is not only uncertain about his condition (diagnosis), but 
also about the resources that should be deployed (treatment) to maintain or improve 
his health. He has to trust medical experts to determine what he needs. Finally, 
health care has positive externalities. A healthy population is important not only for 
the individuals concerned but also for society as a whole, because healthy individuals 
can be employed to greatest effect in the production process, and diseases are easier 
to control in a healthy population. Leaving health care entirely in the realm of the 
free market would therefore lead to major individual and societal ineffi ciencies.
Fairness in health care concerns the right to equal treatment of equal need. This 
means that differences in income and in health risks may have no direct impact on a 
person’s chances of being treated and on the method of treatment. The degree to which 
equal treatment of equal need can be achieved depends on the link between payments 
and health risk (risk solidarity) and the fi nancial capacity of patients (income solidarity).
Equal opportunity of receiving treatment is an important objective in eu countries. 
Generally speaking, countries seem to have achieved this policy goal fairly well 
(oecd 2003df). As far as unequal access to the system is observed, there is often an 
individual explanation and an institutional background. In institutional terms, a 
greater role for private insurance and relatively large own payments for policyholders 
would seem to work to the disadvantage of lower income groups. Education and an 
individual’s labour market status are also found to have an effect on the chance of 
equal treatment in equal circumstances, though the impact of these individual factors 
also depends on the type of insurance system. 
In principle, uncertainty associated with future demand for health care, its high 
costs and the demand for fairness will tend to foster a system of health care insur-
ance. A public insurance system allows more fairness and redistribution than a 
regulated private system. Through adverse selection, a privately-oriented insurance 
system can jeopardise fairness by causing risk selection on the part of insurance 
companies. They will of course be keen to select only low-risk clients. Ultimately, 
without extra regulation, this can lead to price differentiation or even the exclusion 
of certain risk groups.5
5  It can also mean that, if employers pay the insurance premium, those offering the most 
comprehensive health insurance package attract employees with the most health 
problems.
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Any insurance system has inherent problems that are referred to as ‘moral hazard’. 
This concerns two responses on the part of consumers and producers that drive up 
the cost of health care. The fi rst problem is the possible increase in risky behaviour, 
the second the possible unnecessary consumption of health care because of the 
absence of price incentives. Risky behaviour involves consciously running health 
risks in the knowledge that one is well insured. Unnecessary consumption of health 
care occurs when the price to consumers falls to zero (because the insurer reimburses 
all costs), or when there is no fi nancial limit on the production of care services (the 
so-called ‘third party payment problem’). If a consumer is fully insured, medical 
care will cost him nothing. If, furthermore, doctors are paid a rate per visit or proce-
dure, neither of them benefi ts by avoiding extra – possibly unnecessary – treatment.
An insurance system cannot solve the problem of incomplete information of 
patients. However, information asymmetry can be reduced. The Internet, for example, 
provides access to a growing body of information on health care and health care 
institutions, patient associations offer much information and consumers have become 
much more critical of the performance of doctors and hospitals. Although the us and 
a number of eu countries have taken steps towards monitoring and benchmarking 
health care institutions, this form of information provision is still in its infancy.
4.1.3 Challenges and solutions6
The main problem in terms of health care which the countries under review face 
at the beginning of this century is the fi nancial sustainability of their system. Of 
the eu-15, only Denmark, Spain and Luxembourg indicate cost containment is no 
major policy concern. Most of the new member states are also most concerned about 
problems other than fi nancial sustainability of the system, such as the effi ciency of 
care and universal accessibility. Only the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Slov-
enia see the costs of health care as a problem. Effi ciency is a problem in a number 
of new member states as a result of their traditionally strong orientation towards 
inpatient care, which has produced overcapacity in the number of hospital beds and 
medical specialists, and a shortage of primary health care. These problems are felt 
particularly in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta and Cyprus. Universal 
accessibility is also under pressure in a number of new member states because the 
regional availability of health care services is unevenly distributed (this is largely an 
urban-rural issue). It would also seem that in some new member states patients have 
better access to care by making informal payments, which is incompatible with the 
principle of universal accessibility. The system of ‘gift giving’ is so widespread that 
almost all doctors accept ‘gratitude money’. Many people saw these payments as a 
way to ensure supply and also to establish longer-term relations with their doctors 
6  This section is based largely on the country reports produced by the European Observa-
tory on Health Care Systems and the Gesellschaft für Versicherungswissenschaft und 
–Gestaltung e.V.
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(Uslaner& Badescu 2003). Another problem in the new member states is low pay in 
the health care sector (as in the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungary). This means 
the costs of health care are presently not rising too rapidly, but it is doubtful whether 
this low level of pay can be maintained in the long term.
Although developments in the cost of health care are the main problem in the 
eu-15, there are other problems, though these differ strongly from country to coun-
try. Some nations, for example, want to give more priority to the quality of care (the 
United Kingdom, Ireland), some have long waiting lists (Finland, Italy and Denmark), 
some have a considerable shortage of primary health care provision (Greece), while 
others have problems with policy implementation (Portugal).
The attempted solutions vary even more widely than the problems. Most countries 
try to address their problems by intervening directly in the supply or by bringing more 
market forces into the health care system. There are also many countries that want 
to improve the quality of their health care system. Finally, some are attempting to 
solve the problem of rising costs by directly infl uencing the demand for health care, 
or by changing the funding system.
Supply-side interventions most often involve introducing more outpatient services. 
Countries with a relatively weak primary health care sector tend to opt for this solu-
tion (several of the new member states, plus Greece), but countries like Denmark, 
France, Italy and Austria also see this as a way of organising their health care more 
effi ciently and restricting costs. Many of the eu-15 believe that better coordination 
between health care providers would raise effi ciency. It is not always clear how 
policy makers intend to achieve better coordination on the supply side, although 
many countries are considering introducing a new type of management or organi-
sation of health care. Only a few countries regard stricter budget restrictions as a 
way of curbing rising costs. Although Belgium, Germany, France, Austria and the 
Czech Republic are tightening their budgetary belts, they also acknowledge that 
other instruments will be needed in order not to introduce excessive restrictions on 
their populations’ demand for health care. Many countries are opting to introduce 
market forces to health care, for example, by decentralising the system (many new 
member states, and the Netherlands, are currently doing so) and by giving health care 
insurers and suppliers more freedom in the contracts they conclude. Sometimes, 
the entire funding system is under fundamental review. Austria, France and Greece, 
for example, have recently switched to a more universalistic funding system, and 
the Netherlands plans to do so in the near future. Few countries are attempting to 
infl uence the demand for health care through out-of-pocket payments towards the 
cost of care. Austria and Germany have opted for higher out-of-pocket payments and 
Austria hopes to raise cost awareness by having insurers reimburse health care bills 
via the consumers.
Most countries are attempting to improve people’s health by encouraging them 
to adopt a more healthy lifestyle (less smoking, alcohol consumption and unhealthy 
eating) and by improving the living environment (clean water and air). Some are also 
making explicit investments in health care in general (the United Kingdom, Ireland) 
126 Health care
or in the reduction of their waiting lists (Finland, Ireland and recently also the 
Netherlands).
It is striking, how many attempts to modernise health care have encountered political 
and social opposition. Radical proposals in Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Greece have been nipped in the bud. Reform of the health care system involves many 
parties, major interests and complex problems, and it is not always clear what the ben-
efi ts will be. It also takes a long time to reform an entire system. In the meantime, the 
political or social climate will often change, new problems will arise in the system, or 
new insights will emerge into possible solutions to the problems. The Netherlands, for 
example, has made numerous attempts to integrate public and private health insur-
ance systems into a new system with a stronger focus on market forces.
The Council of the European Union has on several recent occasions emphasised 
the need for high quality and fi nancial sustainability in health care in the eu. The 
organisation of the internal market plays a role here, because increasing variety 
among health care systems might induce people to travel between countries in search 
of health care services, putting key health care objectives at risk. It is therefore very 
important to analyse the different systems and their implications for the achievement 
of those objectives more closely.
4.2 Health care systems
In describing and analysing health care systems, a distinction should be made between 
how care is fi nanced and how it is provided. In both cases, there is tension between 
public and private forms of organisation. Virtually all countries have a public-private 
mix of arrangements.
On funding the system, the options are payment from taxation, social insurance, 
employee insurance, private insurance or out-of-pocket payment by the consumer. 
The provision of care can be public, private non-profi t or private for-profi t. Arrange-
ments can differ from one product area to another: inpatient medical care (hospital 
care), outpatient medical care (doctors and nursing) and long-term care (nursing 
homes). Public welfare provisions, a category including homes for the elderly and 
institutions for the handicapped, are not regarded a part of the health care system. 
Medical care of the chronically ill and disabled is regarded as health care, however. 
As a result, the nursing elements of home care are regarded as health care but help 
with domestic chores is not.
4.2.1 Mix of public and private arrangements
As Uplekar (2000) shows, a mixed system of health care arrangements has evolved in 
most countries. The system of all Western countries lies somewhere between the two 
extremes of the us, with its largely privately funded health care, and Sweden, with 
its virtually exclusively publicly funded system. The debate in a number of countries 
has moved on from the pros and cons of public and private care to the issue of how 
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and to what extent health care should be regulated to ensure accessibility for special 
population groups (Bartlett and Phillips 1995). This can be attempted in either a 
public or a private setting.
Relative costs of public and private providers of health care has been studies in an 
extensive literature on effi ciency and productivity at micro level. Many studies have 
compared the costs of public and private hospitals in the United States, where such 
hospitals exist alongside each other. However, the results are not unambiguous. 
Some studies show that public hospitals are more effi cient than either for-profi t or 
non-profi t private hospitals (e.g. Granneman et al. 1986; Grosskopf and Valdmanis 
1987; Valdmanis 1990; see also Mark 1996 for psychiatric hospitals). Other studies 
have found precisely the opposite (e.g. Wilson and Jadlow 1982; Ferrier and Vald-
manis 1996; Burgess and Wilson 1995; Staat and Hammerschmidt 2000), or fi nd no 
signifi cant differences between the two types of hospital (e.g. Register and Bruning 
1987; Burgess and Wilson 1995). Various reasons have been suggested for costdif-
ferences found. Valdmanis (1990), for example, suggests that the quality of private 
hospitals (non-profi t) might be better than that of public hospitals. Ferrier and Vald-
manis (1996) ascribe different cost levels to the fact that private hospitals concen-
trate on the most profi table types of treatment.
There is also an extensive body of literature on nursing homes, but again, the 
results are not unambiguous. Some researchers fi nd commercial nursing to be more 
cost effi cient than non-commercial homes (Nyman and Bricker 1989; Gertler 1992; 
Vitaliano and Toren 1994). Dor (1989) fi nds no signifi cant differences, while Hawes 
and Phillips (1986) and Hofl er and Rungeling (1994) attribute the differences largely 
to differences in quality or the care burden.
In short, the literature offers arguments both for and against privatisation. So it 
can by no means be taken for granted that privatisation of health care provision will 
produce effi ciency gains. One explanation for this is that private insurers compete 
mainly for the insured population and the insured risks. Given institutional restric-
tions, private insurers are often less keen to negotiate costs of health care providers. 
The private sector is also characterised by higher administration costs (Woolhandler 
et al. 2003). In practice, this means that the privatisation of health care often does 
not produce what some hope for and expect: more and better value for money (oecd 
2003dg). Allowing greater scope for market forces in the health care system often 
leads to problems. The trend towards segmentation and monopolisation among care 
suppliers and insurance companies in particular leads to stagnation in the market, 
with few incentives for greater effi ciency. Furthermore, allowing more market 
forces to infl uence the demand side of the market, generally causes costs to rise 
because instruments used to regulate costs in the public sector – budget restric-
tions, cost control and capacity restrictions – are diffi cult or impossible to apply 
(oecd 2003dg). Finally, the government’s potential for public accountability is also 
reduced. If greater market forces are introduced on the demand side – by raising 
out-of-pocket payments, for example – there is a danger that essential care or the 
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principle of equal access will be jeopardised (oecd 2003de). Finally, it becomes 
more diffi cult to make the government accountable to the public for the functioning 
of the health care system.
4.2.2 Empirical characterisation of health care systems
Few attempts have been made in the international literature to produce an empirical char-
acterisation of health care systems. This is partly due to the heterogeneity of existing 
systems. Many system typologies have a dual nature: more privately-oriented versus 
more publicly-oriented systems, or systems based on the ideas of Bismarck or 
Beveridge. Attempts have also been made at more detailed characterisation. Hughes 
Tuohy et al. (2001), for example, distinguish four basic models: (1) parallel public 
and private systems; (2) co-payment, whereby consumers make substantial out-of-
pocket payments for the use of health care services; (3) group-based (or corporatist), 
whereby access to public or private coverage depends on being a member of a certain 
population group or professional group and (4) sectoral, whereby public or private 
coverage is tied to the type of service. In many countries these basic models exist in 
parallel or are interwoven with each other. In practice, a wide variety of health care 
systems exists, in which theoretical classifi cations are diffi cult to identify. The various 
theoretical characteristics are present to varying degrees, and differ between care 
sectors and population groups. It would appear that countries with roughly the same 
goal of providing good-quality affordable health care have tried rather different 
ways to achieve it. Therefore, the present study focuses on the actual organisation of 
the health care system. A cluster analysis of several important institutional charac-
teristics will be used to determine which countries’ systems are most similar. 
The most important institutional characteristics concern the fi nancing of health 
care and the role of market regulation. These characteristics are regarded as impor-
tant determinants of the costs of care, and thus also of the fi nancial sustainability of 
the system, via the price per product (p), the quantity of health care products (q), the 
quality of production (k) and the number of users (n). One of the fi nancing charac-
teristics is the nature of funding:
− via universal taxation (universalistic, Beveridge model);
− via contributions from employees (corporatist, Bismarck model);
− via private fi nance through insurance and/or out-of-pocket payments (privately-
oriented).
All countries have a mixed system. However, we are concerned with the method 
by which the majority of health spending is fi nanced. Another, related characteristic 
is the share of public funding, i.e. the proportion of the fi nancing that comes from 
taxation or social security contributions.
A number of system properties have been identifi ed and quantifi ed for the pur-
pose of this study. Properties have been classifi ed into fi nancing characteristics and 
market characteristics:
− the overall nature of fi nancing;
− the specifi c nature of the fi nancing of family doctors (gps) and medicines;
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− the level of out-of-pocket payments required;
− the share of public fi nancing;
− the legal status of hospitals;
− consumers’ freedom to choose a family doctor (gp), specialist or hospital;
− the degree to which GPs act as ‘gatekeepers’.
Table 4.1 shows results for the various countries. Other characteristics than those 
contained in Table 4.1 are diffi cult to measure (see Box 4.1). For instance, it is hard to 
determine the extent to which quasi-markets exist for contracts between insurance 
companies (or public authorities) and care suppliers and the degree to which policy-
holders are free to change insurance company. Other problems arise in connection 
with differences between theory and practice, particularly in terms of the extent 
to which hospitals are subject to a budget ceiling. For instance, there are countries 
where, though budget restrictions offi cially apply, hospitals exceed their budgets 
by large amounts every year. There are also countries where budget agreements are 
made, but where in practice demand largely determines the costs incurred.
Box 4.1 Market characteristics in detail
Three parties play a key role in health care: consumers, insurance companies and sup-
pliers. The way the system works is determined to a large degree by the positions of 
these three parties and the institutional setting in which they operate. This setting is 
determined by the government. Given the particular position of these parties and the 
relationships between them, we can distinguish the following market characteristics 
(factors potentially affected by the characteristic are shown in brackets):
– the degree to which policyholders can change insurance company (q, n);
– whether insurance companies are obliged to accept all potential clients (q, n);
– consumers’ freedom to choose a health care supplier (q);
– the extent to which insurance companies can conclude contracts with health care 
suppliers (p, q, k);
– the legal status of the health care supplier: public, private non-proﬁ t or private 
for-proﬁ t (p, q, k);
– health care suppliers’ freedom of access to the health care market (p, q, k);
– the existence of free competition between doctors and between institutions: 
do cartels or price agreements exist? (p);
– whether family doctors act as gatekeepers (q);
– the nature of the remuneration system for doctors or institutions: rate per 
procedure, per patient or per registered policyholder (p);
– the existence of price regulation (for medicines, bed days or procedures, for 
example) p);
– the existence of out-of-pocket payments (q);
– the extent of budget restrictions for institutions or medicines (q).
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Table 4.1 Characteristics of health care, 2001
ﬁ nancing characteristics
country
 overall 
 nature of 
 funding
nature of GP 
funding 
by prescr.: 1 
by pat/pol: 2 
salary: 3
nature of 
medicine 
funding 
free pricing: 1 
price reg.: 2 
budget: 3
share of
public 
ﬁ nance
(%)
out-of pocket 
payments for 
curative care 
none: 0 
medicines: 1
+ hospital: 2 
+ GP: 3
EU-15
Belgium Bismarck 1 2 71 3
Denmark Beveridge 2 2 82 1
Germany Bismarck 2 2 75 2
Greece Beveridge 3 2 56 1.5
Spain Beveridge 3 2 71 1
France Bismarck 1 2 76 3
Ireland Beveridge 2 2 76 0
Italy Beveridge 2 2 75 1.5
Luxembourg Bismarck 1 2 89 1
Netherlands Bismarck 2 2 63 0
Austria Bismarck 2 2 70 3
Portugal Beveridge 3 1 69 3
Finland Beveridge 3 2 76 3
Sweden Beveridge 2 1 85 3
United Kingdom Beveridge 2.5 1 82 1
New entrants
Cyprus Bismarck 1 1.5 33 1
Czech Republic Bismarck 1.5 2 91 1
Estonia Bismarck 2 1 81 2
Latvia Beveridge 2 2 58 3
Lithuania Bismarck 1.5 2 73 0
Hungary Bismarck 2 1 75 1
Malta Bismarck 3 2 69 0
Poland Bismarck 1.5 1 67 1
Slovenia Bismarck 2 2 86 2
Slovak Republic Bismarck 1.5 1.5 89 1
Anglo-Saxon
Australia Beveridge 1.5 2 73 2
Canada Beveridge 1 1.5 71 1
New Zealand Beveridge 1 2 77 2.5
United States private 2 1 44 3
NB: fractions refer to mixed systems. Many countries have mixed systems; the most adequate characterisation 
has been chosen here.
Source: Bertels and Cocquyt (1995a), Bertels et al (1995b), Bertels et al (1995c), Bocken, Kunstman and Butzlaff (2002), 
Brettenthaler (2003), GVG (2003), ECHP (a), Kreier (2001), EC (a), OECD (2003di), Sogaard and Kjellberg (2003).
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market characteristics
legal status
of hospitals 
private for-prof: 1 
partly publ: 2 
priv non-prof: 3 
strongly public: 4
free choice of GP
yes: 1 
partly: 2 
no: 3
free choice of 
specialist
yes: 1 
partly: 2 
no:3
free choice of 
hospital 
yes: 1 
partly: 2 
no:3
GP as 
gate-keeper
no: 1 
partly: 2 
yes: 3
3.5 1 1 1 1
4 1 3 2 3
2 1 1 1 1
2 3 2 2 1
2 2 1 3 3
2 1 1 1 1
2 2 1 3 3
2 1 2 1 3
1 1 1 1 1
3 1 1 1 3
3 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 1 3
4 2 1 2 3
2 1 1 2 1
3 1 3 3 3
2 3 1 1 3
4 1 1 1 1
4 1 2 1 3
4 1 2 2 2.5
3 1 1 1 1
4 1 2 2 2
4 3 1 1 3
4 1 1 1 2.5
4 1 1 1 3
4 1 3 3 3
2 1 1 1 3
3 1 2 2 3
4 1 1 1 3
3 2 2 2 2
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Many of the eu-15 me mber States follow the Beveridge model of health care funding. All 
the Anglo-Saxon countries, with the exception of the us, have opted for this model. Many 
countries in this group have also a system of private insurance in place. Private insurance 
can either run parallel to or supplement the public insurance system. Private insurance 
exists where public insurance fails to provide suffi cient coverage or adequate quality, or 
when it is available only to certain groups. The almost unanimous choice of the Bismarck 
model in the new member states is striking. Latvia is the only exception here.
The fi nancing of the health care system gives no clues as to how individual doc-
tors are paid. General practitioners (gp) are sometimes on the payroll of the gov-
ernment, and if self-employed are sometimes paid by the health insurer per patient 
(fi xed amount per year) or per patient visit. The exception here is the Beveridge 
model that never has payment per visit. Another notable fi nding is that drugs prices 
are almost always tied to price agreements. No system includes a strict budget for all 
drugs (medicines), and free pricing occurs in only a small number of countries.
The share of public fi nancing ranges from 44% in the United States to 91% in the 
Czech Republic. Ireland, the Netherlands, Lithuania and Malta are the only coun-
tries that have no form of out-of-pocket payments in the public sector of the regular 
health care system. However, as in other countries, the public make out-of-pocket 
payments towards long-term care (nursing homes), as this also includes a housing 
component. In the other countries patients at any rate contribute towards the costs 
of drugs. In half the countries, users are also expected to pay towards consulting a 
specialist and/or for hospital care. Only in Belgium, France, Austria, Portugal, Fin-
land, Sweden, Latvia and the us do they also have to pay out-of-pocket when visiting 
a doctor. Germany has introduced such payments as from this year. Such payments 
do not occur signifi cantly more often in either of the models.
There is no fi xed pattern as regards the legal status of hospitals, either per group 
of countries or per health care system. Private for-profi t hospitals dominate only 
in Luxembourg’s Bismarck system. In most countries, various forms of ownership 
occur, from fully private to fully public. The ranking in Table 4.1 is based on the 
most dominant or the most characteristic hospital type in each country.
Free choice of gp, specialist or hospital is more common in Bismarck systems than in 
Beveridge systems. There is little difference between groups of countries. Family doctors 
are more likely to function as gatekeepers in the Beveridge system than in the Bismarck 
system. They are most often gatekeepers in the Anglo-Saxon countries, and least often in 
the eu-15.
The data in Table 4.1 have been used to cluster countries that are similar. Figure 4.1 
shows the result of the cluster analysis for the eight dimensions mentioned.7 
7  The market characteristics that indicate freedom of choice for consumers have been 
combined into a single measure of consumer freedom. This makes eight characteristics 
available for the cluster analysis. They have been ranked in ascending order of restric-
tiveness on a scale of 0 to 4, whereby 0 tends towards a very free system, 2 towards a 
mixed system and 4 towards a highly restrictive system.
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The horizontal bars indicate which countries are most similar in a particular 
number of clusters. The graph should be read from the bottom up in order to deter-
mine the method of clustering.
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Figure 4.1  Cluster diagram of health care system characteristics (contiguous shaded areas are 
 countries that resemble each other) 
number of clusters
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The analysis produces neither a unique nor an optimum solution, but does suggest 
possible clusters of countries. The number of country clusters is determined by the 
degree to which the clusters can be regarded as homogeneous from a particular per-
spective. The us and Greece clearly take a unique position. The health care system in 
the us is strongly market-oriented and therefore differs substantially from the sys-
tems on the European continent. The unique position of Greece is not unexpected, as 
several systems operate simultaneously there: a public system, a corporatist system 
and a private system. These systems offer both basic and supplementary packages 
(particularly the private system).
Which cluster best typifi es the countries identifi ed? Assuming that an individual 
country may not constitute a group, and that the number of country groups should 
remain limited, it is possible to identify four fairly homogeneous groups and an 
‘other’ group of seven heterogeneous countries. Two of the four country groups 
sport the Beveridge model, and two the Bismarck model. The groups are:
1 Easter European cluster, with low out-of-pocket payments: Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Estonia, Poland and Lithuania;
2 Public cluster, with high out-of-pocket payments: Finland, Latvia, Portugal, Italy, 
Australia and New Zealand;
3 Public cluster, with low out-of-pocket payments: Denmark, Ireland, Spain,
Canada and the United Kingdom;
4 Corporatist cluster, with high out-of-pocket payments: France, Germany, Belgium 
and Austria;
5 A heterogeneous ‘other’ group consisting of the us, Greece, Cyprus, Malta, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden.
The fi ve country groups can be combined with the eight system properties (Table 4.2). 
A higher score for a given property indicates a higher degree of government regula-
tion.
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Table 4.2  Country groups by system characteristics
health
expend-
iture
per 
capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
type of 
ﬁ nanc-
ing
GP
fund-
ing
fund-
ing of
medi-
cines
public
fund-
ing
out-of-
pocket
pay-
ments
legal 
status 
of
hospi-
tals
free-
dom
of 
choice
GP
gate-
keeper
country group 2001
free>
budget
free>
budget
low>
high
low>
high
pri-
vate>
public
low>
high
low>
high
(1) Czech et al. 830 Bismarck 1.7 1.5 2.3 1.1 3.9 1.4 2.2
(2) Finland 
      et al.
1.630 Bev-
eridge
2.1 1.9 1.7 2.5 3.0 1.3 2.9
(3) Denmark 
      et al.
2.080 Bev-
eridge
2.1 1.7 2.4 0.8 2.8 2.2 3.0
(4) France et al. 2,440 Bismarck 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.8 2.6 1.0 1.0
(5) Other 2.530 various 2.0 1.6 1.6 1.4 2.3 1.7 2.0
Source: SCP
The two Beveridge groups (2 and 3) stand out in terms of the role of out-of-pocket 
payments. They are fairly high in group 2 and fairly low in group 3. Partly as a result 
of this, the share of public fi nancing is slightly lower in group 2. Another difference 
lies in the freedom of choice of care providers. The two Bismarck groups (1 and 4) 
stand out in terms of the role of out-of-pocket payments and the role of family doc-
tors (GPs) as gatekeepers for inpatient care. The countries in group 1 use GPs as 
gatekeepers. Those in group 4 require relatively high out-of-pocket payments for the 
use of health care services. The fi rst group of countries is notable for the sometimes 
restrictive choice of care supplier (particularly in Slovakia). The Netherlands could 
also be included in the fourth group, but differs strongly in terms of its low level of 
out-of-pocket payments and the important role of GPs as gatekeepers. The fourth 
country group can be regarded as ‘corporatist’, and also constitutes a separate group 
in a typology of welfare states based on the means by which social security and the 
labour market are regulated (Wildeboer Schut et al. 2001; scp/cpb 2003). Health 
expenditure per capita is highest in groups 3 and 4, with a moderate spread of 
amounts. In contrast, countries in the fi rst two groups show a wide spread in health 
spending per capita. 
In the fi nal part of this chapter we shall relate the health performance of coun-
tries to the group in which they are found.  
4.3 Use of resources
Roughly speaking, total expenditure on a service breaks down into material expend-
iture, staff expenditure and capital costs. This section looks at current expenditure, 
the number of beds available in inpatient care and employment in inpatient and 
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outpatient health care services. This means that only a part of the material and staff 
resources used are placed in a comparative perspective. The use of capital - except for 
hospital beds - is disregarded entirely.
4.3.1 Expenditure
Total expenditure on health care as a proportion of gdp came to around 8% in the 
eu-15 in 2000 (Figure 4.2).8 Germany and France, on a respective 10% and 9%, had 
higher than average health spending. The Netherlands spent just around the average, 
on 8.2%. This ratio will have moved up, as health spending has sharply increased in 
recent years. Dutch sources often refer to a spending ratio of some 10% of gdp, but 
this fi gure includes public welfare provisions, such as care homes and domestic help, 
which is disregarded in this study.
OECD data: deﬁ nitions and limitations 
Total expenditure on health includes spending by both public and private sources  on 
personal medical services and goods, public health and prevention programmes and 
administration. Individual health care includes curative and rehabilitative care (inpa-
tient, outpatient and home care), long-term nursing care (inpatient and home care), 
ancillary services to health care and  medical goods dispensed to outpatients. 
OECD countries are at varying stages of reporting total expenditure on health accord-
ing to the boundary of health care deﬁ ned in the System of Health Accounts (SHA). The 
comparability of the functional breakdown of health expenditure data in OECD Health 
Data has gradually improved over the past few years, but is still limited, due to the fact 
that data reporting is connected to administrative records of ﬁ nancing systems. Differ-
ent practices in including long-term care in health or social expenditure also affect data 
comparability. Luxembourg’s close social and economic integration with neighbouring 
countries results in severe estimation problems with all kinds of indicators.
Compared with their gdp, Luxembourg and Ireland spend little on health care. In 
Luxembourg this refl ects to a large extent a denominator effect, as this prosperous 
country has the highest income per capita. In fact, Luxembourg actually spends a 
larger amount per capita on health care than all other countries included in this 
report, apart from the us. Only four of the new member states have comparable 
spending fi gures. Health spending as a proportion of gdp varies from 5% to 7%, 
considerably below that of the eu-15.
8  The eu-15 average is always a weighted average; in the case of expenditure, it is 
weighted by BBP, for production, it is weighted by number of inhabitants.
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Figure 4.2 also distinguishes between private and public funding.9 The former 
includes out-of-pocket payments by individual consumers and health insurance 
premiums; the latter includes funding from the government and contributions to 
compulsory social insurance schemes. The share of public expenditure differs con-
siderable from country to country (Table 4.1). It is highest in the Czech Republic, 
Sweden, Denmark and the United Kingdom (between 80% and 90%). The Nether-
lands falls in the large middle group whose public expenditure share ranges from 
65% to 80%. Next comes Greece, on 57%. On 44%, the us is the only country where 
the majority of health spending comes directly from private payments (including 
premiums paid to private insurance companies). 
Figure 4.2  Total current expenditure on health care: percentage of GDP, 2000
Source: OECD (Health Data), Eurostat (New Cronos, World Bank (WDI Online), GVG (2003), ECHP (a) 
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The proportion of private fi nancing accounted for by out-of-pocket payments and by 
insurance premiums differs sharply from one country to another. The Netherlands 
has a relatively high share of private fi nancing, but this is accounted for largely 
by insurance premiums. The proportion that comes from out-of-pocket payments 
is extremely limited. Furthermore, some of the private insurance is regulated by 
government.10 In countries like Portugal, Finland, Spain, Greece, Poland and New 
Zealand, on the other hand, private fi nancing consists largely of out-of-pocket pay-
ments. The share of private fi nancing is negligible in Luxembourg, the Czech Repub-
lic and Slovakia.
9  Absent values in this and subsequent fi gures indicates that underlying data are unavailable.
10  Through a standard insurance package, which is used mainly by high-risk groups 
(particularly the elderly and chronically ill); a maximum premium applies and any extra 
costs are borne by other private health insurance policyholders.
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Figure 4.3 shows developments in expenditure on health care as a proportion of 
gdp. Spending ratios have been relatively stable in all groups of countries. The slight 
upward trend in the ratio for the Netherlands will continue due to a sharp increase 
of spending on health in 2000-2002. To illustrate, the volume of care grew by 2.7% 
annually from 1995 to 2000, and by an annual 7.2% from 2000 to 200211. This is 
due to a large extent to measures taken to tackle waiting lists; extra resources were 
also committed to reduce pressure of work and improve the terms and conditions of 
health care workers (tk 2004).
Figure 4.3  Development of total current health expenditure, 1995-2001 (% GDP) 
Source: OECD (Health Data), Eurostat (New Cronos, World Bank (WDI Online), GVG (2003), ECHP (a)  
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Figure 4.4 shows that the Netherlands’ average health expenditure per capita of 
around nl€ 2,220 in 2001 was slightly above the eu-15 average (nl€ 2,030). The 
fi gure for the us was twice as high. Part of the explanation for the high costs of the 
health care system in the us are high wages of medical staff, the low occupancy rate 
of beds, relatively high administration costs, high insurance premiums resulting 
from many and large claims, the performance of large numbers of tests for fear of 
litigation and the highly sophisticated equipment used (see for example Mobley and 
Magnussen 1998).
Expenditure per capita in a number of Southern European countries (Greece, 
Spain and Portugal) was between nl€ 1,400 and 1,500. Spending in the new member 
states is much lower (nl€ 680 on average). The fi gure also attempts to correct for the
11  According to Van Hilten (2004) this growth of volume of care is overestimated because 
some volume components should be considered price components. 
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age effect on health care costs. Using oecd data (oecd 2003db: 165), it may be con-
cluded that health spending on people aged over 65 is two to four times higher than 
that on people under the age of 65. This is partly the result of the higher number of 
admissions and doctor’s consultations in this age group, and partly the result of the 
higher cost price of each treatment. The fi gure shows the ‘extra’ costs for over-65s, 
on the assumption that they consume health care three times more than other mem-
bers of the population. This refi nement of the fi gures barely affects the ranking of 
countries in terms of health spending per capita. The proportion of over-65s which, 
as Figure 2.3 shows, ranges from 11% to 19% of the total population, can explain to 
only a limited extent differences in spending.
Health expenditure per capita in constant nl€ of 2000 shows a slight increase in 
spending in all country groups over the period 1995-2000 (Figure 4.4). Besides the 
effect of demographic ageing, the rising cost price of health care services relative to 
the average cost price of domestic production has presumably also had an impact. 
This point will be taken up again in the section on cost prices and productivity . 
Figure 4.4  Total current health expenditure per capita, 2000 (NL€) 
Source: OECD (Health Data), Eurostat (New Cronos, World Bank (WDI Online), GVG (2003), ECHP (a); SCP revision
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Figure 4.5  Total current health expenditure per capita, 1995-2001 (NL€)
Source: OECD (Health Data), Eurostat (New Cronos, World Bank (WDI Online), GVG (2003), ECHP (a)  
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Figure 4.6 shows that national health expenditure increases with gdp per capita. From 
bottom left to top right we fi nd fi rst a number of new member states, followed by a 
number of Southern European countries, then a large group of eu countries and Anglo-
Saxon countries, and fi nally the us. In the middle group of eu and Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries, incidentally, no relationship is found between gdp and health expenditure: the 
difference in health spending between Germany at the one extreme and Ireland at the 
other is considerable.
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Figure 4.6  Relationship between share of health expenditure and GDP per capita, 2000 
Source: OECD (Health Data), Eurostat (New Cronos, World Bank (WDI Online), GVG (2003), ECHP (a)  
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Many attempts have been made to systematically identify factors responsible for 
differences in per capita health expenditure. In theory, they could be linked either to 
characteristics of the population or to properties of the health care system. Relevant 
population characteristics include demographic profi le, prevalence of unhealthy life-
styles and level of prosperity. Relevant system characteristics would include access, 
funding and technology. A recent overview of research in this are can be found in 
Gerdtham and Jönsson (2000), who conclude that all attempted explanations are 
founded on a fairly weak theoretical and empirical basis. Income appears to be a 
very robust explanatory factor. The degree to which it plays a role varies, however, 
although most studies point to an income elasticity of around 1, which suggests that 
health care lies halfway between a basic necessity and a luxury good. The impact 
of other population characteristics and properties of the health care system itself 
appears to be quite modest. One notable point is that the demographic profi le of the 
population, such as the proportion of elderly people, cannot generally explain the 
differences found. Figure 4.7 gives an indication of the possible causes of differ-
ences in health spending per capita, showing results of a model with three variables 
explaining 85% of spending differences.12 Factors like lifestyle (alcohol consump-
tion, smoking, obesity) and technical equipment (scanners) were not found to have 
12  Based on a simple one year regression model of countries; explanatory factors are 
hardly correlated. 
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suffi cient explanatory value at country level. The degree to which family doctors 
act as gatekeepers to specialist care also appears to have no signifi cant impact on 
expenditure levels, although the literature suggests it reduces spending.
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Figure 4.7  Health expenditure per capita, related to some explanatory variables, 2001
Source: OECD (Health Data), Eurostat (New Cronos, World Bank (WDI Online), GVG (2003), ECHP (a); SCP analysis
In the end, differences between countries appear to be related mainly to differences 
in the average income.13 There is fairly little correlation with the share of private 
fi nancing and the proportion of over-75s. The cost-raising effect of the share of pri-
vate fi nancing shown in Figure 4.7 is not generally substantiated in the literature 
(Gerdtham and Jönsson 2000), although some research does confi rm our result 
(Gil and Gracia 2002). Nor are there any indications that private health care institu-
tions operate at lower costs than do publicly-run institutions (Mobley and Magnus-
sen, 1998). Countries restricting supply for budgetary reasons, incur lower health 
expenditure in relative terms. In practice, these are often countries with a strongly 
publicly-oriented system, which partly explains the outcomes in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.8 shows spending per capita for some important products: inpatient 
care, outpatient care, medicine and ‘other’. Along with Ireland and Denmark, the 
Netherlands devotes more than half its spending to inpatient care. This fi gure is 
below 30% in Sweden and the United Kingdom. The share of outpatient care is high 
in Luxembourg (almost 50%). In the majority of countries it is somewhere between 
20% and 35%. The Netherlands (on 15%), Sweden, the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
13 One of the explanations is the ‘Baumol effect’. In essence, this means that it is diffi cult 
to raise labour productivity in a labour-intensive sector like health care, while the prices 
of the resources used, particularly staff, follow more general trends.
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Poland and Hungary devote the lowest proportion of their health expenditure to 
outpatient care. The proportion spent on pharmaceuticals14 is above 20% in France, 
Italy, Portugal, the Czech Republic and Hungary. On 12%, the Netherlands comes 
somewhere near the bottom of the mid-section, while Denmark, Austria and Poland 
score below 10%. No clear link can be made with the type of system. It is however 
clear that the Mediterranean countries, in particular, devote a relatively large propor-
tion of their health spending to medicine. This could be related to cultural factors 
(Kooiker and Van der Wijst 2003).
Figure 4.8  Health expenditure per capita by type of care, 2000 
Source: OECD (Health Data), Eurostat (New Cronos, World Bank (WDI Online), GVG (2003), ECHP (a)  
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Figure 4.9 illustrates the relationship between expenditure on inpatient and out-
patient care, corrected for differences in prosperity between countries. A slightly 
positive, though barely signifi cant, correlation was found between the two. It would 
appear that this is more a matter of complementarity than of substitution. Pacolet 
(1999) has observed this in the past in connection with inpatient and outpatient care 
of the elderly. The us is exceptional, with its very high spending on outpatient care, 
while Ireland, the Netherlands and Denmark emphasise inpatient care. These last 
three countries offer relatively intensive nursing home care for the elderly and disa-
bled (see also Figure 4.10).
14  In a broad sense, including ‘non-durables’.
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Figure 4.9  Outpatient and inpatient expenditure, 2000 (% of GDP)  
Source: OECD (Health Data), Eurostat (New Cronos, World Bank (WDI Online), GVG (2003), ECHP (a) 
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4.3.2 Beds
The number of beds in relation to the size of the population is an important indica-
tor of the availability of inpatient care.
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Figure 4.10  Inpatient care: beds per 1000 inhabitants, 2000 
Source: OECD (Health Data) SCP revision
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The average number of beds in acute inpatient care is roughly four per 1000 popula-
tion in the eu-15 (Figure 4.10). Finland, Sweden and the uk have substantially lower 
scores, while Luxembourg, Germany and Austria score substantially higher. The 
new member states have slightly higher bed availability for acute care (more than 
fi ve per 1000), whereas the Anglo-Saxon post slightly lower bed availability (just 
over three per 1000). There are distinct differences between admission fi gures and 
bed capacity in Finland (high admissions, low bed capacity). The Fins achieve this 
thanks to a low average number of days per patient and a very high occupancy rate 
in hospitals. In Sweden and Malta, too, there are differences between admission 
fi gures and bed capacity (average admissions, low bed capacity in the former, low 
admissions, average bed capacity in the latter), but they are signifi cantly smaller 
than in Finland.
Various forms of non-acute inpatient care are much larger in terms of beds than 
in terms of admissions. In the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, the United 
Kingdom and Finland, the number of beds available in non-acute care is greater than 
in acute hospital care. In the Southern European countries and in Canada and New 
Zealand the share of other beds is fairly low. The biggest differences are found in 
long-term care. The availability of long-term care is quite generous on the whole in 
the Northern European countries, moderate in Central and Eastern Europe and fairly 
sparse in Southern Europe. It is at any rate clear that in Southern Europe the elderly 
are still often cared for by their family (Giarchi 1996). This could turn out to be prob-
lematic not only because family ties are slowly eroding and relatives are less likely 
to feel it is their duty to help family members, but also because some of the neces-
sary long-term care would then have to be provided in hospital, which would make 
it relatively expensive. The capacity of non-acute inpatient care also differs strongly 
between countries. Several Southern European countries, Australia and the us have 
very few psychiatric hospitals, for instance. In Greece and Italy, in particular, there 
is minimal availability of psychiatric beds.
Earlier on, it was mentioned that nursing homes and residential care for the 
mentally handicapped are not included here, because according to international 
defi nitions they do not form part of health care but part of welfare work. Pacolet et 
al. (1999) give a picture of inpatient services for the elderly, which also includes care 
homes and sheltered living (Figure 4.11).
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Figuur 4.11  Inpatient care of the elderly, beds per 100 elderly 65+ (about 1995) 
Source: Pacolet et al. (1999) 
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The data in Figure 4.11 refer to the eu-15 in the last year prior to 1998 for which 
information was available. In many cases this was around 1995, but in some the data 
refer to an earlier year, making it diffi cult to compare this fi gure with Figure 4.10. It 
illustrates the wide variability both in the number and type of places available. The 
picture for non-acute care is largely consistent with that in Figure 4.10: relatively 
high availability in the Northern European countries (and the Netherlands), moder-
ate availability in Central Europe and low availability in Southern Europe. 
4.3.3 Staff
The fi gures for total employment in the health care sector (Figure 4.12) are unfor-
tunately rather incomplete. Finland leads, with 45 full-time equivalents (fte) per 
1000 inhabitants, followed by Sweden, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and 
a number of Anglo-Saxon countries on 30 to 35 fte. With 26 and 27 fte the Neth-
erlands and Ireland score just below the eu-15 average, followed by Slovakia on 22. 
Several Southern European countries and Luxembourg have much lower fi gures 
(around 15).
Figure 4.13 shows employment trends in the health care sector per head of popu-
lation. As with real spending per capita (Figure 4.3), employment numbers show a 
slight upward trend in all country groups. The Netherlands is moving towards the 
eu-15 average.
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Figure 4.12  Total health employment per 1000 inhabitants, 2001 (FTE) 
Source: OECD (Health Data) 
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Figure 4.13  Total health employment per 1000 inhabitants, 1995-2001 (FTE)
Source: OECD (Health Data) 
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Figures 4.14 and 4.15 present the number of doctors. For some countries (Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal), the fi gures include retired doctors. In the Neth-
erlands, 10% of all doctors are aged 65 or over. Doctors can be divided into general 
practitioners, specialists and other. However, such a breakdown is not available for 
all countries. In some countries, including the Netherlands, the ‘other’ category 
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includes the majority of doctors. According to fi gures compiled under the Individual 
Health Care Professions Act (big) there were over 52,000 qualifi ed doctors in the 
Netherlands in 2001, including over 7,000 practising GPs and 14,000 specialists. This 
means that 60% of Dutch doctors are not classifi ed as GPs or specialists. Many of 
them will be employed otherwise, for example by occupational health organisations 
or insurance companies, some will be newly qualifi ed doctors training to become 
specialists or working as interns, others will be working in unregistered professions 
(such as homeopathy), have ceased practising or retired.
The total number of doctors per 1000 population ranges from 2 (Ireland, the 
United Kingdom, Poland and several Anglo-Saxon countries) to 4.5 (Greece and 
Italy). Belgium also scores high, with 3.9. The Netherlands falls somewhere in the 
middle, with 3.3, as does the us, on 2.8. The proportion of general practitioners 
varies sharply from country to country. Though Greece has many doctors, very few 
of them are GPs. Most patients’ fi rst port of call will therefore be one of the hospital 
outpatient consultation services, which are relatively expensive. The relatively large 
number of specialists does not, therefore, indicate a high level of service provision. It 
in fact suggest relatively ineffi cient service provision in primary care. Poland is also 
struggling with a chronic shortage of GPs. Its temporary solution is to have a large 
number of specialists work in general practice.
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Figure 4.14  Physicians: number per 1000 inhabitants, 2001   
Source: OECD (Health Data)
The number of doctors per capita (Figure 4.15) shows an upward trend, with the 
Netherlands coming above the eu-15 average only in the fi nal year considered.
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Figure 4.15  Physicians: number per 1000 inhabitants, 1995-2001 
Source: OECD (Health Data) 
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The last two fi gures in this section refer to the number of nurses. As can be seen in 
Figure 4.16, Finland and Ireland lead the fi eld, with some 15 fte per 1000 inhabit-
ants, followed at a slight distance by the Netherlands (13 fte) and Belgium (12 fte). 
Many countries – including Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden, the United Kingdom 
and the Anglo-Saxon countries – have a score somewhere between 8 and 10. France, 
the Southern European countries and a number of new member states all score lower, 
with Greece and Portugal closing the fi eld on around 4 fte per 1000 population.
Over the period 1995-2001 the average number of nurses per 1000 inhabitants 
in the eu-15 and the Anglo-Saxon countries rose steadily (Figure 4.17). The new 
member states witnessed a slight decline. According to this source (oecd Health 
Data 2003), the number of nurses in the Netherlands is not only high, but is also 
increasing rapidly (from 11 per 1000 in 1995 to around 13 in 2001).
150 Health care
Figure 4.16  Nurses: number per 1000 inhabitants, 2001
Source: OECD (Health Data) 
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Figure 4.17 Nurses: number per 1000 inhabitants, 1995-2001
Source: OECD (Heakth Data)
4.4 Patient care
4.4.1 Inpatient care
Most countries break their data on inpatient care down into hospital admissions (acute 
care) and other inpatient care (non-acute care). Where they do not, we can assume that 
the majority of admissions are to hospitals. Figure 4.18 looks at inpatient admissions.
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Figure 4.18  Inpatient care: admissions per 1000 inhabitants, 2000 
Source: OECD (Health Data) 
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Austria is notable for its relatively high number of hospital admissions (270 per 1000 
inhabitants). It belongs to the corporatist cluster, which is generally characterised by 
high admission rates (this applies particularly to Germany and France). The number 
of hospital admissions is high in Eastern Europe and Finland, too. Cyprus and Malta 
have the lowest hospital admission rates (around 75 per 1000 inhabitants). Spain, 
Portugal, the Netherlands, Canada and the us have fairly low rates, too, at around 
100 per 1000 population.
 In many countries, the number of admissions to other inpatient care represents 
only 10% or less of hospital admissions. On 8%, the Netherlands comes behind the 
leaders – Germany (13%), France (19%) and Finland (24%). 
The number of patient days in hospitals (Figure 4.19) correlates with the number 
of beds, via the occupancy rate (Figure 4.29) and with the number of admissions, via 
the average length of stay per patient (Figure 4.12).
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Figure 4.19  Acute care: number of patient days per capita, 2000 
Source: OECD (Health Data) 
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The number of patient days per capita in hospitals ranges from 0.3 (New Zealand) to 
1.9 (Germany). Austria, Luxembourg and several new member states also have high 
scores. On 0.8, the Netherlands is in the lower regions, just above the us, Sweden 
and New Zealand.
Figure 4.20 shows the number of patient days per capita in other inpatient care. 
Unfortunately there is no data for many of the new member states. The variation 
here is even greater than in acute care. Germany leads the fi eld, but Ireland, Luxem-
bourg, Denmark and the US also post high scores. The Southern European countries 
and Canada record the lowest scores.
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Figure 4.20 Non-acute inpatient care: number of patient days per capita, 2000 
Source: OECD (Health Data); Eurostat (SCP revision) 
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There is a downward trend in all country groups in the number of beds and patient 
days in hospital care. This trend is slightly less pronounced in the case of patient 
days than of beds (Figure 4.21), and the fall in the Netherlands is greater than in 
other countries. The downward trend is related to the faster completion of medical 
treatment, which has reduced the length of time patients remain in hospital. This 
corresponds to a similar development in the length of stay (Figure 4.22), which is 
still relatively high in the Netherlands.
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Figure 4.21  Acute care: number of patient days per capita, 1995-2000
Source: OECD (Health Data) 
Figure 4.22 Acute care: average length of stay, 1995-2000 (in days)
Source: OECD (Health Data)
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4.4.2 Outpatient care
There are not many indicators of production in outpatient care. Figure 4.23 shows 
one of the few indicators available: the annual number of doctors’ consultations 
per capita. This includes visits both to GPs and to specialists. Two countries have a 
particularly high score: Hungary (22) and the Czech Republic (12). Both countries 
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have an extensive system of polyclinics, which are regarded here as outpatient care. 
The physicians associated with these clinics also carry out procedures that are often 
performed by nurses in the other countries. The score in most countries is between 4 
and 8, and on 6, the Netherlands is just slightly below the eu-15 average. The number 
of doctors’ consultations is below 4 in countries as diverse as Greece, Portugal, Lux-
embourg and Sweden. Looking only at the number of general practitioners (Figure 
4.24), there is a weak correlation with the number of admissions for acute care in 
hospitals. Where GPs act as gatekeepers, one would rather expect to fi nd a nega-
tive correlation, because of the substitution between outpatient and inpatient care. 
However, no such correlation would appear to exist at country level. There is in fact 
a positive correlation, which suggests complementarity between the two types of care 
(more visits to the doctor leading to more use of inpatient care). Alternatively, the 
results might indicate a higher overall demand for health care.
Trends over time are in Figure 4.25. The number of doctors’ consultations per 
capita saw a slight upward trend in most countries between 1995 and 2000, a devel-
opment which might be related to population ageing. The numbers for the Nether-
lands are fairly stable over the entire period. 
Figure 4.23 Outpatient consultations of physicians: number per capita, 2001  
Source: OECD (Health Data)
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Figure 4.24 General practitioners and acute care admissions, 2000   
Source: OECD (Health Data)Figure  
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Figure 4.25  Doctors’ consultations: number per capita, 1995-2000
Source: OECD (Health Data) 
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The numbers for visits to the dentist are fairly incomplete. Here, too, a wide range is 
found: from 0.4 in Luxembourg to 2.6 in the Netherlands. The Czech Republic and 
Belgium also score fairly high. The eu-15 average is 1.2. One explanation for the high 
number of visits to the dentist in the Netherlands might be that the Dutch guideline 
is two routine check-ups a year, which in the period under review were still paid for 
by the public insurance system.
4.5 Cost price and productivity
Productivity refl ects the relationship between production (Section 4.4) and the 
resources used (Section 4.3), either monetary or staff. By relating resources to total 
production, we obtain insight into cost price, total productivity and labour produc-
tivity.
Figures 4.26 and 4.27 attempt to give an overall picture of productivity differences 
in health care, based on the use of fi nancial resources. These are rough measures, as 
the institutional classifi cation used in the case of production and consumption dif-
fers from the one used in the case of staff numbers and costs.
Figure 4.26 refers to inpatient care. Patient days in hospitals and other institu-
tions offering inpatient care have been weighted at a ratio of 1:0.5, based on a rough 
estimate of the difference in costs per product in the Netherlands. The costs per 
patient day are highest in Sweden, at nl€ 870. These costs are around nl€ 700 per 
patient day in Canada and Italy and well over nl€ 600 in the us and Spain. At the 
other end of the spectrum are Hungary and Poland, on around nl€ 100 per patient 
day, followed by the Czech Republic. Germany, Austria, Finland, the United King-
dom and Australia also have costs below nl€ 300. On nl€ 580, the Netherlands is 
found somewhere in the mid range. 
Results indicate a negative association between the number of patient days per 
capita and the costs per patient day. A lower number of patient days per capita is 
associated with higher costs per patient day. This can probably be explained to some 
extent by more intensive treatment, combined with a shorter length of stay.
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Figure 4.26  Inpatient care: cost per corrected patient day, 2000 (NL€) 
Source: OECD (Health Data) SCP revision
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Figure 4.27 shows trends in costs per patient day in 2000 prices. In the eu-15 these 
costs have been rising by an average 2.5% a year, and in the Anglo-Saxon countries 
by 3.6%. The rate of increase in the Netherlands is 4.4%. The background material 
shows that costs were more or less stable in only three countries: the United King-
dom, New Zealand and Hungary.
Analyses for the Netherlands suggest that three factors cause a rapid rise in costs 
per patient day. The fi rst is more intensive treatment in hospital, where a growing 
number of medical procedures can be performed in a shorter time. Second is the 
increase in the care patients on average need (‘care burden’), not only in nursing 
homes, but also in hospitals, as a result of demographic ageing. The third factor is 
the rising relative cost price of labour-intensive services, like health care. As Baumol 
(1967) famously pointed out, it is much more diffi cult to achieve an increase in 
labour productivity through mechanisation and automation in personal services, 
while the cost price of the resources deployed – particularly of labour – generally fol-
lows the overall market trend (Kuhry and Van der Torre 2002: 22).
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Figure 4.27  Inpatient care: costs per corrected patient day, 1995-2000 (NL€)
Source: OECD (Health Data) SCP revision 
The occupancy rate is an important indicator of productivity in inpatient care, based 
on the use of beds. The average occupancy rate of hospital beds for acute care is 78% 
in the eu-15 (Figure 4.28). Greece clearly falls well below the European average. A 
high occupancy rate need not necessarily lead to waiting list problems. 
Figure 4.28  Acute care: occupancy rate (about 2000)  
Source: OECD (Health Data) SCP revision; dark grey: with waiting list problems 
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In Figure 4.28 countries that are known to have long waiting times for non-acute 
hospital care are shaded dark grey. The low occupancy rate in Greece is linked to 
the infl exible allocation of hospital beds to certain specialists or specialisms, which 
leads to waiting lists for some kinds of specialist care, and none for others.
Labour productivity is an important aspect of overall productivity. However, in relat-
ing staff (number of nurses) to production (number of patient days), it is diffi cult to 
distinguish between quality and production dimensions. More staff can lead either 
to higher quality care for patients or to more comfortable working conditions for 
staff members. In so far as extra staff benefi ts patients, this should statistically be 
measured as additional production, not as productivity loss. Unfortunately, the fi g-
ures available do not enable to identify when this is the case.
Comparing the number of nurses (Figure 4.17) with the number of patient days 
(Figure 4.21), it emerges that the ratio between staff and production increased by 
an average of 18% in the eu-15 over the period 1995-2000. On 32%, the Netherlands 
comes in well above average. The new member states and the Anglo-Saxon countries 
have scores around the eu-15 average (21% and 19% respectively). As noted, it is not 
clear whether this is an indication of better quality or lower productivity. Another 
explanation for the increase of staff per patient day might be the growing care 
burden, which is not refl ected in the yardstick used to measure production (number 
of patient days). Figure 4.22 shows that there has been a decline in the average 
length of stay in hospital, which might imply an increased care burden. Since the 
average stay in the Netherlands has not fallen faster than in other countries, this 
factor fails to explain the particularly sharp increase in nurses per patient day here. 
Analyses suggest that 55% of expenditure growth in the period 1995-2001 in the 
Netherlands is connected with more production of health care services, 20% with 
improved working conditions for nursing staff and just over 25% with other factors 
not directly related either to production or to working conditions (tk 2004).
The wages bill accounts for a signifi cant proportion of health care spending. Dif-
ferences in the relative cost price of staff might affect the level of health spending 
between countries. Figure 4.29 shows the relationship between average pay in the 
health care and welfare sector and average pay of all workers.
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Figure 4.29  Ratio between wages in health care & welfare sector and all wages  
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts (latest available year) 
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However, the comparison of data for different countries is hampered by two impor-
tant factors: the inclusion of the welfare sector (including childcare, and services 
for the disabled and the elderly) and the absence of self-employed health profession-
als. This last factor can be particularly distorting in countries where doctors are 
salaried, which is largely the case in Greece, Spain, Portugal, Finland and Malta. 
Greece’s high score can also be explained by the low number of nurses and high 
number of doctors (see Figures 4.14 and 4.16). Italy and Portugal also have relatively 
few nurses and a relatively large number of doctors. Taking this background data 
into account, and leaving out Greece, Portugal and Spain, we fi nd that cost price 
differences between countries are in fact rather small, ranging from 69% (Poland) to 
103% (Belgium).
Data on productivity in outpatient care are even more scarce than those on inpa-
tient care. The only production indicator available is doctors’ consultations. They 
can be related to staff resources – the number of doctors – to give some measure of 
labour productivity. However, quite apart from the fact that this in no way refl ects 
the heterogeneity and quality of services provided, the indicators are problematic in 
terms of both the numerator and the denominator. The problem associated with the 
numerator is that there also exist inpatient doctors’ consultations. In the Nether-
lands, for example, polyclinic treatment by a specialist is also regarded as a doctors’ 
consultation. In terms of the denominator, the problem is that all practising doctors 
have been counted in, irrespective of whether they contribute to the total number of 
consultations.
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That said, statistics compiled show the annual number of consultations per doctor 
to range from 600 in Greece to over 7,000 in Hungary (Figure 4.30). In most coun-
tries, the fi gure is between 1,500 and 2,500, with the Netherlands somewhere in 
the middle range on 1,900. The same applies to the us, which has a fi gure of 2,000 
consultations. High fi gures are found in the Czech Republic (3,700), Canada (3,000), 
the United Kingdom (2,800) and Australia (2,600), while the fi gures in Sweden, Por-
tugal and Luxembourg are low, at around 1,000. As Figure 4.31 shows, the number of 
consultations per doctor has slightly fallen in most country groups. This does not, 
however, apply to two of the three new member states for which fi gures are available 
(Hungary and Poland), nor to France and Germany.
 
Figure 4.30  Number of consultations per practising physician, 2000 
Source: OECD (Health Data) SCP revision 
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Figure 4.31  Number of consultations per practising physician, 1995-2000
Source: OECD (Health Data) SCP revision 
4.6 Quality of care
Quality is has both subjective and objective dimensions. This section examines two 
aspects of quality: waiting lists as an indicator of objective quality of the health care 
system and public confi dence in the system as an indicator of its subjective quality.
4.6.1 Waiting lists for non-acute care
At the level of the health care system as a whole, the government has the task of match-
ing supply and demand. Waiting lists for health care services are thus an indication 
of the quality of the system. There should, of course, be no waiting lists for acute and 
urgent treatments, and there are few waiting list problems in this area, if any. The 
limits to the capacity of the system are thus felt mainly in the fi eld of non-urgent care. 
An international comparative study has looked at waiting times for non-acute curative 
care (oecd 2003dc).15 The treatments include some for which new technology has 
recently become available, thus sharply increasing demand and creating an imbalance 
in the health care market. Eight of the 15 oecd countries in the study report substan-
tial to long waiting times for non-urgent surgery, and fi ve report no waiting times 
worth speaking of. In some of the eight countries with waiting list problems the wait-
ing times are long (the uk and Finland), in others they are moderate (Spain, Denmark,
15  The study looks at ten surgical procedures: hip replacement, knee replacement, cataract 
surgery, varicose veins, hysterectomy, prostatectomy, cholecystectomy, inguinal and fem-
oral hernia, coronary artery bypass graft surgery and percutaneous coronary angioplasty.
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the Netherlands and Sweden), while in others little information is available about 
actual waiting times (Italy, Ireland). Five oecd countries (Belgium, Austria, France, 
Germany and Luxembourg) have virtually no waiting times and in two countries 
(Greece and Portugal), little information is available. Of the four Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries included in this report, only the us reports no waiting times to speak of, and 
hardly any information is available on the ten new eu entrants.
Generally speaking, it would appear that the likelihood of waiting lists decreases 
as more medical capacity is available, as more fi nancial resources are put to work 
and consumers contribute more to cover costs. Thus, waiting list problems occur 
mainly in health care systems with a small role for market forces, where the trade-
off between benefi ts (in terms of improved health) and cost (in terms of fi nancial 
sustainability) made at the level of society differs from that at the individual level.
The optimum outcome of this trade-off for non-urgent curative care will be a 
waiting time somewhere between zero and a few months. Research has shown that 
short waiting times for this type of care cause very little deterioration in health, 
while the costs of care increase sharply if such treatments have to be performed 
without waiting time. Furthermore, it appears that patients do not strongly object 
to waiting a short time for non-urgent treatment (scp 2003: 123). However, waiting 
times are still regarded as unpleasant and spark public debate.
Figure 4.32 shows the link between the average waiting time for non-urgent 
surgery and health expenditure per capita. There seems to be a clear correlation 
between the resources deployed (health expenditure) and the quality of the health 
care system (waiting times). This suggests that more input of resources can help 
reduce waiting times. But this is not necessarily the case. In practice, it has been 
found that an unconditional increase in supply can lead to higher demand, so that 
waiting lists do not shrink in proportion to the extra resources committed (oecd 
2003dd). Furthermore, unconditional linking of extra resources to the length of 
waiting times can produce a perverse incentive for providers to maintain long wait-
ing times. If the only condition is to produce additional care, there is a risk that 
suppliers will cause a shift from regular to extra care. If the aim is to reduce waiting 
lists, extra resources will therefore have to be linked to measures that ensure that no 
extra demand for care is created, through re-indication of patients on waiting lists 
or enhancement of price mechanisms on the supply side (specialists) or demand 
side (patients), and that there is no shift from regular to extra care. Stronger price 
mechanisms can have a negative impact on fi nancial sustainability (if remuneration 
for medical specialists linked to activities performed is introduced or enhanced) or 
universal accessibility (if out-of-pocket payments are introduced or raised). 
One way of reducing waiting times that is attractive from the cost point of view is 
to enhance effi ciency. Gains in effi ciency have proved diffi cult to achieve at the level 
of individual health care units (surgical teams or wards), but it has proved possible 
in terms of the way in which the provision of care is organised. Better care manage-
ment, more effi cient planning of various procedures and prevention of cancellations 
can reduce waiting times. One factor that is relevant in many countries, though not 
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in the Netherlands, is ‘dual practice’, which allows medical specialists to provide 
treatment both publicly and privately. There are strong indications that the higher 
remuneration for private treatment in dual practices causes public health service 
waiting times to increase (oecd 2003dc).
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Figure 4.32 Mean waiting time for patients admitted to elective surgery, 2000 
Source: OECD (2003dc) 
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4.6.2 Conﬁ dence in the health care system
The confi dence that the public places in the health care system is an important 
indicator of quality. In this respect, Malta, Austria and Finland lead the fi eld, while 
a number of Mediterranean countries, including Greece and Italy, bring up the rear 
(Figure 4.33). The public in the new eu member states generally also have little con-
fi dence in their health care system. In 2000, the Netherlands came just behind the 
leaders, although confi dence has been dented somewhat in recent years, partly in 
response to the public uproar about waiting lists.16
One would expect some connection to exist between the institutional set-up of the 
system and the public’s confi dence in it. Countries in group 4, in particular, with the 
exception of Germany, enjoy high public confi dence. These countries (Austria, Bel-
gium and France) have a premium-fi nanced demand-driven health care system with 
a large degree of free choice for consumers. But this comes at a price: health spend-
ing per capita is relatively high, although not as high as under the strongly market-
oriented system in the us. Several countries in groups 1 and 2 (except for Finland) 
score rather badly. Countries in group 3 enjoy more public confi dence, except for 
Canada. The population of the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Sweden have a fairly 
good opinion of their health care systems, while the population of the us and Greece 
enjoy little public confi dence. 
 
Figure 4.33  Confidence in health care system by country, 2000 
Source: European Values Survey 
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16  In 2002 just over 30% of the adult population in the Netherlands thought that the quality of 
medical care had declined in the past fi ve years, while fewer than 20% felt it had risen. The 
public’s views on the quality of mental health care (confi dence down 30%), care of the disabled 
(down 35%) and care of the elderly (down 50%) were even less positive (scp 2002b: 294).
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4.7 Effectiveness
Effectiveness may be defi ned as the relationship between production (and the quality 
of production) and objectives achieved. A number of measures are available to assess 
the effectiveness of health care systems. However, the scope of these measures is 
too limited to allow health care production to be related directly to the objectives 
achieved. This section, therefore, relates the input of resources (health spending) to 
the health status of the population. The primary objective of any health care system 
is good health. Good health is indicated by a long life expectancy, a healthy life and 
low infant mortality. Subjective health status – how healthy people actually feel – also 
gives an idea of a nation’s state of health.
Indicators of life expectancy and health suffer from the well-known problem 
that always dogs effect indicators: they measure not only the results of the service 
in question (in this case the health care system) but also the effect of other social 
trends, including lifestyle factors such as diet, smoking and alcohol consumption, 
and environmental factors like drinking water quality and environmental pollution. 
The health care system is therefore only one of the factors infl uencing the general 
health of the population.
Health care aims not only to produce a healthy population, it also includes objec-
tives related to the system itself: universal accessibility, high quality and fi nancial 
sustainability. Along with the primary objective of good public health these second-
ary objectives can be correlated with the input of resources, to assess how effective 
the system is in terms of its aims.
4.7.1 Measures of health status
The publication of the World Health Report 2000 constituted a major boost to meas-
uring the effectiveness of health care systems. The who-report presents a composite 
measure of both the ‘goodness and fairness’ of health care in different countries. 
The measure comprises two indicators related to the standard achieved and three 
indicators related to distribution among the population. In theory, there are good 
reasons to include a measure of health inequality in such a composite measure. 
However, this measure causes problems in practice, because distribution has to 
be assessed in relation to a standard of health. Moreover, in assessing inequalities 
one must take into account only those factors that are relevant to health differences 
(and which are not, therefore, caused by differences in other relevant factors such 
as age and hereditary conditions). This report does not, therefore, adopt the who 
approach.
The fi ve indicators in the World Health Report 2000 are disability-adjusted life 
expectancy (weighted 25%), social inequality in infant mortality (25%), the level 
and inequality of responsiveness in terms of basic values such as respect for persons 
and client orientation (together 25%) and the equal distribution of fi nancial risk 
according to capacity (25%). This report uses only the fi rst indicator to help measure 
the effectiveness of health care systems. The indicator of social inequality in infant 
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mortality shows virtually no differences in Europe and the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Though there are differences in the new eu member states, they are hard to inter-
pret.17 No other measures of inequality in health differences are available. Respon-
siveness – in terms of basic values such as respect of persons and client orientation 
of the health care system – has been assessed by country experts and cannot be 
viewed directly as an indicator of the state of health care in a particular country.18 
Finally, the distribution of fi nancial risk according to capacity is seen here as a prop-
erty of health care systems that might explain differences in performance.
Figure 4.34 shows life expectancy at birth. It is highest in Australia and New 
Zealand (80 years). The Netherlands is at the eu-15 average of 78.2 years, a fraction 
above Belgium, Greece, Finland and Malta. The uk, Cyprus, the us, Ireland and Por-
tugal score slightly below average. Most of the new entrants(with the exception of 
Malta and Cyprus, of course) have signifi cantly lower life expectancy, with the lowest 
in Latvia (71 years). However, life expectancy in the new member states is moving 
towards the eu-15 average (Figure 4.35). In 1995 the difference was still 5.3 years, 
but a gradual rise in life expectancy had reduced it to 4.5 years by 2001. Average life 
expectancy has in fact risen in all countries, with the biggest rise in Hungary (2.5 
years) and the smallest in Greece (0.5 years).
Figure 4.34 does not refl ect the considerable difference in life expectancy between 
men and women, which is generally around fi ve years. In some Eastern and Central 
European countries, however, men live on average ten years shorter than women. 
There is some convergence in the life expectancy of men and women, also in the 
Netherlands, which is related to some extent to convergence in (un)healthy lifestyles 
(cbs 2003a). At country level there are no indications of convergence in unhealthy 
lifestyles. The variation coeffi cient in the percentage of regular smokers was around 
18% in the period 1993-2000; for alcohol consumption it was around 20% (oecd 
Health Data 2003).         
Disability-adjusted life expectancy – the number of healthy years of life – is a 
better indicator of health. This measure combines the probability of death with the 
probability of illness. The probability of illness is weighted according to severity of 
illness in such a way that it can be broken down into healthy and ‘lost’ years of life 
(Mathers et al. 2000). In Europe, the average number of ‘lost’ years is 8.0, Denmark 
17  The calculation of infant mortality inequality is based on the assumption that differ-
ences in the probability of death within families are purely coincidental, but that differ-
ences between families are not. Inter-group inequality is thus an indicator of socially 
unequal probability of infant mortality (see Gakidou and King, 2000).
18  Responsiveness comprises seven sub-indicators: respect for the dignity of persons, 
respect for the autonomy of persons, respect for confi dentiality, prompt attention to 
health needs, the availability of basic amenities, access to social support networks and 
free choice of institutions.
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has a relatively good score (7.1) and Portugal a relatively poor score (9.7). The aver-
age number of ‘lost’ years is slightly higher in the Anglo-Saxon countries (8.8) and is 
higher still in the new eu member states (9.7), with Slovenia doing well in compari-
son (8.2) and Lithuania doing exceptionally badly in this respect (11.8).
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Figure 4.34  Life expectancy at birth, 2001 
Source: OECD (Health Data) 
 
Figure 4.35  Life expectancy at birth, 1995-2001
Source: OECD (Health Data) 
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Figure 4.36 shows the relationship between life expectancy and disability-adjusted 
life expectancy. The line on the graph corresponds with the mean eu-15 difference 
between actual and healthy life expectancy (8,0 years). In the Baltic and Central 
European states, life expectancy is not only 8 to 12 years lower than in the lead coun-
try, Sweden, the difference between total and disability-adjusted life expectancy is 
also greater, in the order of ten years. Portugal, Cyprus and the us also have a fairly 
large difference between both measures of life expectancy.
Figure 4.36 reveals an important fact: population ageing resulting from increased 
life expectancy does not necessarily lead to higher per capita health spending, 
because most of the costs are incurred at the end of a person’s life. This point has 
been made repeatedly in the policy debate on the ageing issue (oecd 2003da). 
Another cause of demographic ageing does however push up costs per capita: the 
fall in the fertility rate in Western countries, which led fi rst to a dejuvenation of the 
population, and then to an increase in the proportion of over-65s.
healthy life expectancy
Figure 4.36  Scatter diagram showing life expectancy versus healthy life expectancy, 2001
Source: OECD (Health Data)
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Figure 4.37 pictures infant mortality.19 In 2001 it ranged from 3 per 1000 births in 
Finland to 8 per 1000 in Hungary. The eu-15 average was around 4.8 in that year. 
Sweden, Spain and the Czech Republic also have good fi gures, while Poland, the us, 
Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom score rather badly. The Neth-
erlands also belongs to this group, with 5.2 deaths per 1000 live births. 
19  Defi ned as the number of children who live no longer than a year in every 1000 live births.
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Figure 4.38 shows that the new eu member states are gradually making up ground, 
and that the average in the eu-15 and the Anglo-Saxon countries is gradually improv-
ing. The small deterioration in the Netherlands is due partly to the fact that more 
and more women are postponing motherhood, the fairly early stage at which treat-
ment is terminated if the prospects of survival are very poor, the relatively high number 
of multiple births and relatively limited use of prenatal testing (rivm 2002: 10).
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Figure 4.37  Infant mortality in deaths per 1000 live births, 2001
Source: OECD (Health Data)
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Figure 4.38  Infant mortality in deaths per 1000 live births, 1995-2001
Source: OECD (Health Data) 
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The most general subjective measure of the health of the population is subjective 
health status. General public surveys sometimes include questions about people’s 
state of health as they perceive it, with a choice of fi ve answers, including good and 
very good. The reliability and international comparability of this subjective meas-
ure is the subject of much debate (see who 2002: 369-447). In particular, there are 
doubts about the degree to which this yardstick refl ects objective health and the 
degree to which it in fact refl ects aspirations and wishes. There is evidence to sug-
gest that differences in aspiration are associated with socio-economic status. The 
more prosperous and educated people are, the higher their aspirations are said to 
be, and the more likely they are to have a negative image of their own health. These 
differences might explain the relatively positive views people in developing coun-
tries have of their own state of health (who 2000: 378-383). This particular problem 
would appear to be less signifi cant in the countries reviewed in the present report. 
There is a fairly strong correlation between objectively defi ned and subjectively per-
ceived health status. Denmark, for example, scores well on both the objective and 
subjective health indicators, and Portugal has the worst score on both accounts. One 
exception is Ireland, where the objective state of health is rather poor, while per-
ceived health status is very good. This might have to do with the fact that the Irish 
are relatively healthy in terms of ‘lost’ years of life, despite the fact that life expect-
ancy at birth is on the low side (Figure 4.34).
 People’s assessment of their own health differs between country groups 
(Figure 4.39). The Anglo-Saxon countries lead the fi eld, with more than 80% of their 
populations saying they feel healthy. The eu countries score 75% on average, with 
Portugal and Germany on low scores, and Ireland on a high score. The new entrants 
score well below the eu-15 average.
Figure 4.39  Percentage of persons in good health 
Source: SCP 
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The measures of life expectancy and health can be combined to form an index of 
health status, in which (1) life expectancy at birth, (2) infant mortality, (3) disabil-
ity-adjusted life years as a proportion of total life expectancy, and (4) subjective 
health status have been standardised, totalled and transformed into a 10-point 
scale (Figure 4.40). See Annex B.3 for methodological details. This index meets the 
general requirements of composite measures: that they must refl ect the probability 
of life and health throughout life (who 2003). One major problem encountered in 
compiling such an index is how to weight the constituent indicators. Sometimes the 
weighting is presented to a random sample of the population, sometimes to a panel 
of experts. As in the who report (2000), the four indicators are equally weighted 
here. This means that life expectancy and health during life are each weighted 50%, 
as are state of health during life (objective indicator) and perceived health status 
(subjective indicator). 
Although the four components of the index are moderately to strongly correlated 
and more than comply with the scalability criterion (Cronbach’s alpha is 0.83), 
there are countries where separate components produce markedly different ranking 
positions. Life expectancy, for instance, is relatively low in Denmark, infant mortal-
ity is relatively high in Greece and New Zealand and relatively low in Finland and 
the Czech Republic, and subjective health status is worse than average in Portugal, 
Germany, Italy and France, but better in the us. Outlying scores can usually be 
explained, however. While life expectancy in Denmark and Ireland is not among 
the highest in the eu-15, both countries do have among the highest percentage of 
healthy life years in Europe, which also gives them a relatively high score for subjec-
tive health status. The reverse applies to Portugal and Italy, with Portugal scoring 
particularly low for the ratio of healthy life years to total life expectancy, meaning 
that respondents do not have a positive view of their state of health.
The health status index ranges from 1.6 for Hungary to 6.3 for Sweden. The 
Netherlands comes towards the top of the middle section. Most countries have a 
score between 5 and 6. Only Portugal, the us and the new entrants do not achieve 
this score. The new entrants score fairly badly on the whole, apart from the Czech 
Republic, which has a low rate of infant mortality. Within the eu, Portugal clearly 
scores below average, and Spain, Finland, Denmark and Austria are only just behind 
leader Sweden. 
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Figure 4.40 Health status index, 2001 
a  Subjective health status is not known for Luxembourg; the other three factors have been given extra weight. 
Source: SCP 
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4.7.2 Cost-effectiveness of health care
The health of a population can be set against resources put into the health care 
system. The greater health benefi ts and the fewer resources used, the greater the 
cost-effectiveness of the system as a whole. Figure 4.41 shows the cost-effectiveness 
of health care systems. Total (public and private) spending on health care is con-
fronted with the composite effectiveness score: the health status index presented in 
Figure 4.40. The correlation between spending levels and index scores would barely 
appear to be affected by differences in demographic profi le and lifestyles.20
The us combines a relatively low score on health with extremely high health care 
spending. There are three reasons. Firstly, a fi gure like life expectancy is determined 
not only by the scale and quality of the health care system, but also by risky lifestyles 
(diet, alcohol and tobacco consumption), social risks (traffi c) and industrial risks 
(mining). Secondly, despite the high levels of expenditure, a relatively large propor-
tion of us residents (15%) have no access to health insurance, and will therefore 
demand expensive health care services at a late stage. Thirdly, the health care system 
in the us is characterised by high prices and ineffi ciency, partly as a result of frequent 
litigation in connection with medical treatment (us/hhs 2003).
The Czech Republic manages to achieve a reasonable effectiveness score with rela-
tively low input of resources. Although Figure 4.28 suggests that relative payment 
20  Cost-effectiveness has been corrected for differences in demographic profi le and life-
style on the basis of a cost function.
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of staff employed in health care (and public welfare work) is not far behind the eu-
15 mean, this low input is partly linked to low pay in the Czech health care sector, 
which is the source of much dissatisfaction in the profession.21 It is therefore doubt-
ful whether the country will be able to maintain this favourable ratio of outcome 
to inputs, or whether a substantial increase in input prices will in fact shift it to the 
‘right’, towards Greece and Portugal in Figure 4.28. Its leading position would then 
be at risk. Hungary, Slovakia and Poland have a slightly lower level of expenditure, 
but also score substantially lower on the health status index. The positions of Poland 
and Slovakia look favourable in Figure 4.41, but the key measure of effectiveness is 
the vertical distance from the projected curve. If they were to introduce a fairly small 
increase in their spending, they would have to make a large gain in health terms to 
maintain their position relative to the curve. 
Portugal’s relatively poor position is striking. According to Figure 4.41, it should 
be able to achieve Spain’s level of effectiveness with the same input of resources. Life 
expectancy (healthy or otherwise) and subjective health status (Figure 4.40) are well 
behind those of Spain, however. One possible explanation is socio-economic health 
differences and the limited access to primary health care for lower socio-economic 
groups and the rural population (Santana 2002). This concerns large segments of 
the population in Portugal.
In the group led by Sweden, the Netherlands is in a slightly unfavourable position, 
partly as a result of its somewhat higher infant mortality rate. As discussed earlier on, 
this is partly due to the relatively late age at which Dutch women have children, limited 
prenatal testing and higher cessation of perinatal treatment when prospects are poor.
Figure 4.41 shows that the correlation between health expenditure and effective-
ness, though signifi cant, is rather weak. A country’s vertical distance from the curve 
in Figure 4.41 indicates the potential gains in effectiveness it might in principle real-
ise at the current spending level. Further analysis reveals that the correlation shown 
can be attributed to some extent to the country’s level of prosperity. Average income 
explains the level of health care effectiveness in a similar way to health spending per 
capita. This is not strange, given the fairly strong correlation between income levels 
and health spending (see Figure 4.7).
However, the health of the population is not only determined by income and 
health spending. It also depends on factors associated with people’s lifestyle and 
living environment. Analysis shows that the infl uence of lifestyle characteristics 
is modest at country level. Although a negative correlation between alcohol and 
tobacco consumption and the health of the population can be identifi ed at country 
level, it is not signifi cant. Obesity does appear to have a signifi cant negative impact 
on health, although again this effect is modest. Air quality – in terms of smog-
inducing emissions per square kilometre – bears a negative but insignifi cant rela-
tionship to the health index used here. One striking fact is the strong negative 
21  See statement in European Observatory report on health care systems in transition: 
Czech Republic 2000.
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correlation between the proportion of mineworkers in the population and health. 
It is diffi cult to incorporate these factors into a model to explain differences in 
health between countries because of the strong correlation between the explana-
tory factors. For instance, there is strong correlation between health spending, the 
proportion of mineworkers, the proportion of obese people and average income. 
This makes it impossible to identify which factor best explains national differences 
in health. Furthermore, their joint explanatory capacity is limited. The health of a 
population apparently also depends on factors not considered here.
The health of the population also depends on performance in the health care 
sector. This is refl ected in the extent to which treatments are successful in solving 
health problems. The limited comparative research available shows that the success 
rate of certain treatments for certain diseases and disorders differs considerably 
between oecd countries (oecd 2004da). For instance, in Canada and Australia, 
only 6% of men aged 40-64 died within a year (1996) of admission and treatment for 
acute myocardial infarction, whereas in Denmark, Finland and the uk the fi gure 
was double that. The differences are even greater in the case of stroke: in Italy and 
Finland in 1998, only 3% of men in the age group in question were found to have 
died within a week, as against 9% in the uk. The differences can be considerable 
for women, too. In 1995, for example, a woman in the us with breast cancer had a 
greater chance of survival than a woman in the uk (oecd 2003db). Only a few expla-
nations could be traced, but alongside differences in the technology used, treatment 
methods and procedures followed, it is also possible that the difference is associated 
with quality characteristics at the higher level of institutions and the health care 
system as a whole.22
Health expenditure can also be expressed in relative terms, as percentage of gdp, 
and related to effectiveness. This does not affect the picture presented in fi gure 4.41 
very much. Only Luxemburg moves to the left side and takes a frontier position. 
Furthermore Finland and Spain change positions. But the favourable positions of 
Spain, Finland, Sweden and Australia are preserved, as are the unfavourable posi-
tions of the new member states, Portugal and the us.
22  There are considerable differences in the rate at which countries introduce and distrib-
ute new medical technologies. The us is generally fast, while the uk and Scandinavia 
are usually slow in this. Both rapid and slow introduction would appear to be bad in 
terms of cost-effectiveness, as the costs do not match the benefi ts.
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health status index
Figure 4.41  Cost-effectiveness of health care, 2001 
Source: SCP 
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Though cost-effectiveness is an important objective, it should not be achieved at 
the expense of health. The cost-effectiveness scores of countries like Slovakia and 
Poland, though interesting, do not therefore set the standard, because the health 
status score of the population is around half that achieved in most of the eu-15. In 
this respect, the Czech Republic presents the most interesting case, as health there 
approaches the level in the eu-15. However, the favourable position of the Czech 
Republic is in part achieved with low input prices, which is no viable policy option 
for the eu-15 countries.
There is barely any relationship between health and the institutional set-up of the 
health care system, according to the clustering in Figure 4.42. With the exception of 
the fi rst group, countries in the other four groups all achieve scores between 5 and 6. 
Only Portugal (in group 2) and the us (in the ‘other’ group) do not make 7. Scores in 
the fi rst group have a fairly wide range, with Hungary scoring relatively low and the 
Czech Republic relatively high.
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Figure 4.42  Health status related to type of country, 2001  
Source: SCP 
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4.7.3 Objectives and effectiveness
The primary objective of health care is to maintain and improve the health of the 
population. Financial sustainability, quality and accessibility are also seen as impor-
tant objectives. It is therefore important to look at the health of the population in 
relation to the quality and accessibility of health care on the one hand, and health 
spending on the other.
Public confi dence in the health care system is an important indicator of the qual-
ity of the system. Figure 4.43 shows public confi dence in 2000. It would appear to 
have a weak but signifi cant correlation with spending per capita. The scores of a 
number of Mediterranean countries (Greece, Portugal and Italy) and Germany and 
Canada clearly deviate from the general picture. Respondents in the us also have 
rather little confi dence in their health care system. We might expect them to have 
greater confi dence on the basis of their spending levels. One initial explanation to 
consider is the low level of cost-effectiveness: consumers get relatively little services 
for their money. However, as Figure 4.44 shows, there is only a very weak connection 
between the effectiveness of a health care system and public confi dence. Although 
this could be attributed to failings in the measurement of effectiveness, it is also 
possible that factors other than cost-effectiveness have dented public confi dence in 
the countries concerned. Out-of-pocket payments generate a great deal of dissatis-
faction, for example. According to Figure 4.2, such payments are high in Portugal, 
Greece, Poland, Hungary and Italy, all countries where confi dence in the system is 
not terribly high.
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quite a lot or a great deal
Figure 4.43  Confidence in health care by expenditure, 2001 
Source: OECD Health Data; European Values Survey; values for non-European countries are estimated 
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In Germany there is currently a debate about the fi nancial sustainability of the 
health care system and efforts are being made to relieve the pressure on the system 
by increasing the role of out-of-pocket payments (for medicines, rehabilitation and 
medical devices) and limitations on insurance coverage (dental treatment). Such 
measures do nothing to improve the public’s confi dence in the system, certainly 
not among lower income groups. Furthermore, in the late 1990s private insurance 
companies emerged offering coverage for these services, particularly for expensive 
dental treatment. The dissatisfaction with the public part of the health care system 
has always been fairly high in Greece, Italy and Portugal. In all three countries, 
especially in Italy, local health centres score badly (European Observatory). Rural 
areas get a particularly bad deal. In Italy, inhabitants of the southern provinces also 
indicate they are dissatisfi ed with the supply of health care. In Greece and Portugal 
the public system is under pressure, which has had implications for the quality of 
care and the size of out-of-pocket payments. In both countries, the private sector is 
expected to compensate for the loss of quality in the public system, which presents 
accessibility problems for lower income groups. They have to rely on the poorer-
quality public system, with longer waiting lists and medical facilities and staff of a 
lower standard.
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quite a lot or a great deal
Figure 4.44 Confidence in health care system by effectiveness, 2000 
Source: European Values Survey; SCP 
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The introduction to this chapter mentioned fi nancial sustainability, accessibility and 
quality as the most important objectives of health care policy. By linking these objec-
tives using empirical data, it is possible to obtain an impression of the performances 
of the various countries in terms of the extent to which they achieve them. We have 
chosen four indicators of quality and accessibility that can be linked to spending per 
capita: (1) health status of the population, (2) confi dence in the health care system, 
(3) the existence of waiting lists for non-acute hospital care and (4) out-of-pocket 
payments as a proportion of total health care expenditure. These indicators are not 
scalable (Cronbach’s alpha is 0.26). This suggests that it is diffi cult to achieve all the 
objectives simultaneously, confi rming the assumption made in Section 4.1.1 that the 
policy objectives are incompatible to a certain degree, which means some kind of 
trade-off is unavoidable. 
Figure 4.45 gives national scores on this index, on a scale of 0-10. The four 
component factors have been normalized, weighted and totalled. In accordance 
with who methods, the health status of the population has been given the same 
weight as the state of the health care system. This means that health status has been 
weighted half and the three health care system characteristics each one-sixth.
Sweden, France and Austria lead the index, while Portugal, Poland and Hungary 
come bottom. The three leaders owe their position to the fact that they score fairly 
well on all four components, although Sweden scores only moderately on waiting 
lists. The low position of the fi nal three is down to a very poor score on one of the 
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indicators: Hungary for health status, and Portugal and Poland for high out-of-
pocket payments. The fairly poor results of the Anglo-Saxon countries are notable. 
They are caused mainly by poor public confi dence in the system. Waiting list prob-
lems (Commonwealth countries) and the poor health status of the population (us) 
also exert downward pressure on index values.
Figure 4.45 Composition of the index of health status and health care system, 2001
Weighting: health status 1/2 and other factors 1/6
Source: SCP 
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Adding the extent to which health care systems achieve objectives to the health 
index, does change country rankings (Table 4.3). France, Germany and Luxembourg 
move up the ladder, due to minimal waiting list problems and high levels of public 
confi dence in France and Luxembourg. Belgium and Austria also move up, largely 
for the same reasons. However, some of the leaders by health status index drop con-
siderably on the composite index. Poor public confi dence in the system, waiting list 
problems or higher out-of-pocket payments lose Australia, Finland and Spain their 
leading positions. New Zealand loses out because of its poorer score on all three 
indicators of objectives achieved.
The composite index of (1) health status and (2) the state of the health care system 
is conceptually similar to the who index of overall health system performance 
(who 2000). Despite the fact that it is based on almost entirely different indicators, 
the ranking in the present report is remarkably consistent with the who ranking 
of 1997. Three of the top fi ve presented here would be in the who top fi ve, among 
the selection of 23 countries considered here. Half of the top ten countries in both 
rankings are identical. Nevertheless, there are notable differences too. For instance, 
Germany and Finland do considerably worse on the who index, and Canada, the 
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uk and Italy do considerably better. In the who index, Germany’s poor score on the 
health status index is not offset by a better score for the responsiveness and fairness 
of the system. In the composite index presented here, Germany does relatively well 
in terms of the three indicators for the health care system: (1) confi dence, (2) wait-
ing lists and (3) out-of-pocket payments. The lower position of Finland on the who 
index is explained by a slightly lower position on the health status index. Finland 
does better on the health status index used here, mainly because of its low infant 
mortality rate. Canada’s lower position on our composite index is caused by its lower 
score for public confi dence, while the who gives it a higher score for responsiveness 
and fairness. This puts Canada several places lower on our composite index in com-
parison with its position on the health status index, but it actually gains a few places 
on the who index. The uk scores very well for equal probability on the who index. 
This includes both the probability of infant mortality and probability of health care 
consumption as a result of the fairness of fi nancial contributions from policyhold-
ers. This largely compensates for the uk’s poor score on our health status index. The 
performance of the uk health care system is less impressive here, mainly because 
of the substantial waiting lists for non-acute treatment. The deterioration in Italy’s 
position on our composite index can be attributed to Italians’ low level of confi dence 
in their health care system and the relatively large share of out-of-pocket payments 
in health care expenditure.
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Table 4.3 Rankings of countries by type of health index
health status 
index 2001
SCP composite 
index 2001
WHO compos-
ite index 1997
highest health expendi-
ture 2001 (NL €)
Sweden 1 2 1 11
France 10 1 3 6
Austria 6 3 7 9
Luxembourg 17 4 2 3
Germany 14 5 11 2
Belgium 11 6 10 10
Netherlands 12 7 5 7
Australia 2 12 9 8
Finland 3 9 15 15
Spain 4 11 13 19
Canada 8 13 4 4
Denmark 5 8 14 5
Ireland 15 10 17 13
Italy 9 17 8 12
United Kingdom 16 16 6 14
Czech Republic 18 14 19 20
New Zealand 7 15 18 16
United States 19 18 12 1
Greece 13 19 16 18
Slovak Republic 21 20 22 22
Portugal 20 21 20 17
Poland 22 22 21 23
Hungary 23 23 23 21
Source: SCP
Higher health spending per capita might be expected to produce a higher score on 
the various indices. This proves to be only partially the case, however. The rank 
correlations are signifi cant, though not particularly strong. The poor performance 
of the us is again striking, given its high spending on health. By contrast, Sweden 
scores high on the performance indices with not particularly high spending levels. 
In terms of spending, the Netherlands is comparable to Sweden and France, but fails 
to achieve their score on the composite index. The main cause of its lower score is 
waiting lists for non-acute care which in 2001 were substantial. A reduction in the 
waiting lists would bring the Netherlands closer to the high positions of Sweden and 
France, but it would presumably also shift up a few places in terms of spending.
184 Health care
Figure 4.46  Composite index of health status and health system by type of country, 2001  
Source: SCP 
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The correlation between the type of health care system and performance on the com-
posite index is weak (Figure 4.46). One striking feature is the virtually equal score of 
all countries within the third and within the fourth cluster. The fourth cluster scores 
systematically higher than the third. The score in the fourth cluster is comparable 
only with a few countries in the ‘other’ group, with Luxembourg and Sweden bear-
ing most similarity to the fourth, corporatist cluster of countries according to the 
cluster analysis in Figure 4.1. The Netherlands also achieves the same level as the 
countries in cluster 4. Country group 4 is characterised by a corporatist health care 
system, out-of-pocket payments for the consumption of health care and free choice 
of suppliers. This set-up apparently gives countries like France, Germany, Austria 
and Belgium the ability to perform well, although they do not attain the level of 
Sweden, except for France. However, the countries in cluster 4 spend more on health 
care than Sweden, albeit considerably less than the us. 
If the aim is to achieve good health and health care at not too great a cost, one 
could select Sweden and France as benchmark countries. Austria and Belgium come 
only just behind Sweden and France. Although Germany and Luxembourg achieve 
a similar standard of health and health care, it is at considerably higher cost. The 
Netherlands, Australia, Canada and Denmark achieve a slightly lower standard of 
health and health care at similar costs to Sweden and France. Countries like Spain 
and Finland and – to a slightly lesser degree – Ireland, New Zealand and Greece 
achieve similar standards, but at considerably lower cost. Portugal clearly falls short 
in this respect, achieving a substantially lower standard of health and health care 
than Spain, at the same cost. The same applies to Hungary, which compared with 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic could do considerably better. The us is again the 
odd man out: poor performance in terms of health and health care, at very high cost.
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5 Law and order
Bob Kuhry1, Paul Smit2, Esther Backbier3 and Ab van der Torre1
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Background and structure
The Netherlands is not an island, isolated from the rest of the world. As with 
macroeconomic developments, any changes in the scale and nature of crime rates 
can be prompted either by domestic factors (such as new legislation or demographic 
trends) or refl ect broader international trends (erosion of traditional values and 
social networks, fl ows of migrants, political and economic developments in Eastern 
Europe, and so on). Comparing trends in crime rates in the Netherlands with those 
in other countries can help pinpoint the causes of changes observed. For instance, 
over the past ten years violent crime has risen at roughly the same rate in the Nether-
lands and its neighbour countries. Clearly, then, the causes of more violent crime are 
not specifi c to the Netherlands.
The way in which law enforcement is organised and put into practice differs from 
country to country, hampering the production of comparative statistics. On the 
other hand, institutional variety offers an opportunity to examine the likely effects 
of certain policy measures, by drawing on other countries’ experience.
This chapter compares crime in the EU-15, the new member states and a few 
non-European countries (Australia, Canada, the United States and New Zealand).4 
Unfortunately, however, data are not available for all countries on all relevant 
aspects of crime and law enforcement.
Section 5.1.2 looks at the determinants of crime, while Section 5.1.3 considers 
some of the limitations inherent to international comparisons. Section 5.2 describes 
the organisation of the police and criminal justice apparatus in countries covered 
in the report and attempts to defi ne where systems differ. Section 5.3 examines the 
fi nancial and staff resources absorbed by the police, public prosecutions depart-
ment, courts and prison service. Section 5.4 (‘From crime to punishment’) considers 
the products of the criminal justice system: crime registration, detection, prosecu-
tion, and punishment.
1 Social and Cultural Planning Offi ce
2  Research and Documentation Centre of the Dutch Ministry of Justice
3  Ministry of Justice
4  It is based partly on a previous publication by P. Smit (2003) and on forthcoming publi-
cations by the Dutch Ministry of Justice (of which E. Backbier is co-author).
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Section 5.5 then examines productivity and the quality and effectiveness of law and 
order services provided. Finally, Section 5.6 addresses the experiences and views of 
the general public, considering victimisation, fear of crime and public confi dence in 
the police and the administration of justice.
5.1.2 Determinants of crime
Broadly speaking, crime can be seen as the result of opportunity, individual factors 
and private and public attempts at prevention (see Box 5.1). For the public sector, 
these elements (with the exception of the last) constitute autonomous or semi-
autonomous environmental factors. It is therefore too simplistic, in an international 
comparison of public sector performance, to suggest any direct link between crime 
levels and efforts of the government.
Both private prevention and public prevention and repression can be seen as fac-
tors inhibiting crime. There are two reasons to make the distinction between private 
inhibiting factors and public prevention and repression. Firstly, making this distinc-
tion helps to elucidate the effects of government attempts to control crime. Further-
more, negative and positive feedbacks should be taken account of. For instance, the 
scale of crime has an impact on willingness to invest in prevention and repression. 
In addition, private and public resources employed to combat crime are substitutes 
to a signifi cant degree (Philipson and Posner, 1996). The effect of public measures 
can be counteracted to some extent when the sense of security they create makes 
private parties less inclined to take measures for self-protection.
It is also important to remember that repression and prevention can cause dis-
placement of crime (in terms of location, time, target, modus operandi and type).
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opportunity structure
- theft-sensitive goods on market
- nightlife
- urbanisation
- volume and concentration
  of flows of goods and services
individual factors
- unemployment
- poverty
- firearms possession
- drug and alcohol consumption
private prevention
- social control
- situational prevention
- security sector
public prevention and repression
- size and efforts of criminal justice
  system
- administrative prevention
- regulations, e.g. on security 
  measures in homes
Crime
Opportunity concerns potential targets of crime (pull factors): the presence of 
goods, and also behaviour on the part of potential victims (individuals and 
organisations) which can make them vulnerable to crime.
Individual factors affect a potential offender’s decision as to whether to commit 
a crime. 
Private prevention consists of all measures and actions by individuals and 
private organisations to prevent crime being committed against themselves or 
third parties. 
Public prevention and repression consists of all measures by the public sector to 
define crime in law, to prevent crime and to punish offenders.
Source: Cohen & Felson, 1979; Clarke, 1997; Van Dijk et al., 1998
Box 5.1 Determinants of crime
5.1.3 Drawbacks of international comparisons
Generally speaking, data on crime and its repression come from sources that are com-
piled specifi cally for one country. This is a serious obstacle when trying to draw up com-
parative crime statistics. Sometimes, information on a particular part of the criminal 
justice system will not refer to the same kind of authority in every country. For instance, 
the collection of data on prosecutions – generally the responsibility of the public pros-
ecutions department – is the responsibility of the courts in Spain. Also, it is important 
whether data come from an ‘independent’ source, as is the case with most national sta-
tistics offi ces, or from ‘stakeholders’.
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Virtually all countries distinguish between ‘serious offences’ (which are included in 
the crime statistics) and ‘minor offences’ (where although the law has been broken, the 
action is not regarded as criminal).5 By the very nature of things, the Criminal Code of 
each country is different. This can manifest itself in various ways. Actions which, in one 
country, are regarded as criminal are not in another (e.g. prostitution, abortion, eutha-
nasia). The distinction between serious and minor offences is not always the same. Also, 
the precise defi nitions of offence categories will differ (the distinction between murder/
manslaughter and culpable homicide, for example; does ‘burglary’ mean only breaking 
into someone’s home, or does it also include breaking into a car, etc.?).
Each country organises its criminal justice system differently, too. The precise 
role of the police (and also, for example, the way they record cases) and of the public 
prosecutions department will affect numbers in national statistics. Whether a 
reported crime is recorded as such, will depend on the police’s obligation to report 
offences to the prosecution authorities, even if no suspect has been identifi ed. The 
Dutch police are under no such obligation, while the French police are. The question 
of whether the prosecutor has discretionary powers will also affect crime fi gures 
recorded by the police, and their decision as to whether to pass a case on to the 
public prosecutions department.
The fi nal drawback lies in the very nature of statistics. In compiling statistics 
one has to make certain choices. In the case of crime statistics, the most important 
choices are the unit used and the moment when a case is counted. The unit might 
be offenders, offences or cases prosecuted. Each country will make its own choice. 
The moment when a case is counted determines its characteristics. A case which the 
police initially register as murder might be viewed as culpable homicide after further 
examination by the public prosecutor.
For all these reasons, some scepticism about the comparability of crime numbers 
registered by different countries is fully justifi ed. As in health care and education, 
there is much room for improvement in the international comparability of data. 
However, this report takes the view that one has to make the best of what is avail-
able. Nevertheless, shortcomings of available data underline the need to be cautious 
when interpreting apparent differences found.
 
5  France, however, has three categories of offence: contraventions, délits and crimes. Certain 
petty offences are not regarded as crimes. Germany makes a similar distinction between 
Ordnungswidrichleiten, Vergehen and Verbrechen. Such distinctions can distort the fi gures.
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5.2 Organisation of the criminal justice system
Our analysis of the organisation of the criminal justice system in the twenty-nine 
countries included in this study has been limited by the data available. Lack of 
data did not permit a more in-depth analysis. A number of international overviews 
provide an empirical basis for the proposed analysis.6 However, none of these 
sources tries to group countries by some sort of international classifi cation. For this 
purpose, Blank et al. (2004), which attempts to benchmark the legal systems of a 
number of European countries, is the most useful.
When classifying legal systems, a logical start is to adopt the traditional distinc-
tion between the Anglo-Saxon common law tradition and the continental European 
civil law tradition. Blank et al. summarise the differences as follows (op. cit, p. 18):
‘In the common law tradition, which originated in England, the judiciary 
system has created a nationwide legal framework, building upon precedents. 
The role of judges as the primary lawmakers is refl ected in the style of court 
decisions. In view of their huge responsibilities only highly experienced barris-
ters will qualify for appointment to the Bench. As a consequence, the number 
of professional judges in England & Wales tends to be relatively small. By 
contrast, in the continental European tradition, the legislator is the primary 
lawmaker. The framework of the legal system is laid down in major codes, 
containing systematized statutory provisions extending to large, well defi ned 
areas. The style of court decisions on the continent is conductive to downplay-
ing the role of the individual judge, while magnifying the statutory frame-
work.’
Within the continental tradition, it is possible to distinguish further between the 
Germanic and the Romanistic tradition. The difference between these latter tradi-
tions is rather technical, the Germanic one being more ‘orderly and comprehensive’.
We can also identify Scandinavian and Eastern European traditions. Blank et al.:
‘The Eastern European family is characterized by the transformation from 
a former socialist to a modern market-based civil law judiciary system. The 
Scandinavian tradition combines the presence of a statutory framework with 
a pragmatic egalitarian approach to the legal process, involving considerable 
lay participation. The legal process there refl ects an emancipated, collectivised 
and pragmatic society, traditionally emphasising social responsibilities.’
6  See for example Kangaspunta (1995) and the World Factbook of Criminal Justice 
Systems, which can be found at a number of URLs, with as central contact point: 
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/wfcj.htm).
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From the statutory framework to its practical implementation by the police and the 
administration of justice is a big step. Table 5.1 shows both the legal tradition and 
more specifi c system characteristics, some of them drawn from the above sources. 
The connections between system characteristics and legal tradition are often indi-
rect and more the result of common roots than of a direct causal relationship. Nev-
ertheless, experience shows that countries with the same legal tradition often have 
fairly uniform scores for other characteristics.
We use the following properties to characterise legal and police systems:
– The degree of centralisation in the police service (distinguishing between central-
ised, decentralised and mixed, taking staff numbers as the discriminating fea-
ture; mixed implies a ratio of centralised/decentralised staff between 0.5 and 2). In 
practice, actual police work is always carried out on a decentralised basis, except 
in the case of mini-states. What we are concerned with is whether the police serv-
ice is governed centrally or not centrally.
– The role of private security fi rms, based on the fi gures in Table 5.3. The classifi ca-
tion is based on staffi ng ratios. Unfortunately, this information is only available 
for a limited number of countries.
– The discretionary powers of the public prosecutor. In other words, his power to 
decide whether or not to prosecute.
– The degree of decentralisation and functional differentiation of courts. Decen-
tralisation is found in a number of federal states, where even the law itself may 
differ from state to state (in the us, for example). Specialisation refers to the 
existence of separate courts, for example for criminal and civil cases.
– The existence and importance of lay judges. Their role varies considerably, by the 
way. In England, for example, lay judges act on behalf of judges. In Sweden pro-
fessional judges are assisted by lay judges.
– Specifi c characteristics such as the existence of plea bargaining (negotiating the 
severity of punishment in return for a confession, or willingness to testify against 
others), the role of juries and whether the country has an adversarial or inquisito-
rial system. In the former, an impartial judge plays a neutral role between pros-
ecutor and defence, in the latter the judge has a more active role.
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Alongside these qualitative characteristics, we also consider two more quantitative 
characteristics associated with the ‘repressiveness’ of the system:
– The emphasis on punishment, in terms of the number of prison days per recorded 
crime (see Figure 5.15). The categories are low - fairly low - fairly high - high 
(boundaries corresponding to 5,15 and 30 prison days per recorded crime).
– Staff numbers in the police, administration of justice and prison system per 
100,000 inhabitants (see Figure 5.1). The categories low - fairly low - fairly high - 
high have been applied once more, boundaries corresponding to 400, 500 and 600 
staff per 100,000 of the population.
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Table 5.1 Characteristics of criminal justice systems
law tradition
adversarial/
inquisitorial
centralisation and 
specialisation police
role of private 
security ﬁ rms
Belgium civil Romanistic mixed intermediate / 
intermediate
-
Denmark civil Scandinavian adversarial centralised / 
specialised
moderate
Germany civil Germanic inquisitorial decentralised/ 
specialised
small
Greece civil mixed inquisitorial centralised /
not specialised
-
Spain civil Romanistic inquisitorial intermediate /
not specialised
-
France civil Romanistic inquisitorial centralised / 
intermediate
very small
Ireland common law adversarial centralised /
specialised
-
Italy civil Romanistic mixed intermediate / 
intermediate
-
Luxembourg civil Romanistic inquisitorial centralised /
not specialised
-
Netherlands civil Romanistic mixed decentralised / 
not specialised
small
Austria civil Germanic inquisitorial centralised /
not specialised
very small
Portugal civil Romanistic inquisitorial centralised / 
intermediate
-
Finland civil Scandinavian mixed centralised / - -
Sweden civil Scandinavian adversarial decentralised /
not specialised
small
England/Wales common law adversarial centralised /
not specialised
moderate
Cyprus mixed adversarial intermediate /
not specialised 
-
Czech Republic civil Eastern Europe presumably inquisitorial intermediate / 
specialised
-
Estonia civil Eastern Europe presumably inquisitorial - / - -
Latvia civil Eastern Europe inquisitorial centralised / - -
Lithuania civil Eastern Europe presumably inquisitorial centralised / - -
Hungary civil Eastern Europe inquisitorial centralised / 
specialised
-
Malta mixed adversarial centralised /
not specialised
-
Poland civil Eastern Europe inquisitorial centralised / 
specialised
-
Slovenia civil Eastern Europe mixed centralised /
not specialised
-
Slovakia civil Eastern Europe inquisitorial centralised /
not specialised
-
Australia common law adversarial intermediate / 
not specialised
large
Canada predominantly common adversarial decentralised / 
intermediate
large
New Zealand common law adversarial intermediate / 
not specialised
-
United States predominantly common 
law
adversarial decentralised/ 
specialised
large
a But note the considerable size of the private security services in these countries
Source: Barclay and Tavares (2003), Blank et al. (2004) ; Dalmas-Marty and Spencer (2002), Djankov et al. (2002), 
Jolowicz (2003), Kangaspunta (1995), Martinec (2002), Nijboer (1993), Taekema (204), World Factbook of Criminal 
Justice Systems, European Source Book of Criminal Justice (2003), Brienen and Hoegen (2000)
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discretionary 
power of prosecutor
plea 
bargaining
centralisation and 
differentiation courts
lay judges and 
jury trials
emphasis on 
punishment
personnel per 
100,000 population
intermediate no centralised /
not specialised
yes / yes low fairly high
intermediate no centralised /
intermediate
yes / yes low lowa
no no decentralised /
intermediate
yes / no low fairly low
no no centralised /
not specialised
- / yes fairly low high
no no centralised / 
intermediate
yes / no fairly high fairly low
intermediate no centralised / 
intermediate
yes / yes low high
yes no centralised /
not specialised
yes / yes fairly low fairly high
intermediate no centralised, / 
intermediate
yes / yes fairly low high
yes no centralised/
not specialised
no / no fairly low fairly low
yes, large no centralised/
not specialised
no / no low fairly low
intermediate no centralised /
not specialised
yes / yes low fairly high
no no centralised /
specialised
yes / yes fairly low high
no no centralised/
intermediate
yes / - low low
intermediate no centralised / 
intermediate
yes / yes low low
intermediate no centralised / 
not specialised
yes / yes low low
no - centralised /
not specialised
- / - fairly high high
no no centralised / 
not specialised
- / - fairly high high
- no centralised / 
not specialised
- / - fairly high fairly high
- no centralised / 
not specialised
- / - high high
no no centralised/
not specialised
- / - high high
no no centralised / 
not specialised
yes / no fairly low fairly high
no no centralised /
not specialised
no / yes fairly low high
intermediate no centralised / 
not specialised
yes / - fairly high fairly low
no yes centralised / 
not specialised
yes / no low fairly high
presumably no no centralised / 
not specialised
- / - fairly high fairly high
no yes decentralised / 
specialised
yes / yes fairly low lowa
yes yes decentralised / 
intermediate
yes / yes fairly low lowa
presumably no yes centralised / 
not specialised
yes / yes fairly low fairly low
no yes decentralised /
intermediate
yes / yes high fairly higha
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The selection of relevant system characteristics is less obvious than with education 
(chapter 3). Lack of data and the close link between some characteristics also make 
it hard to do a formal cluster analysis as was performed in the case of health care 
(chapter 4). However, system characteristics that are not fi t for a key role in cluster 
analysis can be relevant to other types of analysis. The degree of specialisation in the 
courts, the discretionary powers of the public prosecutor or the difference between 
an inquisitorial and adversarial system can affect the productivity or effectiveness of 
the actors concerned, for example.
Table 5.2   System types*
Country group Countries
Law
tradition
Adversarial/
inquisitorial
Centralisa-
tion 
of police
Role of private 
security ﬁ rms
Discretionary 
power of public
prosecutor
Scandinavian DK, FI, SE Scandina-
vian
adversarial/
mixed
variable/
variable
small-
moderate
intermediate
West 
European 1
DE Germanic inquisitorial decentralised/
specialised
small no
West
European 2 
NE, LU Romanistic mixed/ 
inquisitorial
variable/
not specialised
very small-small intermediate-
large
West-
European-3
AT, BE, FR Germanic or 
Romanistic 
mixed/
inquisitorial
variable/
variable
very small-small intermediate
South 
European
GR, ES, IT, PT Romanistic mixed/
inquisitorial
variable/
variable
presumably  small no-intermediate
Central 
European
CZ, EE, LV, LT, 
HU, PL, SK
Eastern 
European
inquisitorial centralised/
unknown
presumably small no-intermediate
Anglo-
Saxon 1
IE, UK, AU,
CA, NZ
Common 
Law
adversarial variable/
variable
moderate-large no-yes
Anglo-
Saxon 2
us Common 
Law
adversarial decentralised/
specialised
large no
* Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia do not ﬁ t into any of the groups identiﬁ ed.
Source: See table 5.1; interpretation by SCP.
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Table 5.2 offers a tentative classifi cation of countries on the basis of characteristics 
1 (law tradition), 2 (adversial versus inquisitorial) 4 (private orientation), 6 (plea bar-
gaining and prominence of jury system) , 9 (emphasis on punishment) and 10 (per-
sonnel per 100,000 population) in Table 5.1. 
On the basis of these characteristics, eight country groups are distinguished: a Scan-
dinavian group, three West- European groups, a South-European group, a Central 
European Group, and two Anglo-Saxon groups. 
This classifi cation was subsequently tested against the other characteristics.
Centralisation and differentiation 
of courts Plea bargaining
Lay judges 
and jury 
trials
Emphasis on 
punishment
Personnel per 
100,000 
population
centralised/
intermediate
no yes/yes low low
decentralised/
intermediate
no yes/no low fairly low
centralised/
not specialised
no no/no low fairly low-fairly high
centralised/
not specialised
no yes/yes low fairly high-high
centralised/
variable
no yes/yes fairly low-
fairly high
fairly low-high
centralised/
not specialised
no variable/
variable
fairly low- 
high
fairly low-high
variable/
variable
yes yes/yes fairly low low-fairly low
decentralised/
intermediate
yes yes/yes high fairly high
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The Anglo-Saxon groups are characterized by a common law tradition and dis-
tinct features such as plea bargaining and prominence of the jury system. The 
other groups belong to various subfamilies of the civil law tradition. The adver-
sarial system is characteristic for the Anglo-Saxon countries, but is also applied 
in a number of Scandinavian countries. The South- and Central-European and 
two of the West-European groups are characterized by a centralised court system. 
The Netherlands and Luxembourg are the only countries where the absence of lay 
judges is explicitly documented. By assigning Austria to the same group as France 
and Belgium instead of the group consisting of Germany, more emphasis is given 
to common traits such as the discretionary power of the public prosecutor and the 
role of lay judges and jury trials than to the technical difference between the Rom-
anistic and Germanic tradition. As far as we are aware, private security fi rms play 
a prominent role mainly in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Repression, in the sense of 
tough sentencing, is characteristic of Southern and Eastern Europe, and also of the 
us. Personnel numbers are low in the Scandinavian countries, Germany and in the 
fi rst Anglo-Saxon group. The other characteristics do not contribute to the proposed 
grouping: Police in Central Europe tends to be centralised, but this is also the case in 
quite a number of other countries. The discretionary power of the public prosecutor 
is relatively large in the Netherlands; most clusters are heterogeneous with respect to 
this characteristic.
5.3  Use of resources
Figure 5.1 shows staff numbers in the police, the courts (including public prosecution, 
criminal, civil and administrative administration of justice) and prisons.
Figure 5.1  Police, court and prison staff per 100,000 population, 2000
Source:  European Sourcebook 2003; Barclay and Tavares (2003), United Nations, Dutch ministry of Justice (revision 
 of various National sources); SCP revision 
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The blocs in Figure 5.1 shaded grey denote estimated fi gures. Our estimates are 
based on the average ratio between the three sectors of the criminal justice system in 
countries for which fi gures are available. The average ratio between staff employed 
by the police, courts and prisons is 5:2:1. Total staff numbers range from 270 per 
100,000 inhabitants in Finland to 830 per 100,000 in Italy. Australia, Canada, Den-
mark, Sweden, England/Wales and the Netherlands (score 400 per 100,000) have 
fairly low staff numbers. The us, Greece, Portugal and most of the new member 
states, on the other hand, post high staff numbers. The number of police offi cers 
ranges from 150 per 100,000 inhabitants in Finland to 540 in Italy. The Netherlands, 
on 260, records a fairly low score. It also has relatively low staff numbers in its 
criminal justice system (including the public prosecutions department). Canada and 
Denmark have similar scores to the Netherlands. We fi nd relatively high inputs of 
personnel in the criminal justice systems of Italy, Greece, Portugal, Belgium, the us 
and some new member states. The Netherlands has more or less average staff in its 
prison system. Greece, Slovakia, Denmark and Belgium score very low fi gures, while 
the us and Estonia have high numbers of prison staff per 100,000 inhabitants.
Figures 5.2 and 5.2 present further information on public expenditure on law 
and order. Unfortunately, fi gures are available for only ten countries. Spending on 
police is by far the highest in the us, at 600 euros per capita. The Netherlands comes 
second on 360 euros, followed closely by England/Wales and Canada. Expenditure is 
lowest in Denmark (at just under 200 euros). The us also spends much more on its 
prisons than other countries, at 200 euros per capita, as opposed to 20 to 60 euros 
elsewhere. However, the position of the us is less extreme when public spending 
levels are expressed as a proportion of GDP. It should be noted, however, that these 
fi gures do not take account of the very high expenditure on private security fi rms in 
the us and other Anglo-Saxon countries (see Table 5.3).
198 Law and order
Figure 5.2   Public expenditure on police, administration of justice and prisons per capita, 
 in NL¤
Source: Dutch ministry of Justice, revision of various National Sources 
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Figure 5.3  Public expenditure on law and order as a permillage of GDP
Source: Dutch ministry of Justice, revision of various National Sources
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Figure 5.4 shows the distribution of law and order spending among criminal, civil 
and administrative cases.
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Figure 5.4  Public expenditure on administration of justice  per capita, 2000 (in NL¤)
Source: Dutch ministry of Justice, revision of various National Sources 
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For most countries, fi gures are available only for expenditure on the criminal jus-
tice system as a whole. However, data on the share of criminal prosecutions can be 
derived from, for example, the ratio of criminal cases to the total number of cases 
brought to court, or from the number of criminal law judges as a proportion of all 
judges. Where such data is not available, we have taken the average of the other 
countries. We should stress that these assumptions mean that our estimates of 
spending on criminal justice are highly uncertain. However, their effect on the 
Netherlands’ ranking is minimal.
Austria and Germany are notable for their large share of spending on civil and/or 
administrative cases, France and the us for the large proportion spent on the public 
prosecutions department. The low expenditure on judges in England/Wales might be 
explained by the prominent role of unpaid lay judges.
In addition to resources devoted by the public sector to maintaining law and 
order, the private security industry absorbs signifi cant resources, especially so in the 
us and Australia (see Table 5.3). 
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Table 5.3 Staff numbers in police service and private security industry per 100,000 population, about 2000
Country Police
Private security 
industry Total
US 375 600 975
Australia 285 516 801
Canada 253 432 685
England/Wales 297 275 572
Germany 342 217 559
Sweden 320 184 504
France 375 121 496
Denmark 229 221 450
Austria 375   75 450
Netherlands 271 148 419
Source: Ministry of Justice 2000; Ministry of Justice 2002
The private security industry is prominent in the us, Australia and Canada (numbers 
between 400 and 600 per 100,000 inhabitants. With an average of 148 private secu-
rity offi cers per 100,000 inhabitants, the Netherlands comes slightly below the eu 
average of 160. We should note, however, that the fi gure for the Netherlands is a low 
estimate based on surveys covering some 80% of annual reports of fi rms active in 
the sector ( Jaarboek beveiliging 2002). The precise number of staff working in the pri-
vate security industry in the Netherlands will therefore be higher. It is clear that de 
facto the police no longer have a monopoly in this area. The private security industry 
may take over more and more of their assistance and prevention tasks, in particular.
Table 5.3 also shows total security efforts of the ten countries covered. With a 
total of 419 public and private security offi cials per 100,000 inhabitants (2000 fi g-
ures), the Netherlands falls well below the 1996 eu average of 535. 
5.4 From crime to punishment
5.4.1 Introduction
This section looks at the sequence of activities in the criminal justice system from 
a crime being committed to the sentence being served. Only 10% to 20% of crimes 
come to the attention of the police and are recorded as such (see Section 5.5). This is 
because of two factors which have different effects from one country to an other: (1) 
the willingness of victims to report crime and (2) the extent to which the police actu-
ally record the offences reported.
The registration of offences is the fi rst step in the activities of the criminal justice 
system. It is followed by investigation, prosecution and trying of offenders and 
execution of sentences. Various indicators are used to measure the production of the 
agencies involved. 
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5.4.2 Recorded crime
Figure 5.5 shows the number of recorded crimes per 100,000 population. Figures 
refer to the last year for which data are available. For some countries this was 1999, 
for others 2000, 2001 or 2002. Here, and elsewhere in this chapter, traffi c offences 
are not included.7
Figure 5.5  Number of recorded offences per 100,000 population (excluding traffic 
 offences), 2000. 
Source: European Sourcebook 2003
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Sweden and New Zealand lead the fi eld with more than 10,000 recorded offences per 
100,000 inhabitants. They are followed closely by the Netherlands, Finland, Den-
mark, Belgium and Germany. Ireland, Cyprus, Latvia and Slovakia post relatively low 
scores, less than 2,000 per 100,000 population. Most other Southern European coun-
tries and new member states, score around 4000 per 100,000 population. The same 
applies to the us, despite its generally poor reputation.
Figure 5.6 provides more detailed fi gures on three types of crime: violent crime 
(murder/manslaughter, assault, rape and robbery), property offences (theft), and 
drugs-related crime. Vandalism has been excluded, as well as traffi c offences. The 
totals in Figure 5.6 are therefore not consistent with those in Figure 5.5.
7  Figures on traffi c offences are available for only a small number of countries, and show 
extreme differences in frequency: approx. 2,800 per 100,000 inhabitants in Finland, as 
against one or two in Ireland and Italy. The Netherlands comes third, after Finland and 
Greece, on 740. This can only mean that the term ‘traffi c offence’ is defi ned differently 
in different countries.
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Figure 5.6  Number of recorded offences per 100,000 population, by type (excluding 
 traffic offences and vandalism), circa 2000 
* The number of drug-related crimes committed in the us is unknown
Source: European Sourcebook 2003, US Sourcebook 2003; SCP revision
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Figure 5.6 shows that Sweden has the highest rate of property offences. The Neth-
erlands also comes near the top, along with England/Wales and Denmark. The 
Netherlands’ high fi gures are mainly the result of bicycle theft. The Southern Euro-
pean countries and the new member states typically record low fi gures for property 
offences. Greece and Cyprus come last.
Police crime fi gures include far fewer drug-related crimes than property offences. 
In most countries, such offences also occur much less frequently than violent crime. 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Sweden and Finland have the highest rates of 
drug-related crime. They appear to play a fairly insignifi cant role in the Netherlands. 
However, like traffi c offences, drug-related crime is recorded only if it is observed. 
So drug-related offences actually recorded represent only the tip of the iceberg. Table 
5.4 gives more detailed fi gures.
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Table 5.4 Drug problem indicators, circa 1999
Drug-related 
crimes per 100,000 
population
Problematic drug 
use per 100,000 
population
Percentage of 
young people who 
have used mari-
huana/cannabis
Heroine/
cocaine 
seizures (kg)
US – 21.3 41 –
UK 215 5.6 35 5,300
Sweden 365 4.6 8 480
France 176 4.1 35 3,900
Denmark 17 3.9 24 120
Austria 223 3.2 – 140
Netherlands 47 2.7 28 11,100
Germany 297 2.1 – 2,800
Source: European Sourcebook 2000, EMCDDA, 2001; ESPAD and MTF 1999; UNODC World Drug report, 2000, p. 93
The number of drug-related crimes in the Netherlands is exceptionally low. This can 
be explained by the Netherlands’ policy of tolerance’, whereby drug dealing is pros-
ecuted but possession of drugs for personal use is not. The level of problematic drug 
use and the proportion of youngsters who use marihuana or cannabis is also fairly 
low. By contrast, the Netherlands is an unmistakable international centre of the 
drugs trade, as revealed by fi gures for heroine and cocaine seizures, which are even 
more striking when expressed in kilos per 100,000 inhabitants. The situation is even 
worse when it comes to marihuana/cannabis and ecstasy. Indeed, the Netherlands is 
one of the world’s biggest producers of ecstasy.
Figure 5.6 shows that England/Wales, Belgium and Sweden have the highest fi g-
ures for violent crime and that the Netherlands falls somewhere in the middle. This 
can be seen even more clearly in Figure 5.7, which shows differences in the incidence 
of several types of violent crime. This fi gure is based on standardised scores, which 
means all categories of crime receive equal weight.8
8  An average and a standard deviation for all countries have been calculated for each sub-
category. The z-value for each country has been calculated as follows: 
zi = (xi – xaverage)/standard deviation.
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Figure 5.7  Standardised country scores for various types of violent crime, circa 2000
Source: European Sourcebook 2003, Barclay and Tavares 2003. SCP revision 
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Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the us score high on homicide (murder and man-
slaughter). High levels of assault are found in England/Wales, Sweden, Belgium 
and Finland. The us has the highest rate of rape, followed by Ireland, Sweden and 
Belgium. Robbery is most common in Estonia. The Netherlands has a fairly average 
score for all categories. Greece, Italy and the new member states (with the exception 
of the three Baltic states) have low rates of violent crime.
Figure 5.8 shows the incidence of arguably the most dramatic of all crimes: homi-
cide. Figures shown represent the annual number of victims per 100,000 inhabitants, 
excluding attempted homicide. The mean over a three-year period has been used to 
average out any ‘coincidental’ fl uctuations.
Estonia and Lithuania have some ten homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, and the 
us and Latvia have around six. Finland, New Zealand, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Poland and Hungary score between two and three, Luxembourg below one, and the 
other countries, including the Netherlands, between one and two. Notably, murder 
and manslaughter occur relatively frequently in a number of countries that are other-
wise not generally known for their high crime rates. This applies to the Baltic states 
mentioned above, and also to the us. The latter’s poor reputation for crime is based 
mainly on the incidence of violent crime, particularly rape and homicide.
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Figure 5.8  Homicides per 100,000 population (average 1999-2001)
Source: Barclay & Tavares 2003 
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Figures extending over the past decade (see Smit 2003, Box 7.1) show that most Euro-
pean countries saw the number of homicides fall in the second half of the 1990s. 
This applies especially to the us, where the number of homicides dropped from 9 to 6 
per 100,000.
The Netherlands’ position looks less rosy, incidentally, when we look at the 
murder rate in capital cities (see Figure 5.9). Here, Amsterdam comes in seventh 
place, with three murders per 100,000, behind Washington and several Central Euro-
pean cities. The lowest rates of homicide (fewer than one per 100,000) are recorded 
in Athens (Greece), Lefkosia (Cyprus), Canberra (Australia) and Ottawa (Canada).
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Figure 5.9  Homicides in capitals (average 1999-2001)a
a Washington DC (43 murders per 100,000 population) has been replaced by New York (8.65 murders) to keep
 the figure legible.
Source: Barclay and Tavares 2003 
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Figure 5.10 shows recent trends in recorded violent offences and property offences 
per 100,000 population.
Figure 5.10  Trends in crime rate, 1995–2000 (annual change in percentages) 
The figures for England/Wales have been corrected for the change in definition in 1997/1998.
Source: WODC, US Sourcebook
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Notably, violent crime rates (Figure 5.10) of most European countries show an 
upward trend. The sharpest rise has been recorded in Latvia and in England/Wales. 
With an annual increase of 6%, the Netherlands has an average growth rate. Spain, 
Luxembourg and several new member states have in fact seen a slight decrease of 
violent crime rates. The most striking exception is Ireland, where violent crime fell 
by almost half between 1995 and 2000. The us has also seen a substantial fall in 
violent crime.
The fi gures for property offences show a varied pattern. Slovenia, Estonia and 
Lithuania have seen a relatively sharp increase, while Slovakia, the us, Denmark, 
Luxembourg and England/Wales have experienced a signifi cant fall. There has been 
a slight fall in the number of property offences in the Netherlands.
To close this section, we turn our attention to the role of fi rearms as a cause of 
violent death. A comparative study of fi rearms-related deaths in 36 countries has 
found major differences in the degree to which fi rearms are involved in fatal inci-
dents. Firearms are used fi ve or six times more in North America than in Europe, 
and no less than 95 times more than in Asia. More than half of all murders are 
committed with guns. In the us, fi rearms are involved in 71% of murders and 61% 
of suicides. A study of the us and Australia has shown that 92% of the differences in 
murder and suicide rates between regions can be attributed to differences in access 
to fi rearms (Miller and Cohen, 1997). An American study has found that easy access 
to fi rearms played a key role in the epidemic of violent crime among young people 
in the us in the early 1990s (Fagan and Wilkinson, 1998). The trade in crack cocaine 
and the subculture associated with it caused a huge increase in fi rearms possession 
and use among young people. us government policy currently is focused on reducing 
fi rearms possession by young people, partly in response to a number of incidents in 
schools (Source: Miller & Cohen, 1997; Fagan & Wilkinson, 1998).
The role that the availability of fi rearms plays in the number of gun deaths is the 
subject of continued debate, particularly in the us. Attempts to place restrictions 
on the sale of fi rearms to ordinary citizens repeatedly fail, partly as a consequence 
of efforts by the powerful pro-gun lobby, in the form of the National Rifl e Associa-
tion. One argument continually put forward is that the danger comes not from the 
fi rearms themselves, but from some of the people who carry them (‘Guns don’t kill, 
people do’). The availability of fi rearms should therefore have no impact on the level 
of crime involving fi rearms.
It is striking, however, that even the very rough data in this report support the 
opposite view: that the availability of fi rearms in itself increases the likelihood of 
gun violence. Possession of fi rearms in different countries can be categorised as very 
low (1-100), low (101-200), high (201-300) or very high (301 or more). Similarly the rate 
of gun deaths can be categorised as very low (0.1-2.0), low (2.1-4.0), high (4.1-6.0) or 
very high (6.0 or more). When these two classifi cations are combined, the following 
picture emerges (Table 5.5).
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Table 5.5 Possession and fatal use of ﬁ rearms, several years
Possession of ﬁ rearms
Very low Low High Very high
Firearms-related deaths
Very low
Netherlands
Germany
UK
Sweden
Low AustriaAustralia
High FranceCanada
Very high Finland US
Source: Dutch Ministry of Justice (2002)
5.4.3 Investigation, prosecution and conviction
The recording of an offence can lead to the identifi cation and interviewing of sus-
pects, and subsequent criminal prosecution. Prosecution might, in turn, lead to 
a conviction. The correlation between the relevant indicators for each step in this 
process can be regarded as a country’s criminal justice profi le. Figure 5.11 shows 
some of these indicators, expressed in numbers per 100,000 inhabitants. The ratios 
between these indicators, which refer not to production volume but to the quality 
and effectiveness of the criminal justice system, are discussed in Section 5.5.
Figure 5.11  Offences, offenders/suspects and convictions (excl. traffic) per 100,000 
 population, 2000 
Source: European Sourcebook 2003
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In virtually all countries, the number of offenders (suspects interviewed by police) is 
signifi cantly lower than the number of crimes recorded. Only Latvia offers the sur-
prising picture that the number of suspects interviewed is higher than the number 
of recorded offences. Finland leads on the number of suspects interviewed, followed 
by Luxembourg, Germany and England/Wales. The Netherlands falls somewhere in 
the middle. The number of suspects interviewed is low in Greece, Spain, Ireland and 
most of the new member states.
The number of convictions is generally much lower than the number of suspects 
interviewed. The conviction rate is high in Finland, Sweden and England/Wales, 
on the low side in the Netherlands (partly as a result of the number of out-of-court 
settlements by the public prosecutions department) and very low in Spain, Portugal, 
Ireland and Cyprus. Sweden is the only country where the number of convictions is 
higher than the number of suspects interviewed, but this is because each individual 
offence or element of an offence leads to a separate conviction.
5.4.4 Emphasis on punishment
The number of convictions is shown in Figure 5.11 (fi nal bar). Figure 5.12 distin-
guishes between three different types of punishment: (1) imprisonment, (2) fi nes 
and (3) other sanctions imposed by the public prosecutions department, and other 
sanctions (such as alternative punishments, and also suspended prison sentences).
Figure 5.12  Percentage distribution by type of punishment or measure, 1999
Source: European Sourcebook 2000 
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It is clear that, in most countries, fi nes are the most common type of punishment. At 
18%, the proportion of prison sentences in the Netherlands is more or less average. 
It is, however, signifi cantly higher than in France, England/Wales and, especially, 
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Germany. Countries where the ‘Other’ category of punishment is large, often have a 
high incidence of suspended prison sentences.
The prison population in the Netherlands is not particularly high in comparison 
with the other countries. The number of prisoners is just below the eu average. How-
ever, the prison population in the Netherlands has been growing rapidly since 1987. 
The us and the Baltic states have exceptionally large prison populations (Figure 5.13).
Figure 5.13  Prisoners per 100,000 population 
Source: European Sourcebook 2003, Barclay and Tavares 2003 (Estonia) 
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The length of prison sentences – the subject of Figure 5.14 – is also relevant. The sen-
tences presented here are those actually served, not the sentences passed. Sentences 
actually served can be estimated by taking the total number of prisoners at any given 
moment (which is an estimate of the number of years served in prison) and dividing 
it by the number of prison sentences imposed.9
9  This estimate is not entirely accurate. For instance, it takes no account of suspects in 
provisional detention who will not ultimately receive a prison sentence.
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Figure 5.14  Average length of sentence served, in months, 1999 
Source: European Sourcebook 2000
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The average length of sentences served in the Netherlands is fairly low by European 
standards, at 6.1 months. France (6.9) and England/Wales (8.7) have slightly longer 
periods of imprisonment, and in Germany, in particular, the average sentence served 
is much longer (18.9 months).
The Netherlands’ relatively low score can be explained by two factors. Prison 
sentences tend to be imposed more often in the Netherlands, including for less seri-
ous offences and, since the offences are less serious, the sentences are generally for 
shorter prison terms. Also, the most prevalent type of offence – property offences – gener-
ally incurs a less severe punishment.
On closer analysis, we fi nd that in the Netherlands, as in Sweden, more than 
half the prison sentences imposed are shorter than three months. Also, the major-
ity of the prison population in the Netherlands are serving a sentence of between 
one and fi ve years, which is comparable to the situation in Austria and the UK. We 
should note, however, that the average length of prison sentences in the Netherlands 
increased by 48%, from 133 to 197 days, between 1985 and 1995 (Grapendaal et al., 
1997).
The system analysis in Section 5.2 placed a great deal of emphasis on the degree 
of repression of the criminal justice system. This is defi ned as the extent to which 
a country takes tough measures to fi ght crime. It thus refers to both the nature and 
duration of sentences passed and to the number of staff and level of resources used 
in fi ghting crime.
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Figure 5.15  Repressiveness: average number of prison days per recorded offence, 2000a
a corrected for share of violent crime
Source: European Sourcebook 2003 
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Figure 5.15 shows the number of prison days per recorded offence. The total number 
of prison days (estimated by multiplying the number of prisoners on a given date10 
by 365) has been divided by the total number of recorded crimes. This thus repre-
sents a large segment of the over-all criminal justice system.11 The outcome depends 
on various factors: (a) the number of suspects per recorded offence (similar to, 
though not entirely the same as the clear-up rate), (b) the degree to which offenders 
are punished, (c) the share of prison sentences among all punitive measures and (d) 
the average length of sentence. The ratio of serious to less serious offences also plays 
a role, but this has been corrected for in the fi gure.12 On balance, these indicators 
give some insight into the emphasis on punishment in each country.
The clear geographical division is striking: Scandinavian countries have the 
lowest number of prison days per recorded offence (in the order of one to three), 
followed by most Western European countries (including the Netherlands), Slovenia, 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The countries of Southern and Central Europe 
are much more repressive. The us and Latvia are the most repressive, with over 50 
prison days per recorded offence.
 
10  1 September 2000 for most countries.
11  For this purpose, violent crimes have been assigned a double weight.
12  In other words, the average prison sentence for each country has been calculated as if 
the same proportion of violent crimes were recorded there as in the Netherlands, and 
assuming that violent offences incur a prison sentence twice as long on average as other 
offences.
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The number of staff per capita (Figure 5.1) or the number of staff per recorded crime 
(Figure 5.25) also give an indication of the repressiveness of the criminal justice 
system. These are found to correlate quite closely to the severity of punitive meas-
ures. The number of staff per capita was used in the classifi cation of systems in Sec-
tion 5.2, alongside the repressiveness indicator in Figure 5.15.
5.5 Productivity, quality and effectiveness: ofﬁ cial records
One frequently used measure of the success of criminal investigation work is the 
clear-up rate (Figure 5.16). This is usually defi ned as the percentage of recorded 
offences for which at least one suspect is found. It should be noted, however, that 
the public prosecutions department in the Netherlands performs tasks that are not 
refl ected in these fi gures, in particular the processing of traffi c offences (‘Mulder’ 
cases and sub-district court cases). Special investigation services such as the Fiscal 
Information and Investigation Service and the Economic Investigation Service 
also bring cases to the attention of the Dutch public prosecutions department. The 
number of cases solved has been obtained by multiplying the number of recorded 
crimes by the clear-up rate.
Figure 5.16  Clear-up rates 
Source: Interpol, SCP revision 
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The clear-up rate in the Netherlands (15% in 2001) is low compared to other coun-
tries. Only Denmark, Australia and the us have a similarly low score. In Germany, 
Greece, Finland and a number of new member states the clear-up rate is over 50%. 
However, major differences in the way clear-up rates are determined make it diffi -
cult to compare countries (Smit et al., 2003). Nevertheless, we can conclude that the 
Netherlands’ low rate is partly due to the fact that there is less violent crime in this 
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country. The direct contact between offender and victim in this type of crime means 
that, in general, the clear-up rate is higher than for property offences.
Figure 5.17 shows the trend in the clear-up rate for two categories of crime over 
the past ten years. Differences in defi nition mean that the rates cannot really be 
compared in absolute terms. As in most other countries, the clear-up rate in the 
Netherlands is on the decline. Only Germany and the us have seen an improvement.
 
Figure 5.17 Average annual change in clear-up rate (1996 - 2000) 
Source: WODC 2003 SCP revision
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Prosecution is organised in a variety of ways. In some countries, the police are 
authorised to deal with cases independently (this includes so-called ‘Halt’ cases in 
the Netherlands, whereby the police have the power to conditionally dismiss cases 
under the responsibility of the public prosecutions department). The extent to which 
the prosecuting authority can handle cases independently also differs from coun-
try to country. And there are many more examples. It is therefore risky to compare 
individual aspects of criminal prosecution in various countries (different types of 
dismissal, out-of-court settlement, etc.). Comparing the number of suspects inter-
viewed by the police (as a measure of cases that are ‘ripe for prosecution’) and the 
number of individuals who receive a sanction, sentence or other punitive measure 
from the public prosecutions department or court (as a measure of successfully 
prosecuted cases) does shed some light on the ‘conviction rate’, however. Figure 5.18 
confronts the number of convicted persons and the number of suspects.
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Figure 5.18  Number of convicted persons as percentage of number of suspects, 2000 
 (excl. traffic) 
Source: European Sourcebook 2003 
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The conviction rate is above 50% in England/Wales, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary and 
Poland. Sweden (not shown in fi gure) in fact scores over 100%, but this can be attrib-
uted to the way the Swedes handle multiple offences. Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus, 
Latvia and Slovenia score below 30%. The Netherlands falls in the middle, with 35%, 
though the conviction rate turns out much higher (in the order of 60%) if out-of-
court settlements are included. However, for a fair comparison we would then have 
to apply similar corrections to other countries’ fi gures.
Clear-up rates are a refl ection of the functioning of the police service, convic-
tion rates refl ect the functioning of the police, public prosecutions department and 
courts. To obtain an impression of the functioning of the entire criminal justice 
system, we can express the number of convicted persons as a percentage of the 
number of recorded offences (Figure 5.19).
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Figure 5.19  Number of convicted persons as percentage of recorded offences, 2000 
 (excl. traffic) 
Source: European Sourcebook 2003
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By this criterion, Greece posts the highest score, at almost 40%, followed by a 
number of new member states, with rates between 15% and 25%. Finland and Eng-
land/Wales have the highest rates in the eu-15 (15% to 20%). The Netherlands comes 
bottom, on 7% (but see remark in connection with fi gure 5.18).
Disregarding the practical diffi culty of comparing fi gures internationally, clear-
up rates can be seen as an important product of the police service. The number of 
convictions is less useful as a measure of the production of the courts, because from 
the court’s perspective a case that leads to an acquittal can also be seen as a prod-
uct. We should therefore in fact focus on the number of cases brought before the 
courts. However, this fi gures is available for only a limited number of countries, and 
this topic is not therefore examined further in this report. However, the number of 
convictions can be regarded as the fi nal product of the criminal justice system (dis-
regarding the prison system for the time being). From this particular point of view, 
acquitted suspects would have to be seen as failures.
Figure 5.20 therefore shows labour productivity in the criminal justice system as 
the quotient of the number of convicted suspects and staff numbers of the police, 
public prosecutions department and criminal courts.
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Figure 5.20  Labour productivity in criminal justice system: convicted suspects per FTE in 
 police service, public prosecutions dept. and criminal courts, 2000 (excl traffic) 
Source: European Sourcebook 2003; see also Figure 5.1 
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Productivity defi ned in this way is very high in Finland, Sweden and England/Wales (at 
fi ve to eight convicted suspects per fte) (It should be kept in mind, however, that mul-
tiple crimes count as several convictions in Sweden). Productivity is low (less than one 
conviction per fte) in Ireland, the Southern European countries and a number of new 
member states (particularly Cyprus, Latvia, Slovenia and Slovakia). The Netherlands 
comes somewhere in the middle, with 1.7 convictions per fte. Figure 5.21 depicts the 
relationship between convicted suspects and fte in a scatterplot.
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number of convicts per 1000 population
Figure 5.21  Scatterplot of convicted suspects versus FTE in police service, public 
 prosecutions dept. and criminal courts, 2000
Source:  European Sourcebook 2003 SCP revision 
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There appears to be a negative correlation between the number of convicted suspects 
and the number of fte employed by the police service, public prosecutions depart-
ment and criminal courts. This is accentuated by two outliers (Finland and England/
Wales) which combine high numbers of convicted suspects with low staffi ng levels. 
It is diffi cult to interpret these outcomes. As will be shown in Figure 5.25, there 
is a strong negative correlation between registered crime and the number of fte 
employed by the criminal justice system, which might mean that high staffi ng levels 
in the criminal justice system have a preventive effect. This preliminary conclusion is 
reinforced by the fact that in countries where staffi ng levels are high, sentences are 
generally harsh. Such sentences not only have a deterrent effect, any criminals sen-
tenced to imprisonment are also kept out of circulation for a long time (the ‘lock-up 
effect’). At the same time, this means that countries deploying signifi cant resources, 
have fewer suspects to arrest and convict, which lowers measured productivity.
Quality and quantity are not always compatible. To a certain extent, the number 
of appeals can be regarded as an indicator of the quality of the administration of 
justice (see Table 5.6). However, the costs of lodging an appeal and certain cultural 
factors also play a role (Blank et al. 2004).
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Table 5.6  Number of appeals as percentage of number of completed cases
criminal
Belgium 7
Denmark 3
Germany 7
France 5
Italy 3
Netherlands 8
Austria 9
Finland 13
Sweden 13
England/Wales 1
Poland 1
Source: Blank et al. 2004
Table 5.6 shows that the proportion of appeals in criminal cases ranges from 1% (in 
England/Wales and Poland) to 13% (in Sweden and Finland). The Netherlands has an 
average rate of appeals (7%).
We turn now to a number of indicators of the productivity and quality of the 
prison system. Figure 5.22 shows a measure of labour productivity: the number of 
prisoners per prison guard.
Figure 5.22 Labour productivity: prisoners per prison guard, 2000 
Source:  European Sourcebook 2003, Home Office and UNODC 
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In the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Finland and Sweden the ratio of prisoners to 
guards is 1:1. In the majority of countries it lies between 1:1 and 1:3, though the ratio is 
considerably higher in Slovakia and the us. Expenditure per prisoner is also very high 
in the Netherlands (approx. 90,000 euros per prisoner, as against 30,000 in the us).
As always with this kind of rough data, we must consider whether high staffi ng 
levels and high expenditure per prisoner should be seen as a sign of ineffi ciency or of 
high quality.
While, in the us, the high spending on the prison system can be attributed to a 
very large prison population with low costs per prisoner, spending in the Nether-
lands is high because of the high costs per prisoner, on a prison population that is 
average by eu standards. The high costs per prisoner found for the Netherlands are 
confi rmed in a study conducted by ioo, the Institute for Public Sector Economic 
Research (ioo/iva, 1998). It also looked at Belgium, Lower Saxony, England/Wales 
and Sweden.
High spending is associated with a humane prison regime. Though this quality 
aspect is diffi cult to quantify, some indicators are presented here. One important 
factor is prevention of overcrowding. In 2000, the Netherlands used 91% of its prison 
capacity. Denmark and Austria also underused their capacity. Canada, Germany, the 
UK, France and Sweden had occupation rates over 100% (at a rate of 101% to 105%). 
No fi gures are available for the us.
The ioo study examined other indicators, such as the number of hours prison-
ers are allowed to spend outside their cell and the number of prisoners per cell. The 
Netherlands and Sweden had positive outcomes for both of these indicators.
Table 5.7 gives more qualitative information on the prison system in a number of 
countries. Unfortunately, however, this information is somewhat outdated.
Table 5.7  Tentative performance indicators for prison system, 1994
suicides per 10,000 
prisoners
escapes per 10,000 
prisoners
Denmark 22 138
Germany 14 37
France 18 10
Netherlands 5 250
Austria 23 194
United Kingdom 13 47
Sweden 5 221
US 1 –
Source: DJI 1996; Council of Europe 1998; Maguire & Pastore 1998
The number of suicides can be seen as refl ecting prison conditions. According to 
Table 5.7 there are few prison suicides in the Netherlands. The us fi gure is remark-
ably low, so low in fact that it is open to doubt. No correlation with spending per 
prisoner is evident. Table 5.7 suggests that the number of escapes in the Netherlands 
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is high. The fi gures mainly refer to escapes from semi-open prisons, however, which 
are relatively common in the Netherlands and Sweden. There are few escapes from 
closed prisons. Finally, some insight into rates of re-offending in the different coun-
tries would be useful. Unfortunately, however, no such information is available.
Recorded crime, which was already discussed in connection with Figure 5.5, can 
be seen not only as the starting point of all activities in the criminal justice system, 
but also as a measure of the effectiveness of the agencies concerned. One problem 
with effect indicators in general, and those for the criminal justice system in par-
ticular, is that many social actors and factors can contribute to the measured end 
result. This complication was discussed in Section 5.1.2. Figure 5.23 relates staff-
ing levels in the criminal justice system to the scale of recorded crime and can be 
regarded as an indication of cost-effectiveness (whereby staff numbers rather than 
costs are the measure of resource use, given the lack of complete cost data).
There are several objections to the use of recorded crime fi gures. Firstly, the 
police have a certain latitude in deciding what deviant behaviour is regarded as seri-
ous enough to be offi cially recorded. Secondly, recorded crime might be regarded to 
some extent as a function of the efforts of the police, and therefore indirectly of the 
resources used. However, as the discussion of Figure 5.25 will make clear, there is no 
empirical evidence to support this conjecture. Section 5.6 looks at another source of 
information which is not subject to this shortcoming: victimisation surveys.
Figure 5.23  Personnel in police service, public prosecutions department, criminal courts
 and prison system per 1000 recorded crimes, 2000 
Source:  European Sourcebook 2003; Dutch ministry of Justice, revision of various National sources  
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Figure 5.23 shows that the number of personnel in the police service and criminal 
justice system per 1,000 crimes varies sharply from country to country. In the Neth-
erlands, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, England/Wales and Canada, the fi gure is well 
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below 50. Cyprus lies at the other extreme, with 900, and has been omitted from 
the fi gure to maintain readability. Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, many new 
member states and the us also record high inputs of personnel (between 140 and 
280). As the discussion of Figure 5.25 will make clear, the differences found here are 
enhanced by an apparent negative correlation between police numbers and the level 
of crimes. The Southern European countries and many of the new member states 
have low crime rates and high police numbers, while the reverse applies in other 
countries (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Canada, England/Wales and the Nether-
lands).
It is interesting to look at total expenditure, too. Figure 5.24 presents some data, 
although information on spending is available for only a limited number of countries.
Figure 5. 24 Expenditure on police, public prosecutions department, criminal courts and 
 prison system per offence, 2000 (PPP’s in  NL¤)
Source:  Dutch ministry of Justice, revision of various National sources   
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At fi rst glance, the picture in Figure 5.24 looks completely different from that in 
Figure 5.23. However, this is mainly because data on many countries are missing in 
Figure 5.24. The outcomes are similar for the countries that are represented in both 
fi gures, with the us way out in front (1,400 dollars per offence), the Netherlands as 
runner-up (500 dollars per offence) and Sweden and Denmark bringing up the rear 
(150 dollars per offence).
Figure 5.25 shows the relationship between the number of recorded crimes and 
staffi ng levels in the criminal justice system in a scatterplot.
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Figure 5.25 Scatterplot of recorded offences (per 1000 population) versus criminal justice 
 system personnel (per 1000 population), 2000
 Source: European Sourcebook 2003, Home Office, Interpol; supplementary country data: Dutch ministry of Justice, 
 revision of various National sources; SCP revision  
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Figure 5.25 demonstrates a clear negative correlation between the scale of the 
criminal justice system and crime rates. In the top left of the fi gure are a group of 
countries with low staffi ng levels and high crime rates: the Scandinavian countries, 
Canada, the Netherlands and England/Wales. Another group of Western European 
countries (Belgium, Austria, Germany and France) have average scores on both 
dimensions. A third group, including Spain, Ireland and most of the new member 
states, report average staffi ng levels and low crime rates. The fourth group have high 
staffi ng levels and low crime rates. They include the us, the other Southern Euro-
pean countries and the remaining new member states.
Incidentally, Figure 5.25 explodes the myth that the number of recorded crimes 
is a function of the resources absorbed by the police apparatus: in that case there 
would in fact be a positive correlation between recorded crime and resources allo-
cated to the police force.
5.6 Quality and effectiveness: the public’s view
5.6.1 Crime and victimisation
Only a small proportion of offences, some 10% to 20%, are reported and registered 
by the police. Generally speaking, population surveys therefore give a much better 
indication of crime levels than do police statistics. However, surveys also have draw-
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backs, including the distortions that are inherent in random sampling and the much 
less direct relationship of crimes reported by respondents with the work of the crim-
inal justice system. Furthermore, only a small number of countries carry out surveys 
among victims. Finally, ‘victimless crimes’ (traffi c offences, fraud, drugs crimes) are 
not included in victimisation surveys. The key questions in such surveys relate to the 
extent to which respondents have themselves been the victim of a crime. This infor-
mation allows two indicators to be calculated. The fi rst is prevalence: the proportion 
of respondents who have been the victim of a crime on one or more occasions over 
the course of a year. The second is the number of offences per 100 inhabitants in a 
year. This indicator is known as incidence.
 The International Crime Victimisation Survey (icvs) measures and compares 
the level of crime in various countries (Van Kesteren et al., 2000).13 Figures 5.26 and 
5.27 show some of the most important results.
Figure 5.26  Prevalence: risk of victimisation, 2000 (percentage) 
Source: International Crime Victimisation Survey 
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13  It is important to realise, when interpreting the fi gures in the icvs, that victims might 
have fallen victim to a crime in another country. So the result is not a precise measure 
of crime in a particular country, but of crime as experienced by victims who live in that 
country. Although the limited sample size in the ICVS does not allow any clear conclu-
sions to be drawn about any possible distortion, the impact would not appear to be 
too great. Depending on the type of crime and the country, the proportion of offences 
experienced abroad is between 0% and 20%. For comments on the methodology see 
also Bruinsma et al., 1990.
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Figure 5.27 Incidence: number of offences experienced per 100 respondents, 2000 
Source: International Crime Victimisation Survey: 
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According to the International Crime Victimisation Survey (Van Kesteren et al., 2000), 
in 2000 prevalence in the Netherlands was 25 per 100 respondents. The incidence 
was 54 offences per 100 respondents. The incidence is greater than the prevalence 
because some respondents had been multiple victims, either of the same crime or of 
several different crimes.
From these data it may be concluded that three-quarters of the population have 
not been the victim of any crime, and that the rest have fallen victim to on average 
two crimes. Repeated victimisation is considerably more common with offences like 
assault (sexual or otherwise) and burglary than one would expect to see statistically 
(cf. dpjr, 1996). Polvi et al. (1990), for example, found that, once someone has been 
burglarised, the likelihood that they will be burglarised again increases fourfold. 
Information about repeated victimisation allows preventive measures to be targeted 
more effectively.
Quite strikingly, the icvs reveals the Netherlands to have a relatively high risk of 
victimisation, in terms both of the likelihood that a respondent had fallen victim 
to a crime in 2000 (Figure 5.26) and of the number of offences per 100 respondents 
(Figure 5.27).
High fi gures for the Netherlands appear to result mainly from the exception-
ally high frequency of two types of offence: bicycle theft and car vandalism. These 
two offences account for roughly 50% of the total number of crimes reported in the 
survey. In other countries the corresponding fi gure is much lower, at 25% to 35%.
Besides the specifi c opportunity factor in the Netherlands – the fact that there are 
far more bicycles to ‘shoplift’ than in other countries – its high level of urbanisation, 
combined with its level of prosperity, probably also play a role. These are generally 
regarded as criminogenic factors, particularly in relation to property offences.
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The picture is clearly different when it comes to other crimes. The Netherlands 
comes in fourth place for burglary (and attempted burglary), behind England/Wales, 
Canada and the United States. In terms of crimes against the person (robbery, 
assault and sexual crimes), the Netherlands falls somewhere in the middle.
In comparison with England/Wales and France, victimisation in the Netherlands 
is clearly lower when it comes to more serious crimes such as car theft, robbery, 
intimidation and assault.14
5.6.2 Public opinion
In the victimisation surveys respondents who had actually been victims were asked 
whether they were satisfi ed with the way the police had responded (Figure 5.28). In most 
countries 65% to 77% of victims were satisfi ed. Denmark scored a fi rst, and the Nether-
lands also did fairly well, with 70%. Poland, Portugal and France did signifi cantly worse.
Figure 5. 28 Satisfaction with police response, 2000 (percentage) 
Source: International Crime Victimisation Survey 
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Figure 5.29 looks at the relationship between the level of crime according to victimi-
sation surveys and people’s fear of crime. This is approximated by the total stand-
ardised scores for three questions in the victimisation survey, concerning (1) the 
perceived risk of burglary, (2) fear of crime in the home and (3) fear of crime on the 
street. The proportion of respondents estimating the risk of burglary as likely to very 
likely, for example, ranges from 13% in Austria to 58% in Portugal (18% in the Neth-
erlands). The proportion of respondents feeling unsafe when walking alone in the 
dark ranges from 14% in Sweden and the us to 35% in Australia, Poland and Spain 
(again, 18% in the Netherlands). These fi gures bear no relation whatsoever to the 
objective risk of violent victimisation in the countries considered.
14  Germany did not participate in the ICVS in 1999.
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Figure 5.29  Fear of crime and level of crime, 2000
Source: International Crime Victimisation Survey. SCP revision
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Figure 5.29 confi rms the weak connection between fear of crime and the actual risk 
of victimisation. Respondents feel unsafe in Portugal, Poland and Australia, while 
their risk of actually falling victim to a crime in these countries is very low, average 
and high respectively. People feel relatively safe in the Netherlands, even though they 
have a relatively high risk of victimisation (Wittebrood 2001).
Figures 5.30 and 5.31 report confi dence in the police, and the administration of 
justice system. In Denmark, 92% of the respondents said to have confi dence in the 
police, as against 28% in Lithuania. Most of the eu-15, and the non-European Anglo-
Saxon countries, post an average to high score. The Netherlands and Belgium fall 
in the middle, on 66% and 54% respectively. Greece has a considerably lower score 
(38%). The new member states also score low, except for Malta. A similar picture 
emerges for the administration of justice, albeit confi dence in that organisation is 
generally lower than that enjoyed by the police. Again, Denmark tops the table with 
79%, and Lithuania comes last with 19%. The Netherlands does slightly better than 
average, on 50%, and Greece, Latvia and Hungary rise to middle positions in the 
over-all rankings. New Zealand has a fairly poor score and Australia a bad score. 
Respondents’ confi dence in the administration of justice in Belgium, Australia and 
Italy (39%, 35% and 31% respectively) is signifi cantly lower than their confi dence in 
the national police.
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Figure 5.30  Confidence in the police (1999/2000) 
Source: European Values Survey (1999-2000), World Values Survey (1995-1997, non-EU counties) 
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Figure 5.31  Confidence in the adminstration of justice, 1999/2000 
Source: European Values Survey (1999-2000), World Values Survey (1995-1997, Australia and New Zealand) 
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Figure 5.32 shows composite scores for confi dence in the police and administration 
of justice. To obtain these results, the z-scores for the responses (‘quite a lot’ and ‘a 
great deal’) were converted and added as elsewhere in this report, producing marks 
between 0 and 10.
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Figure 5.32  Confidence in police and administration of justice 1999/2000 
 Source: European Values Survey; World Values Survey 
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Overall marks for confi dence in the police and the administration of justice range 
between 2 and 8. Highest marks go to Denmark (8), Finland (over 7) and Austria 
(almost 7). The Netherlands comes in the middle, with 5. The Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Latvia and Slovakia score less than 4.
5.6.3 Closer analysis
Figure 5.33 looks more closely at the relationship between crime rates according to 
victimisation surveys and crimes recorded by the police.
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Figure 5.33  Crime rates per 100,000 according to various measures (2000) 
Source: International Crime Victimisation Survey 2000, European Sourcebook 2003; SCP revision 
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In all countries, only a proportion of offences reported in victimisation surveys, are 
recorded by the police.15 The share of offences recorded by the police ranges from 
8-9% in Spain, the us and Poland, to 25-35% in Finland, Sweden and Denmark. The 
Netherlands comes in the middle, with 15%.
This report has wrestled with the issue of which indicator should be used as a 
measure of actual crime rates. Crimes reported by the population (in representa-
tive surveys) seem a measure to be preferred over offences recorded by the police, 
when the objective is to analyse cost-effectiveness (Figure 5.34), and for the overall 
analyses in Chapter 7. Bearing in mind that ‘victimless crimes’ (traffi c, drugs, fraud) 
are not included, victimisation surveys should be regarded as the superior choice, 
despite the risk of distortion inherent in random sampling. Unfortunately, survey 
data, unlike recorded crime fi gures, are available for only a limited number of coun-
tries. In the absence of anything better, therefore, we have calculated a composite 
indicator whereby the results of victimisation surveys are taken as the norm where 
they are available. In the case of the other countries, recorded crime has been cor-
rected upwards, by applying the ratio of the total crime according to victimisation 
surveys to the total of recorded crimes, found in those countries where these fi gures 
are available. This approach could perhaps be improved upon if one were to take 
account of specifi c country characteristics when imputing the missing data, but we 
have not taken this idea any further in the present report.
15  To make the fi gures more comparable, traffi c offences and vandalism have been 
excluded. The former are not represented in victimisation surveys, and the latter are not 
included in the recorded crime fi gures presented in the European Sourcebook. 
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Figure 5.34 looks at the relationship between crime rates and staffi ng levels in the 
police and administration of justice. The composite measure discussed in the previ-
ous paragraph is using as the indicator of crime.
composite crime per 1000
Figure 5.34  Scatterplot of crime according to victimisation surveys versus personnel 
 in criminal justice system, 2000 
Source: Dutch ministry of Justice, revision of various National sources; International Crime Victimisation Survey; 
 European Sourcebook 2003. SCP revision
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In a sense, Figure 5.34 refers to cost-effectiveness, albeit that the crime rate is an 
inverse indicator of effectiveness (high crime equals low effectiveness). We have 
also taken staff numbers as a basis rather than expenditure, because of incomplete 
spending data. The criminal justice system can be depicted as a circle. The starting 
point is offences brought to the attention of the police. The investigation, prosecu-
tion and punishment of offenders is intended to reduce crime, via the deterrent 
effect of the likelihood of being caught and punished, and via the lock-up effect. 
Recorded crime is thus the starting point of the entire process, but actual crime as 
an effect indicator is also the end point. As stated above, we would rather prefer to 
measure actual crime rates via victimisation surveys (icvs), but these surveys are 
held in only a limited number of countries. For the rest, the data used are in fact 
corrected recorded crime data. It should therefore come as no surprise that Figure 
5.34 bears a strong resemblance to its counterpart, Figure 5.25. The message is 
also roughly the same: countries that devote signifi cant resources to fi ghting crime 
(bottom right) have low crime rates, and vice versa. The fi rst group includes mainly 
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the Southern European countries and the new member states, while the second 
comprises a number of Western European and Anglo-Saxon countries. Although 
the correlation is clear, the causal relationship is not. It is possible that factors other 
than staff numbers are partially responsible for the correlation. One strong possibil-
ity would be the severity of punishment, particularly the number of prison days per 
recorded offence, which is high in the countries that also have high staff numbers in 
their criminal justice system. 
Despite problems inherent in random sampling, the data from crime victimisa-
tion surveys must be regarded as a better measure of crime than police crime fi gures. 
Such data are indicated by dark symbols in the fi gure. We should note that the nega-
tive correlation between resource use and crime is less clear in the case of the data 
from victimisation surveys than for the other data. 
Finally, Figure 5.35 considers the relationship between effectiveness and confi -
dence. Here too, the indicator of confi dence is based on the composite indicator in 
Figure 5.33.
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Figure 5.35  Police and criminal justice system: crime and confidence, 1999/2000 
Source: see Figures 5.32 and 5.33 
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Contrary to expectations, there appears to be a weak positive correlation between 
crime levels and confi dence in the police and administration of justice. The North-
ern and Western European countries, plus Australia and New Zealand, have average 
to high crime rates, with comparable levels of confi dence. By contrast, the Southern 
European countries and, above all, the new member states, combine low confi dence 
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in the police and administration of justice with relatively low levels of crime. Table 5.8 
relates the rather surprising outcomes to some other fi ndings in this report. 
Table 5.8 Connections identiﬁ ed in this report (schematic)
crime 
rate
repres-
siveness 
(severity 
of punish-
ment))
repres-
siveness 
(number 
of staff)
probability 
of punish-
ment
produc-
tivity
conﬁ -
dence
Northern and Western 
Europe, Australia, New 
Zealand
high low low low, except 
for Finland 
and Eng-
land/Wales
high high
Southern and Central 
European countries
low high high high, except 
for Portugal 
and Spain
low low
Source: SCP
The same groups of countries are notable for the repressiveness of their criminal 
justice system (severity of punishment and resource use), probability of punishment 
and productivity. The low productivity in countries with low crime rates is connected 
with high staffi ng levels both per capita and in terms of the scale of crime. The low 
confi dence in the police and administration of justice in these countries is possibly 
related to yet another factor associated with repressiveness: the strong focus on 
tackling crime and catching offenders might mean that there is less regard for the 
rights of offenders and the soundness of evidence. There might also be a connec-
tion between low pay in the public sector and low confi dence, related to corruption 
in some of the countries concerned (see also Chapter 6). An alternative explanation 
could be that a lack of confi dence moves people not to report crimes to the police. 
Indeed, the discrepancy between the number of crimes reported in population sur-
veys and registered offences is relatively high in countries such as Poland, Portugal 
and Spain (see Fig. 5.33). However, this registration failure can only partly explain 
the differences between the country groups. Further research in this area seems 
warranted. 
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6 Public administration
Steven Van de Walle, Miekatrien Sterck, Wouter van Dooren, Geert Bouckaert en Evert Pommer1
6.1 Introduction
After the rapid expansion of the welfare state in the 1950s and 1960s, the public 
sector has been under considerable pressure in the past few decades. Declining 
public confi dence in government institutions and growing demands on public 
fi nances have prompted governments to initiate measures to trim the public sector 
and make it more effi cient and effective. Reform strategies adopted can be catalogued 
as: Maintain, Modernise, Marketise and Minimise (Pollit and Bouckaert 2004).
‘Maintain’ involves tightening up traditional control mechanisms. The exist-
ing system is stretched, for example, by placing linear restrictions on expenditure 
(the ‘cheese slice method’), with no downward revision of policy targets. Another 
example of the Maintain strategy is more detailed control of expenditure programs. 
Although this strategy causes less disruption in the functioning of government 
organisations, it is probably not adequate to tackle existing fi nancial and legitimacy 
problems of the public sector.
‘Modernise’ involves organising alternative structures and processes of govern-
ment policy making. However, any modernisation operation must be consistent 
with traditional values of public service provision. The public sector is intrinsically 
different from the private sector, and any fundamental reform has to take account 
of these differences. The focus of reforms is to improve management (managerial 
modernisation) and/or to foster participation by citizens and user groups (participa-
tory modernisation).
‘Marketise’, the third strategy, involves introducing a private-sector focus to the 
public sector and its values. It does not mean that services are privatised. The aim is 
still primarily to reform the public sector, not to reduce its scope and public outlays. 
Techniques common to the private sector are transplanted wholesale to the public 
sector. In doing so, the unique character of public sector services is implicitly called 
into question. One example of this strategy has been the introduction of internal 
competition (competitive tendering) in New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
1  This chapter is mainly based on Van de Walle et al., 2004. The fi rst four authors are 
employed at the Public Management Institute (‘Instituut voor de Overheid’) of Leuven 
University. 
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‘Minimise’ – reducing the public sector – involves privatising functions that have tra-
ditionally been in the domain of the public sector. The railways in the United King-
dom are perhaps the most notorious example of privatisation, resulting in a poorer 
safety record and higher rail fares. Privatisation has been much more successful in 
other sectors (such as telecommunications).
Many monitoring systems have been put into place as part of these reforms, in 
order to chart the performance of the public sector. This is an essential prerequi-
site for the success of new management techniques, such as performance budgets, 
performance contracts and strategic plans. Such national systems produce a wealth 
of information, but they do not extend beyond the confi nes of a particular admin-
istrative system. National boundaries are rarely crossed. It is in fact diffi cult to 
consolidate the data, as different countries use different defi nitions for the variables 
concerned. The data available on public adminsitration mainly concerns subjective 
perceptions of performance, rather than actual measurements of performance. This 
lack of objective data makes it impossible to draw generalised conclusions as to what 
is the optimal administrative system, even if we wanted to. This chapter therefore 
aims above all to point out the possibilities and limitations associated with the com-
parison of administrative systems at European level, drawing from empirical data on 
public administration performance.
The public administration includes all those activities directed at policymaking, 
legislation and management of the public sector. Activities producing individual 
services for citizens, like health care and education, are not the domain of public 
administration. However, in practice the demarcation between policy, legislation 
and management on the one hand and concrete services provided to individual 
citizens on the other hand, is not always easy to draw. Moreover, data available on 
public sector performance usually do not allow public administration activities to be 
identifi ed separately. Consequently, public administration and activities performed 
by the public administration must often be measured by related concepts, like ‘gov-
ernment’ and ‘general public services’. 
The chapter is structured as follows. An overall comparison of administrative 
systems (Section 6.2), covering administrative culture, the degree of decentraliza-
tion and the trend towards the autonomisation of government organisations is 
followed by a survey of resources claimed by the public administration (Section 6.3). 
Section 6.4 looks at administrative processes in the public sector, including fi nancial 
management, human resources management and e-government. The fi nal section 
examines the quality of the government and confi dence in the Civil Service.
6.2 Administrative systems
6.2.1 Administrative culture
Differences in administrative culture have a major impact both on fundamental 
choices concerning the structure of the public sector, and on the daily functioning of 
the government apparatus. Administrative culture forms part of a wider political and 
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social culture.2 Hofstede’s dimensions are probably the best-known categorisation 
of administrative cultures (Hofstede 1980), although other attempts have been made 
(Mamadouh 1999). It is clearly no simple matter to group countries on the basis of 
their administrative culture.
Loughlin (1994) groups countries on the basis of broad philosophical and cultural 
traditions. He distinguishes an Anglo-Saxon (minimal state), a Germanic-organicist 
and a French Napoleonic state tradition. The Scandinavian type is a mix of the fi rst 
two. For Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004), administrative culture is that which is consid-
ered normal and acceptable in an organisation, and they have mapped the extent of a 
Rechtsstaat vs. public interest tradition in a country. In the Rechtsstaat (rule of law) model, 
the state is the central integrating force in society, and administrative law takes a 
prominent place in this tradition. In the public interest model the state assumes a less 
prominent role in society and is regarded as something of a necessary evil. Account-
ability is more important here than legality. Of course, Rechtsstaat and public interest 
are not extremes on a continuum, and in some countries, such as the Netherlands, 
Finland and Sweden, a trend towards other models can be observed. Hooghe (2002) 
used four dimensions developed by Page (1995) – cohesion, autonomy from political 
control, caste-like character and non-permeability of external interest – to construct 
an index of ‘Weberian bureaucratic tradition’ (strong, medium, weak), indicating to 
what degree a national administrative culture corresponds to the Weberian model 
(strong cohesion, large degree of autonomy from political control, strong caste-
like character of the bureaucracy and low permeability of external interests). Her 
research focused on the European Commission, where differences in administrative 
cultures are of course more pronounced. 
Hajnal (2003) analysed public administration education programmes in Europe. 
European countries are clustered in three groups. A ‘legal’ group of countries, where 
there is a strong focus on law in public administration education, a ‘public’ group 
where the unique public and political character of the public administration is rec-
ognised, and a ‘corporate’ group, where (business) management techniques take a 
central place in the curriculum. 
2  See Peters (1989) for a detailed discussion of the phenomenon of ‘administrative 
culture’.
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Table 6.1  Administrative cultures in EU-15 countries
administrative culture
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 
2004)
state traditions
(Loughlin 1994)  
type of national admin-
istration: Weberian 
bureaucratic tradition
(Hooghe 2002)
clusters in PA 
education
(Hajnal 
2003)
AT – Germanic-organicist weak weberian –
BE rechtsstaat French-Napoleonic (until 
1988), Germanic-organi-
cist (after 1988)
weak weberian public
DE rechtsstaat Germanic-organicist medium weberian –
DK – Scandinavian (mixture 
of Anglo-Saxon and Ger-
manic)
medium weberian corporate
ES – French-Napoleonic (until 
1978), Germanic-organi-
cist (after 1978)
medium weberian public
FI tending to rechtsstaat weak weberian –
FR predominantly 
rechtsstaat
French-Napoleonic strong weberian public
GR  – French-Napoleonic weak weberian legal
IE – Anglo-Saxon (minimal 
state)
strong weberian corporate
IT  rechtsstaat French-Napoleonic weak weberian legal
LU – weak weberian –
NL originally very legalistic, 
but has changed to 
pluralistic/consensual
Germanic-organicist medium weberian corporate
PT – French-Napoleonic medium weberian legal
SE originally legalistic but 
has changed to cor-
poratist
Scandinavian (mixture 
of Anglo-Saxon and Ger-
manic)
medium weberian public
UK public interest Anglo-Saxon (minimal 
state)
strong weberian –
- : not available
The four categorisations discussed here each have their own focus, so it is diffi cult to 
obtain a clear picture. The categorisation of some countries seems fairly coherent, but the 
absence of clear indicators means it still entails some risk. The Anglo-Saxon tradition dif-
fers considerably from the continental tradition. This is refl ected, among other things, in 
the fact that many public servants in the United Kingdom are generalists, while in Ger-
many they tend to have a legal background. The large number of studies of cultural differ-
ences among European public servants shows how important it is to take a more in-depth 
look at this subject. Obviously, the evolution towards a European Administrative Space will 
be affected by different views on the role of the public administration in society.
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6.2.2 Degree of local decentralization
Another important characteristic of administrative systems is the degree of decen-
tralization. Decentralization has many faces. One is functional decentralization, 
whereby resources and powers are devolved to semi-autonomous institutions. Then 
there is territorial decentralization, which increases the role of other tiers of govern-
ment, such as regions and local authorities. We focus here on decentralization to the 
local level. Autonomised institutions are examined in the next section. There appear 
to be major differences between countries in the degree of decentralization.
Decentralization is usually approached from a fi nancial perspective, with a focus 
on devolving public resources. Figure 6.1 shows the proportion of the government 
budget spent by local authorities. Three groups of countries may be distinguished. 
Firstly, the Scandinavian countries, with a very strong local sector (accounting 
for over 30% of spending). The outsider here is Luxembourg. The second cluster 
comprises a number of Central European countries (20%-30%). One notable country 
included in this group is France, which generally has a centralist image. Finally, we 
have a number of countries with a small local sector, mainly Southern European 
countries, and also Ireland and Belgium.
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Figure 6.1 Spending by local authorities as % of total government expenditure 
Source: Council of Europe (1997)
These fi gures give an fi rst impression. However, the relative share in total public 
spending is too coarse a measure of decentralization. Can we call it decentralization 
when a local authority merely acts as the agent of a higher level of government? What 
autonomy do local authorities have? Figures on spending must always be viewed in 
the light of autonomy. Indicators of autonomy include spending freedom and free-
dom to collect resources. The latter concerns the freedom to increase or cut back 
certain fl ows of income, and the former an authority’s freedom to spend its income 
as it sees fi t. We can examine these concepts on the basis of local authorities’ income 
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structure. Spending freedom and freedom of resources can be established by analys-
ing a breakdown of local authority income.
– Taxes:   high freedom of resources, high spending freedom
– Loans:  high freedom of resources, high spending freedom
– Shared taxation: low freedom of resources, high spending freedom
– General grants:  low freedom of resources, high spending freedom
– Fees & charges:  high freedom of resources, low spending freedom3
– Targeted grants:  low freedom of resources, low spending freedom
Figure 6.2 combines the level of local government expenditure with spending free-
dom, as a measure of autonomy, showing the product of the percentage of the gov-
ernment budget spent by local authorities (see Figure 6.1) and the percentage over 
which the local authority has a high degree of spending freedom. 
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Figure 6.2  Autonomy of local authorities (% of total government budget) 
Source: Council of Europe (1997)
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The groups identifi ed above remain largely intact. A number of atypical positions 
are confi rmed. France, for instance, despite its centralist image, tends towards the 
Scandinavian model. Ireland has only a limited degree of decentralization, and thus 
differs strongly from the United Kingdom, with which it is often associated. The 
Netherlands fi nances local authorities to a large extent by means of targeted grants 
and is therefore less decentralised according to this measure. It ends up closer to 
Belgium, as was to be expected. Local administration in the Netherlands and 
3  This income fl ow can be increased by raising either performance or charges. Spending 
freedom is limited, since charges do not always cover costs, so no new policy freedom 
is created.
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Belgium has developed since the early nineteenth century on the foundations laid 
during the Dutch Republic.
Another indicator of the degree of decentralization is the distribution of public 
servants among the different tiers of government. Table 6.2 shows the proportion 
of public servants employed at the various levels of administration. It clearly shows 
a shift in staff employed by central government to staff on the payroll of local and 
regional authorities. The proportion of public servants working in central govern-
ment is declining, while the proportion of staff working at the local and regional 
level is on the increase. The Scandinavian countries (Finland (23.4%) and Sweden 
(17.3%)) and most of the federal countries (Australia (12.1%), Germany (11.5%), 
Canada (17.1%) and the United States (13.5%) ) have small central governments. 
Belgium is an exception, on 34.3%. In unitarian states such as France (51.6%), the 
Netherlands (74.2%) and Italy (57.9%), the proportion of public servants working in 
central government is signifi cantly higher. In 2000, as many as 90.9% of public serv-
ants worked in central government in New Zealand.
Table 6.2  Percentages of public servants working in each tier of government
central government other level of government
 1990   1994 2000 level  1994 2000 
Belgium 53.7 b 39.9 
c
34.3 regional 14.1c 14,8 
local 46.0c 50,8
Germany 21.6 11.9 11.5 länder 51.0 52.2
municipalities 37.1 36.3
France 55.0 48.7 51.6
d
sub national        30.7 25.3d
Italy 63.0 63.0 57.9
d
regional  23.0 26.8d
municipalities 14.0 15.3d
Netherlands 70.1 73.2 74.2
a
regional     5.2 4.7a
municipalities 21.6 21.1a
Finland 24.3 25.2 23.4
a
municipalities    74.8 76.6a
Sweden 26.7 17.3 n.a. regional  24.6 n.a.
municipalities      58.1 n.a.
UK 47.7 47.7 47.6d local                  52.3 52.4d
Australia 15.0 14.6 12.1
e state                  73.3 77.1e
local 12.1 10.8e
New Zealand 90.1 89.7 90.9 local                  10.3 9.1
Canada 17.9 17.1 13.2 provincial                      44.1 51.9
local 38.9 35.0
USA 16.7 15.2 13.5 state               22.6 23.1
local 61.1 63.4
Notes:  a: ﬁ gures are for 1999; b: ﬁ gures are for 1989; c: ﬁ gures are for 1995d: ﬁ gures are for 1997; 
  e: ﬁ gures are for 1998
Source: Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004)
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6.2.3 Autonomisation of government organizations
This section takes a close look at the trend towards granting government organisa-
tions autonomous status, otherwise known as autonomisation. Unlike territorial 
decentralization to the local level, this is a relatively recent strategy. However, it has 
formed the core of many public sector reforms in Europe. Autonomisation is based 
on the hypothesis that greater autonomy for ‘front offi ce’ agencies leads them to 
work more effi ciently and effectively. The Scandinavian countries have a fairly long 
tradition of autonomisation. However, in most countries the trend did not set in 
until the advent of New Public Management in the 1980s (Hood 1991).
Autonomisation can take various forms. There are differences in terms both of 
legal status, and of the degree of policy and management autonomy. Here, however, 
we distinguish between three major types of autonomous organisation: arm’s length 
agencies, public law agencies and mixed agencies. Arm’s length agencies have been 
hived off from their parent organisation, but remain answerable to the minister. 
They might still form part of the parent organisation, or they might have their own 
separate legal status. Examples include the United Kingdom’s executive agencies, 
and the Netherlands’ baten-lastenagentschappen. Public law agencies are bodies set up 
under public law which are institutionally separate from the parent organisation and 
have their own board. Examples include the Netherlands’ zelfstandige bestuursorganen 
(zbos), the United Kingdom’s non-departmental public bodies and New Zealand’s 
crown entities. The third group of agencies are private-law bodies that have a public 
function. Examples include public enterprises and non-profi t organisations. These 
are therefore sometimes referred to as mixed agencies.
Table 6.3 reviews the three forms of autonomisation in fourteen countries, 
indicating which forms exist in each country, whether they form part of the central 
budget, and the size of their budgets in relation to the total government budget. This 
information is helpful to indicate the degree of autonomy and the relative impor-
tance of the different forms of autonomous organisations. The data have been drawn 
from a survey by the oecd and the World Bank (oecd and World Bank 2003).
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Table 6.3  Forms of autonomisation
arm’s length agencies4 public law agencies5 mixed agencies6
part of central 
budget?
% of overall 
government 
budget
part of central 
budget?
% of overall 
government 
budget
part of central 
budget?
% of overall 
government 
budget
BE yes, entirely <10% yes, partially 10-20% – –
DK – – yes, entirely 10-20% yes, partially –
DE yes, entirely 10-20% yes, partially 10-20% no <10%
FR yes, entirely – no – no –
GR yes, entirely – yes, partially – no –
IE yes, entirely – yes, partially <10% no <10%
ES yes, entirely – yes, partially – yes, partially –
PT yes, entirely 40-60% yes, entirely 40-60% no <10%
UK yes, entirely – yes, entirely – yes, entirely –
NL yes, entirely <10% yes, partially 10-20% yes, partially <10%
HU yes, entirely – yes, partially – yes, partially –
CZ yes, partially – no – no –
AU yes, entirely 10-20% yes, partially <10% no <10%
NZ yes, entirely <10% yes, entirely 40-60% no <10%
-: not available
Source: OECD and World Bank (2003)
4  “Arm’s length agencies have no separate entity from the state; the fi nancial framework 
is predefi ned; most are funded through allocations from the state budget, and their 
budget is annually reviewed through the state budget process; no own accounts; e.g. 
semi-autonomous bodies in New Zealand, executive agencies in the uk (oecd and 
World Bank 2003).”
5  “Public Law Agencies: 100 per cent public ownership; partially or completely institu-
tionally separate from ministries; can be partially separate or fully separate legal bodies; 
function mostly under public law; not commercially oriented; most PLAs are tax-rev-
enue fi nanced, and their budget is part of the general budget law; own accounts; e.g. 
public law ZBOs in the Netherlands, crown entities in New Zealand, most non-depart-
mental public bodies in the uk, Swedish agencies and boards (oecd and World Bank 
2003).”
6  “Mixed agencies function mostly under private law, usually with a full separate legal 
identity from the state; commercially oriented; usually mostly sales revenue fi nanced 
and can carry forward surpluses, borrow and lend; their budgets are separate from 
those of ministries; own accounts; e.g. private law ZBOs in the Netherlands (oecd and 
World Bank 2003).”
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In most countries, the entire budget of arm’s length agencies is part of the budget 
of the central or federal government. This is due to the fact that these agencies are 
still answerable to central government, even though they have been placed at arm’s 
length. Their share of the total government budget ranges from less than 10% to 
20%. One exception is Portugal, where the budget of arm’s length agencies accounts 
for 40% to 60% of the total budget. The budgets of public law agencies are usually 
only partially included in the central government budget. Their proportion of the 
total government budget ranges from less than 10% to 20%. In Portugal and New 
Zealand, public law agencies account from 40% to 60% of the budget.
Finally, mixed agencies do not form part of the central budget in the majority of 
the countries studied. In most cases, their share of the total government budget is 
below 10%.
6.3 Use of resources
Public administration includes policy making, legislating policy and management 
of the public sector. The un classifi cation of functions of government distinguishes 
general public services, including legislative, executive, fi nancial, fi scal and foreign 
activities, apart from other typical public functions like defence, public order and 
safety.7 This classifi cation fi ts very well the usual defi nition of public administration 
activities. Unfortunately, this information is only available for eu-15 countries. The 
new member states will follow this classifi cation from 2004.
The share of expenditure on general public services in gdp varies between 1,3% 
(United Kingdom) and 4,8% (France). Other countries are scattered evenly between 
these extreme values (Figure 6.3). Different levels of expenditure are partly explained 
by differences in over-all public spending levels (Figure 2.6). Expressed as a share of 
gdp, public expenditure is high in Sweden and Denmark and low in Ireland and the 
uk. The same pattern holds for expenditure on general public services. 
7  The various functions are: (1) general public services, (2) defence, (3) public order and 
safety, (4) economic affairs, (5) environment protection, (6) housing and community 
amenities, (7) health, (8) education, (9) recreation, culture and religion, (10) social 
protection. 
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Figure 6.3  Expenditure on general public services of EU-15 countries, 2001 (percentage 
 of GDP)a
a Excluding debt interest payments (classified as property income consolidated) and foreign transfers (classified as 
 others transfers consolidated).
Source: Eurostat
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The share of general public services in total government expenditure varies widely 
between eu-15 countries (Figure 6.4). Luxembourg and France spend well over 9% of 
total government expenditure on general public services, while the United Kingdom 
spends only 3%. A closer view shows a striking similarity between Figures 6.3 and 
6.4. Obviously, countries spending much on general public services (Figure 6.3) also 
devote a larger part of total government expenditure to produce general public serv-
ices (Figure 6.4). 
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Figure 6.4  Government expenditure on general public services of EU-15 countries, 2001 
 (percentage of total government expenditure)a
a Excluding debt interest payments (classified as property income consolidated) and foreign transfers (classified as 
 others transfers consolidated).
Source: Eurostat
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In Figure 2.12 (Chapter 2) the share of employees in the public administration, 
expressed as a percentage of total employment, appeared to range from less then 1% 
in Cyprus to more then 8 percent in Belgium. Because public administration pro-
duces public services, it’s also relevant to relate employment in public administra-
tion to total population (Figure 6.5).
 
Figure 6.5  Employees in public administration per 1.000 population, 2000
Source: OECD, ILO, NATO, European Sourcebook, US Sourcebook, AIV (SCP revision)
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The number of employees per 1.000 inhabitants ranges from 4 in Cyprus to 33 in the 
United Status. In eu-15 countries the ratio of public administration staff is low in 
Greece, Italy and Ireland and high in Belgium, Denmark and France. The staff-ratio 
ends up between 15 and 25 in the other eu-15 countries. Most new member states 
end up between 10 and 20 employees per 1.000 inhabitants, except for Cyprus and 
Poland (about 5) and the Czech republic (just over 20). 
The ranking of eu-15 countries according to Figure 6.3 (expenditure on Civil 
service related to gdp) and to Figure 6.5 (civil servants related to inhabitants) differs, 
although the relation is positive. On top of the civil expenditure ranking are France, 
Sweden and Austria and on top of the civil staff ranking are Belgium, Denmark and 
France. Inversely, at the bottom of the civil expenditure ranking are the United King-
dom, Ireland and Spain and at the bottom of the civil staff ranking are Greece, Italy 
and Ireland. These differences can be attributed partly to differences in share of cost 
of staff in total production of general public services (Figure 6.6). For example, Sweden 
scores high on civil expenditure but low on share spent on staff; Belgium scores mod-
erate on civil expenditure but high on share spent on staff and the United Kingdom 
scores low on civil expenditure but rather high on share spent on staff.    
  
Figure 6.6  Composition of government expenditure on general public services of EU-15 
 countries, 2001 (percentage)a
a  Excluding debt interest payments (classified as property income consolidated) and foreign transfers (classified as 
 others transfers consolidated).
Source: Eurostat; SCP revision
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Unfortunately, no comparable information is available on wages in public admin-
istration, but there is some information on public sector wages in general. These 
public sector wages include earnings in health care, education, defence and law 
and order. The level of public sector spending in general depends heavily on costs 
of staff. In most countries, mean public sector wages surpass mean wages of all 
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employees in the economy (Figure 6.7). The ratio between public sector wages and 
all wages is almost unity in France, Finland, Sweden and Czech Republic. In all other 
countries, especially in Greece, this ratio is in favour of public sector employees. On 
average, public sector employees earned in 2002 about 37% more then employees 
in general. In part, this salary gap can be explained by the fact that government 
employees are on average better educated than market sector workers, given job 
requirements, for example in education and health care.
Figure 6.7  Ratio of public sector wages and all wages, 2002 (or latest available year)
Source: Eurostat; SCP revision
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6.4 Administrative processes
The previous section considered various input variables for public administration. The 
government absorbs productive resources to perform its tasks and achieve certain 
effects in society. This chapter reviews administrative processes associated with the 
machinery that allows government to pursue its policies. Policy implementation is sup-
ported by administrative processes such as fi nancial management, human resources 
management and information technology. This section looks at trends in fi nancial 
management (Section 6.4.1), human resources management (Section 6.4.2), and e-gov-
ernment (Section 6.4.3). The scope of this section extends to the public sector in gen-
eral, but the government – and the public administration in particular - is responsible 
for the quality of fi nancial management, human resources and openness in the public 
sector. This creates a horizontal persepctive in public sector policy.
6.4.1 Financial management
Various factors have prompted public authorities to modernise their budget cycle. 
The fi nancial reform agenda consists of three major components: greater fi nancial 
responsibility for management, results-based budgets and multi-year budgets.
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Financial responsibility for management
Approval of the budget constitutes part of the legislative power’s control function 
over the executive power. The New Public Management movement has shifted the 
focus from traditional a priori control to control in retrospect, and placed more 
emphasis on results and greater fi nancial responsibility for management. This sec-
tion indicates the extent to which governments in Europe are following this trend.
One indicator of the degree of parliamentary control over the budget and of man-
agement freedom is the degree of detail to which the budget is appropriated. Five 
levels of appropriation can be distinguished, corresponding to a declining degree of 
discretionary power and freedom for agency management:
– aggregated allocation at the level of broad programmes or outcomes;
– aggregated allocation at the level of government departments;
– aggregated allocation for staff and programmes at the programme level, appro-
priation per programme;
– appropriation for staff expenditure and programme expenditure; and
– disaggregated allocation within programmes.
The more aggregated the appropriation, the more freedom management has 
to change the budget allocation, giving it more fl exibility to make adjustments in 
order to achieve the desired results. However, a higher level of appropriation usually 
goes hand in hand with a greater demand for policy information. This information 
should allow parliament to guide programmes towards the results envisaged.
Another indicator of the degree of parliamentary control and the degree of man-
agement freedom is end of year fl exibility. This allows managers to carry any surplus 
budget allocation over to next year’s budget. Although the principle of end of year 
fl exibility is contrary to the traditional one-year budget principle, it does offer incen-
tives to use resources more effi ciently and can counteract wastage of resources at the 
end of the year (‘December fever’). Budgets no longer have to be used up completely. 
End of year fl exibility might be subject to certain conditions, such as a maximum 
transferable amount, approval by the fi nance minister or parliamentary approval.
Table 6.4 shows the level of parliamentary appropriation (X axis) and the degree 
of end of year fl exibility (Y axis). When it comes to parliamentary appropriation, a 
number of scenarios are possible:
− Aggregate budget amounts for broad programme or outcome areas: envelope for 
each policy area or policy objective;
− Aggregate amounts for Ministries: envelope for each Ministry;
− Aggregate amounts of personnel and aggregate amounts at the Ministry level for 
programmes: staff envelope and programme envelope for each Ministry;
− Appropriations at the programme level: envelope for each programme;
− Appropriations split between personnel and programme spending at the pro-
gramme level: staff envelope and programme envelope for each programme;
− Disaggregated appropriations at the programme level: detailed allocation to 
budget items within each programme.
249Public administration
End of year fl exibility means that unused resources may be carried over to the fol-
lowing year. The following possibilities exist: 
− “Yes, without limit”: unrestricted transfer of operational resources;
− “Yes, up to a maximum percentage”: limited transfer of operational resources;
− “Yes, as approved on a case by case basis by the Ministry of Finance or the Central 
Budget Authority”: transfer of operational resources possible only with approval 
of the central department responsible for administering the budget;
− “Yes, on a case by case basis according to the underlying statute”: transfer of 
operational resources possible only if specifi ed in a statute;
− “Yes, with notifi cation of the legislature”: transfer of operational resources pos-
sible only after parliament has been notifi ed;
− “Yes, with the approval of the legislature”: transfer of operational resources pos-
sible only with parliamentary approval;
− “No”: no transfer of operational resources possible.
The countries with the highest degree of management freedom are in the bottom 
left corner of Table 6.4, those with the least discretionary powers in the top right. 
The table is based partially on a recent survey of budget practices by the oecd and 
the World Bank (oecd and World Bank 2003; Scheers and Sterck et al. 2003). Table 
6.4 includes data for the eu-15, the new member states and other oecd countries 
such as the United States, Australia and New Zealand.
Table 6.4  Level of budget appropriation and end of year ﬂ exibility in the OECD
level of appropriation
aggre-
gated
pro-
gramme
outcomes
aggre-
gated at 
Ministerial 
level
aggregated
staff & pro-
gramme 
at pro-
gramme 
level
at 
pro-
gramme
level
staff 
& pro-
gramme 
expendi-
ture
disaggre-
gated 
at pro-
gramme
level
en
d-
ye
ar
 ﬂ 
ex
ib
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ty
no GR, IE ES US, SI
yes, with parliamentary 
approval
UK NZ
according to statute BE
yes, if approved by Min 
Finance
NL AT, HU
yes, up to maximum SE
yes, without limit AU DK FI
Source:OECD and World Bank (2003)
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In some countries, parliamentary appropriation occurs at an aggregated level and it 
is possible to carry over unused budget resources at the end of the year, albeit some-
times only under certain conditions. This group includes Australia, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Diametrically opposed to this group is a clus-
ter of countries with less management freedom, where there is no end of year fl ex-
ibility and parliamentary appropriation is very detailed (the us, Slovenia, Spain). In 
a number of countries, end of year fl exibility is allowed subject to certain conditions, 
such as a maximum limit, parliamentary approval or the approval of the fi nance 
minister. This is the case, for example, in Belgium, Austria, Hungary, Portugal and 
Sweden. These countries combine conditional end of year fl exibility with a relatively 
detailed level of parliamentary appropriation. A number of countries have both full 
end of year fl exibility and disaggregated appropriation (Finland, Germany and Italy). 
A number of others have a highly aggregated budget, but no end of year fl exibility 
(Greece and Ireland).
The third indicator of parliamentary control is the legislature’s infl uence on the 
budget. To what extent does the budget ultimately approved by parliament differ 
from the budget originally submitted by the government? In the majority of the 
countries studied, the budget submitted by the executive is approved without major 
amendments (less than 3%). This is the case in Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovenia and the United States. Some countries in the oecd-World Bank survey even 
reported that parliament approved the budget without any amendments (Belgium, 
Greece, Ireland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada) 
(oecd and World Bank 2003).
Results-based budgets
The growing importance of effi ciency and effectiveness has prompted governments 
to focus more and more on results as the basis for their budgets. Information on 
output and outcome is included in the budget. A number of countries are in fact 
moving towards accrual budgeting, a system of costs and benefi ts. Table 6.5 depicts 
the trend towards more result-based budgeting. First, we have classifi ed countries on 
the basis of the use of output and outcome information in budgets. We then went on 
to classify them on the basis of their method of reporting receipts and outlays: cash 
or accrual. In a cash-based budget system, the actual cash receipts and expenditure for 
the budget period are estimated. An accrual budgeting system focuses on resources used 
and the associated costs, and claims on receipts that arise during the budget period. 
Table 6.5 shows the percentage of spending programmes in the budget for which 
performance information is given (from 0% to 100%). The Y axis shows the method 
of charging (from full cash to full accrual). The table is based partially on a recent 
survey of budget practices by the oecd and the World Bank (oecd and World Bank 
2003; Scheers and Sterck et al. 2003). It includes data for the eu-15, the new member 
states and other oecd countries such as the United States, Australia and New Zealand.
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Table 6.5  Use of performance information in budget and method of charging 
percentage of programs for which performance information is 
contained in the budget documentation
0% 1%-25% 25%-50% 50%-75% 75%-99% 100%
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et
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of
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ha
rg
in
g
full accrual AU, NZ
cash and accrual IT FI SE
cash and commitment BE DK US, NL
full cash IE, PT, 
AT
DE, GR, 
CZ
SI ES
Source: OECD and World Bank (2003) 
The fi rst cluster consists of countries which have full or partial accrual budgeting 
whereby performance information is provided for all programmes (Australia, New 
Zealand, Finland and Sweden). The second group comprises countries which include 
performance information in the budget documents, but have opted not to make the 
move to accrual budgeting (the us, the Netherlands8, Denmark, Slovenia and Spain). 
The third group of countries maintain the traditional line-item cash budget geared 
mainly to inputs, with little performance information (Ireland, Portugal, Austria, 
the Czech Republic and Greece).
A number of positions allocated to countries in Table 6.5 seem questionable. For 
instance, according to the oecd-World Bank survey, all of the Netherlands’ budget 
programmes include performance information. Reports from the Netherlands’ 
Court of Audit, however, show that this is not yet the case (Algemene Rekenkamer 
2002; Algemene Rekenkamer 2003). There is therefore a gap between aspirations 
concerning results-based budgeting and its actual implementation. The positions 
of Sweden and Spain should also be put into perspective. However, the oecd and 
World Bank survey does not take account of differences between rhetoric and reality.
Multi-year budgets
The third trend in the modernisation of government fi nances has been a move 
towards multi-year budgets. Most countries add multi-year forecasts to their budg-
ets to place their annual income and expenditure in a longer-term perspective. In 
most cases, these forecasts are purely informative and do not require parliamentary 
approval. However, in Italy and the United States, parliament does have to approve 
the multi-year budget. Table 6.4 shows which countries have a multi-year budget, 
and what exactly its status is.
8  In 2001 the Netherlands announced it intended to introduce accrual budgeting for all 
ministries, as it had done previously for baten-lastenagentschappen (executive agencies). 
However, in 2003 the Minister of Finance decided to alter this policy towards a partial 
implementation of accrual budgeting.
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Table 6.6  Existence and status of multi-year budgets
yes no
does the annual central government 
budget documentation submitted to 
the legislature contain multi-year 
expenditure estimates? 
BE, DK, DE, GR, FR, IE, IT, NL, PT, 
SE, UK, HU, SI, AU, US, NZ, CA
ES, AT, FI, CZ,
do these expenditure estimates require 
authorization by the legislature?
IT, US9 AU, AT, BE, CA, CZ, DE, 
DK, ES, FI, FR, GR, HU, 
IE, NL, NZ, SI, SE, UK
Source: OECD and World Bank (2003)
6.4.2 Human resources management
Personnel policy, or human resources management is another horizontal policy area 
within the public sector currently experiencing change. Strategic human resources 
policy, competency management, equal opportunities policy and public service moti-
vation are key concepts in the modernisation of human resources management (hrm) 
in the public sector. One important choice in public-sector hrm policy is whether 
to attempt to ensure that the staff profi le refl ects the composition of the population. 
Moreover, the Lisbon agenda aims to raise the employment rate of women from an 
average of 51% in 2000 to more than 60% by 2010. This section therefore looks at the 
number of female public servants and the age profi le of the public service.
Figure 6.8 shows the proportion of female staff in the public administration and 
defence sector.10
9  The multi-year expenditure estimates are approved by Congress, apart from the appro-
priation bills for the budget year
10  isic Rev. 3 (un Classifi cations Registry): isic l – Public administration and defence; 
compulsory social security & isic m – Education. Public servants can also be employed 
in other categories, M (health and social work) or O (other community, social and 
personal service activities).
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Figure 6.8  Employment of women in public administration, defence and compulsory 
 social security, 2002 
Source: OECD online database 
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An average of 47% of staff in the public administration and defence sector are women. 
The average is much higher in education, at 69%, while in the health care and social 
welfare sector it is no less than 80%. We shall focus our attention here on the propor-
tion of female staff in public administration, defence and compulsory social security. 
The proportion of female staff in this sector is well above average in Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden. In Hungary and Slovakia, too, there are more female than male staff in 
this sector. The United Kingdom and New Zealand also score above average. A number 
of countries fl uctuate around the average: Ireland, Germany, France, Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Canada. In a number of Southern European countries, such as Spain, Por-
tugal and Italy, the representation of women in the public sector is some 10% lower than 
the overall average. The proportion is even lower in Greece. Notably, the proportion of 
female staff in the Dutch public administration and defence sector is also well below 
average (38%). Figures from Statistics Netherlands confi rm and indeed reinforce this 
conclusion, indicating that only 35% of jobs in public administration and compulsory 
social security11 are held by women (cbs 2004).
Figure 6.9 shows staff in the public sector by age group. The graph reveals that 40- to 
49-year-olds are most strongly represented in the public service. Exceptions are Sweden, 
where 50- to 59-year-olds constitute the largest group, and Germany, which has relatively 
young public servants. In the majority of countries, there are more older public servants 
(over-50s) than young public servants (aged 20 to 29). Ireland and Germany, however, 
seem to have enjoyed more success than other countries in attracting young people to the 
public service. In these two countries, staff in their 20s account for more than a quarter 
of all public servants, and the 18-19 age group is also relatively large.
11  Category 75, sbi 1993.
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Figure 6.9  Staff in central/federal government by age group, 2002 
Source: OECD/PMC (2002) 
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The problem of demographic ageing also presents the public sector with a major 
challenge. The preponderance of staff aged over 50 in the public service has 
increased steadily since 1990. As the baby boom generation (born between 1945 
and 1955) retires over the next ten years, the public service may face a growing staff 
shortage. Personnel planning and the recruitment of young staff by promoting 
the public sector as a good employer are therefore key objectives of current human 
resources policy.
6.4.3 e-Government
The development of a knowledge-based society also has implications for the services 
and communications of the public sector. There is a general tendency in the public 
sector towards automating bureaucratic procedures and processes, and electronic 
interaction with citizens. However, e-government is a very broad concept, ranging 
from electronic communications, via online services to e-democracy and e-participa-
tion. e-Government is one of the newest forms of modernisation in the public sector, 
and it is being followed closely by research centres and international organisations. 
In this fi eld, benchmarks are frequently used to compare and rank countries (Jans-
sen et al. 2004). The focus in this section is on three such benchmarks.
The United Nations and the American Society for Public Administration (aspa) 
have developed an e-government index based on countries’ offi cial online presence, 
their telecommunications infrastructure and their human development capacity. 
This benchmark defi nes e-government as utilising the Internet and the World Wide 
Web to deliver government information and services to citizens. Table 6.7 ranks 
countries on the basis of this benchmark.
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Table 6.7 Ranking of EU-15, accession countries and other OECD countries in the e-govern-
ment index compiled by the United Nations and the American Society for Public 
Administration 
1 US 11 FI 21 LV
2 AU 12 FR 22 LI
3 NZ 13 ES 23 GR
4 UK 14 IT 24 SK
5 CA 15 IE 25 SI
6 NL 16 PT
7 DK 17 AT
8 DE 18 CZ
9 SE 19 EE
10 BE 20 PL
Source: ASPA and UN (2002)
The second benchmark, the Networked Readiness of Nations (nrn) was compiled by 
Harvard University’s Centre for International Development (Table 6.8). It uses a 
broad defi nition of e-government, which includes e-administration, e-business, the 
presence of infrastructure and it know-how. The indicators used in this benchmark 
include the number of online services, the number of online transactions, subsidies 
for e-government, promotion of it by government and the e-government environ-
ment (e.g. public access to the Internet).
Table 6.8 Ranking of EU-15, accession countries and other OECD countries in the Networked 
Readiness of Nations Benchmark
1 FI 11 FR 21 LV
2 US 12 IE 22 PL
3 SE 13 BE 23 SK
4 CA 14 NZ 24 GR
5 UK 15 EE 25 LI
6 DK 16 ES
7 DE 17 IT
8 NL 18 CZ
9 AU 19 PT
10 AT 20 SI
Source: Harvard University Centre for International Development (2003)
The third benchmark is the e-Readiness Ranking (err) 2003 produced by the Econo-
mist Intelligence Unit (Table 6.9). Here, too, a broad defi nition of e-government is 
used. Indicators include public expenditure on it as a proportion of gnp, the quality 
of Internet connections, fi nancial support for it projects, and the number of pcs and 
Internet connections.
256 Public administration
Table 6.9 Ranking of EU-15, accession countries and other OECD countries in the e-Readiness 
Ranking (ERR), 2003 
1 SE 7 CA 13 BE
2 DK 8 AU 14 FR
3 US 9 DE 15 IT
4 UK 10 AT 16 PT
5 NL 11 IE 17 ES
6 FI 12 NZ 18 GR
Source: EIU/IBM (2003)
Although the three benchmarks do not use the same indicators, the correlation 
between ranking orders in Tables 6.7 through 6.9 would appear to be signifi cant. 
Countries that score high on one benchmark also tend to score high on the others. 
The only exceptions are Finland and New Zealand, for which varied pictures emerge.
The us has the best average score on all three e-government benchmarks, and 
three Scandinavian countries appear in the top fi ve: Sweden (2), Finland (3) and 
Denmark (5).12 The United Kingdom comes in fourth place. The majority of coun-
tries have an average score. This group includes a number of countries in continen-
tal Europe: the Netherlands (7), Germany (8), Austria (10), France (11) and Belgium 
(13). Canada (6), Australia (9) and New Zealand (12) are also in this group. A small 
number of countries score below 5: Ireland (14) and a group of Southern European 
countries (Italy (15), Spain (16), Portugal (17) and Greece (18).
The United Nations and aspa Networked Readiness of Nations benchmark also 
includes data on the newly acceded eu member states (with the exception of Malta 
and Cyprus). These countries score less well than the eu-15 and Canada, the United 
States, Australia and New Zealand. The new member countries that have progressed 
furthest in the fi eld of e-government are Estonia (1), the Czech Republic (2) and 
Slovenia (3), followed by Poland (4), Latvia (5) and Slovakia (6). Lithuania (7) has the 
poorest scores.
6.5 Performance
A well-functioning and reliable public administration is an essential factor for 
economic growth. However, there are no objective indicators of the effi ciency and 
effectiveness of public administration. Because the whole nation takes advantage of 
services produced by public administration, they can be classifi ed as social goods: 
consumption is non-rival and nobody can be excluded from consumption (Musgrave 
and Musgrave 1984). In the absence of individual consumers, the functioning of the 
12  The average score differs from the average ranking; especially the ranking of Germany, 
Finland and Canada differs: Germany takes position 5 on the base of average scores and 
position 9 on the base of average ranking; Finland takes position 3 respectively 6 and 
Canada takes position 7 respectively 4.
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public administration can only be measured by subjective indicators. These indica-
tors refl ect trust of the population in public administration and confi dence in the 
Civil service. Of course, the lack of information about the performance of public 
administration can be explained by the very nature of its products: legislation, policy 
and management. No ‘natural’ performance indicators are available for these activi-
ties. However, some public administration activities can be regarded as individual 
services, like the issue of passports or the entering of transactions in the land regis-
ter. In Kuhry en Veldheer (2004) objective performance indicators are defi ned for the 
majority of municipal services. However, we don’t have acccess to similar detailed 
data for other countries. 
While subjective indicators yield useful information, they must be approached 
with caution, for two reasons (Van de Walle et al. 2004). Firstly, a negative attitude 
towards the public sector on the part of the general public can lead to a negative per-
ception of its performance. Such an attitude might arise from the general cultural 
context, and therefore have little to do with objective performance. Secondly, expec-
tations of the citizenry will affect their perception of public sector performance. 
Satisfaction and perception are determined partly by expectations. In countries with 
traditionally strong services, people will expect a lot of the public sector. If their 
expectations are not met, they will award low performance scores, even if the objec-
tive performance of the public sector is better than in countries where people expect 
less of their government.
It is already hard to measure the performance of public administration at all, but 
even more diffi cult to make cross-national comparisons of administrative perform-
ance. Only global judgements about the functioning of government and the public 
administration can be used to measure the performance of public administrations. 
The Dutch government states that citizens may expect an integer, transparent, 
credible, responsive, effective and effi cient government in exchange for taxes and 
trust they make available (TK 2003). In general, public administrative systems are 
founded on the following principles (Vidlakova 1999): trust and credibility, openness 
and transparency, accountability, effi ciency and effectiveness. These principles were 
an important condition for the new member states to enter the European commu-
nity.
6.5.1 Quality of government
The well functioning of the government is an important dimension of the performance 
of public administrations. A major source for measurement of well functioning govern-
ments- called hereafter government quality - is a survey among representatives of the busi-
ness community in a range of countries (imd 2003). More than 4,000 respondents in about 
60 countries answered questions about economic performance and government quality.
Four indicators of government quality are selected, based on the principles of well 
functioning administrative systems:
− level of bureaucracy: does bureaucracy hinder business activity?
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− level of transparency: is transparency of government policy satisfactory?
− level of effectiveness: are government decisions effectively implemented?
− level of corruption: do bribing and corruption exist in the economy?
The level of corruption is included in the imd index of government effi ciency. 
However, because Transparency International publishes a widely used composite 
index of corruption, including the imd index, this composite index will be used 
instead of the imd index (www.transparency.org).13 On the next indices, zero is the 
worst possible score and ten the best possible.
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Figure 6.10  Bureaucracy does not hinder business activity, 1995 and 2003a
a  scale: 0-10 (0 = total bureaucracy; 10 = no bureaucracy);
Scores only available for 2003: EE (4,7), SI (2,2), SK (1,9)
Source: IMD (1995, 2003) 
-
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Bureaucracy seems to hinder economic activities more in southern then in northern 
European countries (Figure 6.10). In 2003, countries with the most favourable outcome 
13  This composite index of Transparency international (ti) is compiled of different 
indices, of which the imd index, World economic forum index, World bank index and 
Gallup international index. Both corruption indices (imd and ti) are highly correlated 
(r > 0,96).  
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are Finland, Denmark, Luxembourg and Sweden. The ranking of Germany amongst the 
less performing southern countries is striking. Differences between the new member 
states are also worth mentioning. Between 1995 and 2003 the perception of the level of 
bureaucracy shows an upward trend. Especially in New Zealand but also in Germany, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom the level of bureaucracy has risen substantially. Luxem-
bourg and Finland counter this trend and have moved to a lower level of bureaucracy.
Transparency of government is judged markedly more positive then is bureaucracy 
(Figure 6.11). Even though differences between countries are smaller, roughly the 
same ranking emerges. Within the eu-15 area, northern countries generally perform 
well and southern countries perform less. But this pattern is less manifest then with 
bureaucracy. Compared with its position on bureaucracy, Portugal performs better 
on transparency. Obviously, the level of transparency has strongly improved between 
1995 and 2003. Only two countries, Germany and the Czech republic, deviate from 
this positive trend. Transparency has increased most in Finland, Luxemburg, Spain, 
Portugal, Hungary and the United Kingdom.
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
BE
DKDE
GR
ES
FR
IE
IT
LU
NL
AT
PT
FI
SE
UK
CZ
HU
PL
AU
CA
NZ
US
EU-15 new member states non-EU Anglo-Saxon
Figure 6.11  Transparency of government is satisfactory, 1995 and 2003a
a   scale: 0-10 (0 = no transparency; 10 = full transparency)
Scores only available for 2003: EE (6,0), SI (4,3), SK (5,1)
Source: IMD (1995, 2003) 
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An important indicator for the quality of the government is effective implementa-
tion of decisions and regulations. Government decisions seem to be implemented 
very well in Scandinavian countries (Figure 6.12). Greece, Germany and Italy seem 
to experience some problems in implementing government decisions. Differences 
between the new member states are smaller, as compared with bureaucracy and 
transparency, but their ranking is about the same. The perception of effective imple-
mentation of governmental decisions did not change much between 1998 and 2003. 
Some countries improved the implementation of their decisions according to the 
business community (Australia, Sweden) but some did not (Netherlands, Canada, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom).
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Figure 6.12  Government decisions are effectively implemented, 1998 and 2003a
a   scale: 0-10 (0 = not effective; 10 = full effective)
Scores only available for 2003: EE (5,1), SI (3,9), SK (3,6)
Source: IMD (1998, 2003)
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Another important dimension of the quality of government is absence of corruption. 
The differences between European countries are signifi cant. Confi dence in public 
services appears to be linked to perceived corruption. In countries where there is 
believed to be a lot of corruption, citizens do not tend to have confi dence in the 
administration. 
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Figure 6.13  Perception of corruption, 1997 and 2003a
a   scale: 0-10 (0 =total corruption; 10 = no corruption)
Source: www.transparency.org 
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Figure 6.13 compares scores on Transparency International’s corruption perceptions 
Index for the eu-15 and the new member countries in 1997 and 2003. The Scandi-
navian countries head again, and the central European countries trail behind the 
rest. Among the Western European countries, the poor scores of Italy and Greece are 
striking, as well as the poor scores of most new member states in eastern Europe. 
Belgium, in particular, is experiencing an upward trend. Italy, Lithuania and Latvia 
are also making progress, although – on the basis of these results – they still have 
a long way to go to reach the current European average. Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Greece have declining scores and Latvia, Lithuania and Spain have rising scores. 
6.5.2 Openness of government
Freedom of information is a fundamental right in a democracy. The importance of 
open and transparent government is universally recognised. Although freedom of 
information has been enshrined in law for centuries in some countries, most of the 
legislation allowing access to government information has been passed in the last 
ten or twenty years, in response to the democratisation of countries in transition, 
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scandals, the modernisation of the public sector, the growth of the knowledge-based 
society and international pressure. Sweden was a pioneer, passing its Freedom of the 
Press Act in 1766. Other early birds were the United States (Freedom of Information 
Act 1966), France and Australia. Most industrialised countries took steps towards 
legislation on access to government information in the 1980s and early 1990s. One 
exception is the United Kingdom, which did not pass its Freedom of Information Act 
until 2000. This particular legislation will not come into force until 2005. In Central 
and Eastern Europe, the fall of the Communist regimes allowed freedom of informa-
tion to be enshrined in the constitution and the statute books. Most of these coun-
tries passed freedom of information legislation in the late 1990s/early 2000s.
Access to information is a constitutional right in most countries. The openness 
of government is also regulated by legislation. Firstly, there are laws that determine 
procedures. Freedom of Information Acts stipulate the type of documents that 
should be in the public domain, institutions subject to the legislation, response 
times, any exceptions and appeal procedures in the event of a refusal. The most 
common reasons cited for refusing access to information are national security and 
international relations, privacy, commercial confi dentiality, law and order, respect 
for the confi dentiality in which information was given and the internal nature of 
certain debates among policy makers. Most countries also have specifi c legislation 
relating to classifi ed information. The protection of personal data and access to 
individual information are also regulated separately in most countries. Legisla-
tion gives people access to their own personal fi les held by both public and private 
institutions.
 Deadlines for responding to requests for information differ from country to 
country. In Sweden, Denmark and Belgium the authorities are obliged to respond 
immediately. On average, legislation stipulates a maximum of 19 days for the release 
of the information. Spain has the longest deadline, with offi cials having up to three 
months to furnish the requested information.
Table 6.10 shows the degree of government openness in the eu-15, the accession 
countries and other oecd countries. The fi gures refl ect whether the principle of 
transparency is laid down in the constitution, when the fi rst freedom of information 
laws were passed, what legislation on transparency is currently in place, the situa-
tion regarding classifi ed information and protection of and access to personal data 
and, fi nally, the deadline for responding to requests for information. The data are 
based on surveys of the openness of government (Banisar 2003; Mendel 2003).
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Table 6.10  Openness of government in the EU-15, the accession countries and other 
OECD countries
con-
stitu-
tion
current freedom of Information;
legislation
legislation on classiﬁ ed 
information
legislation on the 
protection of and access 
to personal data
SE yes Freedom of the Press Act 1976 Secrecy Act 1980 Personal Data Act 1998
DK no Access to Public Administration; 
Files Act 1985
- Act on Processing of 
Personal Data
US no Freedom of Information Act 1966 
as amended by the Electronic 
Freedom of Information Act 1996
Presidential Records Act Privacy Act of 1974
FR - Law on Access to Administrative
Documents 1978
Loi du 8 juillet 1998 
instituant une Commis-
sion ; Consultative du 
secret de la défense 
nationale
1978 Data Protection Act
NL yes Government Information (Public 
Access) Act 1991
- Personal Data Protection 
Act of 2000
NZ no Ofﬁ cial Information Act 1982 Ofﬁ cial secrets Act 1951 Privacy Act 1993
AU no Freedom of Information Act 1982 266 (2001-2002) Privacy Amendment Act 
2000
CA no Access to Information Act 1983 
as amended by the Terrorism Act 
2001
Security of Informa-
tion Act 
Privacy Act of 1985
AT yes Federal Law on the Duty to Fur-
nish Information 1987
- Data Protection Act 2000
IT no Law n°241 of 7 August 1990 - Data Protection Act of 
1996
HU yes 1992 Protection of Personal Data 
and Disclosure of Data of Public 
Interest
Secrecy Act of 1995 1992 Protection of Per-
sonal Data and Disclosure 
of Data of Public Interest
ES yes Law on Rules for Public Adminis-
tration 1992
- Personal Data Protection 
Act 1999
PT yes Law of Access to Administrative
Documents 1993
Law of State Secrecy 
1994
Act on the Protection of 
Personal Data 1998
BE yes Wet van 11 april 1994 op de 
openbaarheid van bestuur
Law on the Security of 
Information 1998
Law on the Protection of 
Personal Data 1992
LI yes Law on the Provision of Informa-
tion to the Public 1996
Law on State Secrets 
and Ofﬁ cial Secrets 
1999
Law on Legal Protection of 
Personal Data 2003
IE no Freedom of Information (Amend-
ment) Act 2003
Ofﬁ cial Secrets Act 963 Data Protection Act 1988 
as amended by the Data 
Protection (Amendment) 
Act of 2003
LV yes Law on the Freedom of Informa-
tion 1998
State Secrets Act 1996 
as amended in 2001
Law on Personal Data 
Protection
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Table 6.10  Openness of government in the EU-15, the accession countries and other 
OECD countries
con-
stitu-
tion
current freedom of Information;
legislation
legislation on classiﬁ ed 
information
legislation on the 
protection of and access 
to personal data
FI yes Act on the Openness of Govern-
ment Activities 1999 -
Personal Data Act 1999
CZ  Law on Free Access to Informa-
tion 1999
Protection of Classiﬁ ed 
Information Act 1998
2000 Data Protection Act
GR yes Code of Administrative Procedure 
1999
- Law on the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to 
the processing of personal 
data
EE yes Public Information Act 2000 State Secrets Act 1999 Data Protection Act
SK yes Act on Free Access to Information 
2000
Act on Protecting Classi-
ﬁ ed Information 2001
Act on Protection of 
Personal Data
UK no Freedom of Information Act 2000 Ofﬁ cial Secrets Act 
1989
Data Protection Act 1998
PL yes Law on Access of Public Informa-
tion 2001
Classiﬁ ed Information 
Protection Act 1999
Act on Protection of 
Personal Data 1997
SI yes Act on Access to Information of 
Public Character 2003
Classiﬁ ed Information 
Act 2001
Personal Data Protec-
tion Act
-: not available
Source: Banisar (2003); Mendel (2003)
6.5.3 Conﬁ dence in the Civil service
Confi dence in public institutions has been widely researched by political scien-
tists. In general, trust in government is declining in almost all modern welfare 
states (Dalton 2004). The World Values Survey (wvs) is the most important source 
to investigate cross-national differences in confi dence and trust. This worldwide 
survey, conducted by a network of social scientist around the world, is performed on 
nationally representative samples of at least 1,000 respondents and includes ques-
tions about confi dence in different public institutions. According Rothstein & Stolle 
(2002) three types of public institutions can be distinguished: political (parliament, 
government), controlling (media) and implementing (police, justice, school, hospi-
tal) institutions. The civil service is in between those three types of public institu-
tions, but resembles most the controlling type. 
Confi dence in the Civil service differs strongly across countries (Figure 6.14). 
The eu-15 countries are both scattered at the left side (much confi dence) as well as 
the center and right side (less confi dence) of the range of values. The same holds for 
the non-eu Anglo-Saxon countries and – to a smaller degree - for the new member 
states. Residents of Luxembourg and Ireland are the most positive about their Civil 
service and the residents of Greece and Lithuania are the least positive.
(cont.)
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Figure 6.14  Confidence in the Civil service, 2000
Source: European Values Survey (2000); World Values Survey (1995-1997) 
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Confi dence in the Civil service can be compared with confi dence in other institu-
tions delivering public sector services, like health care, safety, justice, education and 
social security (Figure 6.15). On average, confi dence in the Civil service amounts to 
about 70% of mean confi dence in other public sector institutions. Only in Portugal 
and Hungary the Civil service is able to compete with other public sector institu-
tions. The Civil services in Ireland, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg and Latvia 
perform relatively well on confi dence, but this is certainly not the case in Slovenia 
and Finland.
266 Public administration
Figure 6.15  Confidence in the Civil service as percentage of average rating of public 
 sector services, 2000
Source: European Values Survey (2000) 
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An important issue in some countries is the level of decentralization of public services. 
One argument in favour of decentralization is better fi ne-tuning of supply of public 
services to demand, because the needs and preferences of citizens are in principle 
better known at the local level. One argument against decentralization is the unequal 
regional allocation of public services that may result. In general, the population sup-
ports the idea to enlarge the competence of local authorities (Figure 6.16). On average, 
about 46% of the residents of all selected countries are in favour of handing down 
greater powers to local authorities. A lot of residents don’t have an opinion on this 
matter and only a minority of 25% feel decentralization to be a bad idea.  
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Figure 6.16  Percentage of population that thinks that more power to local authorities is 
 a good thing, 2000
Source: European Values Survey (2000) 
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Opinions differ strongly between countries. Especially in the new member states, 
except for Hungary, residents are in favour of shifting power to local authorities. 
This is not surprising, given the high level of centralization in the former socialist 
republics. Nowadays, the process of decentralization is well under way. In the eu-15, 
only residents of the Netherlands are clearly in favour of central government and 
don’t like to give more power to local authorities.    
6.5.4 Quality, conﬁ dence and expenditure
The public administration produces public services like legislation, public policy and 
public management. In general, no clear indicators are available to measure the pro-
duction of this kind of public services. Because of the lack of objective indicators, the 
effectiveness of public administration is measured here by using subjective indica-
tors. In previous sections two types of subjective indicators were presented: subjec-
tive judgements of government quality and confi dence in the Civil service. Subjective 
quality refers to the perception of governmental bureaucracy, transparency, effec-
tiveness and corruption expressed by representatives of the business community in 
different countries (imd 2003). Confi dence refers to the perception of the perform-
ance of the Civil service by a representative sample of the population (wvs 2000). 
Effectiveness of public administration can be expressed in subjective terms by relat-
ing expenditure to subjective quality (Figure 6.17) and confi dence (Figure 6.18). 
Subjective quality of the government is a composite index of perceived bureaucracy, 
transparency, effectiveness and corruption, and is related to expenditure on general 
public services per capita.
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Figure 6.17  Subjective quality of government (2003) and expenditure per capita on 
 general public services, 2001 (nl €) 
Source: IMD (2003) and Eurostat 
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In both fi gures there is a weak relation between expenditure and subjective per-
formance. The most striking observation is the location of Finland and Denmark, 
combining fairly moderate expenditure with high subjective quality. Luxembourg is 
also characterized by high quality, but pays a considerably higher price.The lowest 
spending countries in Figure 6.17 perform in general at a lower level and the high-
est spending countries at a higher level. In Figure 6.18 this weak relation is hardly 
observable. As far as there is any relation between expenditure on general public 
services and subjective performance, this relation cannot be interpreted as a causal 
relation without closer investigation. Other factors related to expenditure as well as 
subjective performance can explain the observed relation. In this report, the rela-
tions between expenditure and performance are not checked on possible intervening 
factors.
Expenditure on general public services can also be expressed in relative terms, as 
percentage of GDP, and related to quality and confi dence. However, in general this 
does not change the presented pictures. Of course, Luxemburg moves halfway to the 
left (above the Netherlands) and Ireland and Spain change positions in fi gure 6.17. 
But the favourable positions of Finland, Denmark and - to a lower degree - the uk in 
fi gure 6.17 are preserved, as are the unfavourable positions of Greece, Italy, Ger-
many and France. In fi gure 6.18 only Luxembourg moves halfway to the left and the 
remainder of the picture is roughly preserved.
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Figure 6.18  Confidence in the Civil service (2000) and expenditure per capita on general
 public services, 2001 (nl€) 
Source: European Values Survey (2000) and Eurostat
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A closer examination of both plots shows a fairly similar pattern. However, Finland 
has fallen from the top (Figure 6.17) to the lower part of the middle group (Figure 
6.18). The resemblance of both plots seems to indicate a strong correlation between 
subjective quality of government and confi dence in the Civil service. Figure 6.19 
demonstrates the relationship between both types of subjective indicators, including 
some other countries too. Over half of the countries are located close to the diago-
nal, indicating a close relationship between subjective quality of government and 
confi dence in the Civil service. In just over a quarter of all countries this relation-
ship is somewhat weaker, but still strong. Only three countries show a greater gap 
between both indicators: Ireland, Australia and Finland. In Ireland, the population 
expresses slightly more confi dence in the Civil service then the business community 
in the perceived quality of the government. In Australia but especially in Finland it’s 
just the opposite: more quality perceived by the business community and less confi -
dence expressed by the population. 
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Figure 6.19  Subjective quality of government (2003) and confidence in the Civil service, 
 2000 
Source: European Values Survey (2000); World Values Survey (1995-1997); IMD (2003)
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7 Performance of the public sector
Bob Kuhry and Evert Pommer
7.1 Introduction
Previous chapters have assessed the performance of twenty-nine countries in several 
policy areas: the economy (Chapter 2), education (Chapter 3), health care (Chapter 4), 
law and order (Chapter 5) and public administration (Chapter 6). In some cases, the 
analysis covered less than twenty-nine countries because of missing data. This con-
cluding chapter aims to synthesise the fi ndings presented in earlier chapters. Section 
7.2 attempts to group nations in several classes by taking into account system charac-
teristics in all policy areas considered in the report. Section 7.3 describes aggregated 
performance in the fi elds of education, health care and law and order. Section 7.4 
attempts to group nations on the basis of aggregate public service sector performance. 
Sections 7.5 describes aggregated performance and relates it to aggregated confi dence. 
The fi nal section summarizes core results for a number of different regions which, 
irrespective of the subject, appear to emerge from all cluster analyses: Northern, West-
ern, Southern en Central Europe and the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
7.2 Grouping welfare states by type 
Existing typologies of welfare states
In a strand of the literature, the performance of welfare states is linked to their 
institutions. A typology aims to explain the performance of national institutions 
in the light of their key characteristics. One well-known typology of institutions for 
social protection found in welfare states was developed by Esping-Andersen (1990). 
In his approach, the defi ning characteristic of welfare states is the generosity and 
accessibility of government programs designed to protect the citizenry against loss 
of income and poverty. Esping-Andersen proceeds by grouping countries on the 
basis of a historical sociological theory, and uses an analytical sociological model to 
defi ne three types of welfare state that perform differently in their efforts to provide 
social protection: liberal, corporatist and social-democratic. Each type is different 
in terms of the regulation of labour markets (primary protection) and the level and 
scope of income guarantees (secondary protection). The Social and Cultural Plan-
ning Offi ce – using empirical data – has also classifi ed welfare states on the basis of 
social protection offered to citizens. Eastern European countries emerge as a sepa-
rate type of welfare state.1 
1  See: scp/cerp 2004.
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Mediterranean countries are characterised by limited access to social security, but a 
high level of pension benefi ts. Corporatist countries score fairly low on both points, 
liberal countries score low on providing pensions and social-democratic countries 
score high on access to social security programs. In fact, Eastern European coun-
tries resemble corporatist countries to a great extent. While responsibility for social 
protection rests largely with the individual in liberal countries and with the public 
sector in social-democratic countries, in corporatist countries it is more the province 
of civil society, with an important role for employer, professional and trade associa-
tions. The Netherlands is diffi cult to place in this classifi cation, and is usually posi-
tioned between the corporatist and the social-democratic types.
Other studies have attempted to fi nd a relationship between key demographic 
indicators and the institutions of welfare states. For example, Mellens (1999)2 has 
tried to relate birth rate, migration, family formation and the death rate to domi-
nant socio-economic and cultural treats of welfare states. Socio-economic char-
acteristics here include level of income, educational attainment and health status 
of the population. Cultural characteristics include gender equality, conservatism, 
individualism and post-modernism. In fact, his classifi cation is largely consistent 
with the classifi cation based on the degree of social protection. Mediterranean, 
Scandinavian, Central European and Eastern European types can be distinguished. 
Notably, Ireland ends up in the Mediterranean group and Portugal in the Eastern 
European group. In Ireland’s case, this is put down to the Catholic tradition and a 
strong orientation towards family values, while Portugal’s position can be attributed 
to its relatively poor economic performance. Another outcome worth noting is that 
Mellens fi nds no liberal cluster. Australia and the UK mostly resemble the Central 
European countries.
Typology of welfare states: the public service sector
In producing a typology of welfare states, we have opted for yet another approach. 
We start by considering the degree to which countries manage to guarantee certain 
basic rights for the whole of the population (education, health care, law and order). 
To this end, the government must provide or arrange the provision of police services, 
a judicial system, various health care services and education of suffi cient quality. The 
producers of these services, which may include public, private or non-profi t organi-
zations, constitute the ‘public service sector’ of the economy (see defi nitions in Box 
1.1 and in Section 2.3).
The typology of the public service sector should tie in with structural character-
istics of welfare states, which help determine the degree to which they succeed in 
offering citizens basic rights such as education, health care and safety. Another very 
important factor is income. Basic rights can be guaranteed in various ways, given the 
income available.
2  In De Beer and Van Wissen (eds.), Europe: One Continent, Different Worlds; Nidi 1999.
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In education the aim is to allow individuals to develop their innate talents. The philos-
ophy of equal opportunity can be applied either broadly or in depth. When applied 
broadly, governments try to keep children on the same educational course for as 
long as possible; when applied in depth, institutions focus on selecting children as 
soon as possible in order to exploit their talents. In both cases, there is a risk that 
talent may be wasted: in the ‘broad’ version in children with good chances, and in 
the ‘in-depth’ version in children with poor chances.
The goal of health care is for the population to be healthy and have a long life expect-
ancy. Good accessibility to health care is essential. In practice, national health systems 
differ in the degree to which responsibility for health care lies with the government or 
with individual citizens. Countries that place more responsibility on citizens will also 
expect them to pay part of the bill – in the form of out-of-pocket payments – but also 
offer them greater choice in terms of insurers and health care providers.
When it comes to law and order the aim is to achieve the lowest possible level of 
crime. The focus will be either on repression or on prevention. Countries that put 
their faith in repression are likely to devote a relatively large amount of resources to 
the punishment side of the criminal justice system. Countries that focus more on 
prevention will maximise the likelihood of punishment and minimise the chance of 
repetition. The likelihood of being punished depends on the likelihood of criminals 
being caught, and this in itself is largely the result of the investigation and detec-
tion efforts of the policy and judiciary. This characteristic is therefore so interwoven 
with the performance of the police and judiciary that it is diffi cult to use it in a public 
service sector typology.
 
Responsibility for guaranteeing the three basic rights mentioned above can be 
apportioned in various ways. On the one hand, primary responsibility for safety, care 
and skills can be placed in the hands of individuals, e.g. in the form of high out-of-
pocket payments in health care and with a signifi cant role for private security fi rms. 
On the other hand, primary responsibility may be placed in civil society (e.g. private 
educational organisations) or the public sector, e.g. state hospitals and state prisons. 
Indicators selected must refl ect these policy options.
Moreover, indicators must also tie in with types of education, health care and 
police systems outlined in the previous chapters. Our analysis has revealed that 
education systems differ mainly in terms of the degree of differentiation in learn-
ing paths. In health care, countries differ mainly in the level of private and public 
fi nancing and the degree to which the insurance system is universalistic (Beveridge) 
or corporatist (Bismarck). In law and order, the repressiveness (number of prisoners 
per crime) and the distinction between an adversarial and inquisitorial system are 
selected as system characteristics..
Performance in the public service sector depends not only on the resources used 
but also on the size and composition of the target group. For education, therefore, 
the analysis is based on spending per 5- to 19-year-old, and in considering health 
care account is taken of demographic ageing, by assuming that health care expendi-
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ture on the over-65s is three times higher than that on the rest of the population (see 
Chapter 4). No correction has been made for the size of the ‘target group’ in the case 
of law and order, in view of the lack of a demographic component in spending.
The above considerations produce three groups of properties that are potentially 
important for the typology of welfare states in terms of their public services: indica-
tors of resources used, indicators of the method by which services are fi nanced and 
indicators of the delivery of services. The choice of indicators is limited by the fact 
that suffi cient data have to be available for all countries covered in the report.
Table 7.1 lists selected indicators and results of a principal component analysis 
of these indicators. This analysis was performed in order to identify correlations 
between the indicators and to classify countries.3 
Table 7.1 System characteristics of public service sector, principal component analysis (2001)
system characteristic compo-nent 1
compo-
nent 2
compo-
nent 3
level of resources used
- health spending per capitaa 0.95 0.15 0.05
- education spending per 5- to 19-year-old 0.87 –0.29 0.17
- law and order spending per capita 0.71 0.37 –0.27
- public administration and defence spending per capitab 0.89 –0.24 –0.23
structural characteristics of ﬁ nancing
- proportion of income spent on health carea 0.73 0.44 0.06
- proportion of income spent on education 0.46 –0.25 0.39
- proportion of income spent on law and order –0.10 0.70 –0.46
- proportion of income spent on public administration and defence 0.43 –0.23 –0.47
- proportion of private ﬁ nancing of health care 0.02 0.73 0.07
- proportion of out-of-pocket payments for health care –0.54 0.48 0.13
- proportion of private ﬁ nancing of tertiary education 0.41 0.74 0.07
- Bismarck (1) or Beveridge (2) system of ﬁ nancing –0.20 –0.16 0.76
- structural characteristics of delivery
- free choice of health care supplier –0.14 0.20 0.02
- degree of differentiation in educationc –0.07 0.41 0.75
- adversarial criminal law system (versus inquisitorial) 0.43 0.38 0.63
- number of prisoners per 1000 crimes –0.32 0.52 –0.24
a Corrected for differences in demographic ageing between countries.
b Including defence and social security administration bodies.
c A high score implies low differentiation.
Source: SCP
3  Principal component analysis attempts to fi nd out if a large number of variables meas-
ures one or more underlying common factors. The fi gures in table 7.1 and 7.1 represent 
the correlation between each variable and the (non observed) hypothetical component. 
These correlations range from 0 (no) to 1 (perfect). A high correlation means that this 
variable counts well in the component score of countries.
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Some 60% of the variance in the sixteen characteristics is tied to the fi rst three com-
ponents. This implies that the selected components are highly correlated and that 
the correlation can be summarised in a limited number of components. The ﬁ rst 
component represents the input of resources for public sector services. Since inputs 
are measured in absolute levels at comparable prices, this dimension is determined 
to a large degree by the income level of a country. Notably, health spending as a pro-
portion of income also scores high on this component. This is a refl ection of the fact that 
the level of health spending is strongly related to income per capita (see Chapter 4). The 
second component represents the public or private orientation of the country. The key 
factor here is the degree to which health care and education are publicly or privately 
fi nanced. Notably, this also corresponds to a certain extent to spending on the police 
and judiciary, and the likelihood that crime will lead to a stay in prison. Apparently, 
countries with a strong orientation towards private fi nancing tend to tackle law and 
order problems more rigorously. The reason might be cultural, with individuals in 
these countries being held more responsible for their own actions. A third component 
is centred around three items: type of welfare state, the degree of differentiation in 
education and type of criminal law system. On the one hand we observe countries 
where the fi nancing of social security and health care is based more on universalistic 
principles (Beveridge-type welfare state), where education systems are more uniform 
organized and where the judge’s role is that of an impartial referee (adversarial type 
of criminal law). On the other hand we observe countries with corporative fi nancing 
of social security and health care (Bismarck-type welfare state), with differentiated 
education systems and with a legal system where the court is actively involved in 
determining the facts of crime (inquisitional type of criminal law). In general, these 
component is weakly correlated with spending on traditional functions of the wel-
fare state (public administration, law and order). 
Combination of the fi rst and second component generates four areas, of which 
only three can be used to classify countries: Poland, Lithuania and Greece in the 
private, low expenditure area; the us in the private, high expenditure area and 
Denmark, Sweden, Luxembourg, Austria, Belgium and France in the public, high 
expenditure area of the plot. Figure 7.1 shows countries’ scores for the second and 
third components, which produce clearer clusters than the plot of the fi rst and 
second components. 
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Figure 7.1  Plot of countries on second (horizontal axis) and third ((vertical axis) 
 component of institutional characteristics, 2001 
Source: SCP (US out of range) 
public orientation, less repressive
Beveridge type, uniform education,
adversarial criminal law system
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inquisitorial criminal law system
private orientation, more repressive
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In the plot of the second and third component, the Scandinavian countries are found 
in the top left quarter, refl ecting the fact that they have a publicly oriented system, 
low expenditure on the police and judiciary, a uniform education system and a Bev-
eridge-type health care system. The bottom left quarter contains most of the countries 
of Western and Central Europe, with their publicly-oriented systems, Bismarck-type 
health care systems and generally strongly differentiated education systems. Both 
these groups of countries are notable for their scores on the fi rst component (spending 
per capita, not shown here). In the top right quarter of Figure 7.1 are the non-European 
Anglo-Saxon countries, with the us at the extreme (out of range). These countries 
combine a stronger private orientation with a Beveridge-type health care system and 
a uniform education system. Close to the centre of the plot are the Southern Euro-
pean countries, with a Beveridge-type health care system and various types of educa-
tion system.
7.3 Overall performance for education, health care and law and order
To measure aggregated performance, we have for each country combined its per-
formance scores for education (Chapter 3), health care (Chapter 4) and law and order 
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(Chapter 5) by adding and rescaling the separate z-scores for these characteristics 
(see Annex B.3 for an explanation). The aggregated score (see Figure 7.2) represents 
the allocation function of the public sector. The scores for education refer to achieve-
ment and attainment. The performance of the health care system is refl ected in the 
health of the population measured by disability-adjusted life years, infant mortality 
and subjective health status. The performance of the police and judiciary system is 
refl ected in the level of crime. No suitable performance indicators are available for 
public administration.
Notably, many countries have a score that deviates from the average. Ireland and 
Finland score well above average, followed by a group of eu-15 countries, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Canada. The Netherlands comes somewhere in the middle. 
Poland, Hungary and Portugal clearly score below average. Ireland achieves its top 
position thanks to its excellent crime rate, a good score for education and an aver-
age score for health. Finland has a very good score for education and health, but is 
beaten to the top position by Ireland because of its poor score on law and order.
Figure 7.2   Overall performance for the allocation function (education, health care, 
 law and order)
Source: SCP
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The scores range between 3,5 and 6, indicating that the correlation between sepa-
rate indicators is not very high, since scores for individual indicators tend to range 
from 2 to 8. Apparently, countries performing well in one area will not necessarily 
perform well in other areas. There is therefore a weak correlation between perform-
ances in the three selected areas. The correlation is greatest between health and 
education (0.48), smaller between education and crime (0.31) and smallest between 
health and crime (0.19).
At the country level, we observe a signifi cant relationship between overall 
performance scores and system characteristics reduced to the three components 
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identifi ed in Section 7.2, but the correlation is rather weak (see Figure 7.3). Income 
per capita still appears to have most infl uence on overall performance, measured by 
educational attainment, health status and crime rates. However, where per capita 
income is high, countries with relatively low expenditure would seem to put in a 
slightly better average performance: this does especially hold for Ireland and Fin-
land. Apparently, good arrangements are not necessarily expensive arrangements. 
Furthermore, publicly-oriented systems perform on average better than privately-
oriented systems. Although Figure 7.3 shows that these correlations are generally 
present (see inserted regression line), the country variation within the groups is so 
great that it is not possible to draw any defi nite conclusions.
Figure 7.3   Overall performance for the allocation function by type of country 
overall effectiveness score
Country types (inserted: mean overall performance score):
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Figure 7.4 shows a scatterplot of overall performance in the policy areas of educa-
tion, health care and law and order, now in relation to the resources used.
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Figure 7.4  Cost effectiveness of allocation function
Source: SCP
performance allocation
total expenditure (% GDP)
EU-15 new member states non-EU Anglo-Saxon
3,0
3,5
4,0
4,5
5,0
5,5
6,0
6,5
10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
BE DK
DE
GR
ES FR
IE
IT NL
AT
PT
FI
SE
UK
CZ
HU
PL
SK
AU
CA
US
From Figure 7.4 it emerges that Ireland and Finland combine relatively low expendi-
ture (as a proportion of gdp) with high levels of performance. Spain, the United 
Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland also use relatively few 
resources. However, the last two countries, in particular, are characterised by rela-
tively weak performances. Portugal is an exception, with weak performances and 
average expenditure levels, as is the us, with fairly poor performances and very high 
spending, especially on health care. The other countries, including the Netherlands, 
have more or less average performance and expenditure levels. 
7.4 Grouping of countries on the basis of performance
This section places performance of the public service sector in a broader perspec-
tive. Our analysis is inspired by the work of Afonso et al. (2003). Their paper for the 
European Central Bank compares the performance of the public sector in twenty-
four countries and relates it to resource use. These authors use indicators relating 
to effectiveness and in a number of major policy areas: education, health care and 
infrastructure. In addition, Afonso et al. draw on indicators of the quality of public 
administration, based on survey data. Finally, the authors operationalize the conven-
tional functions of government: distribution, stabilization and allocation (Musgrave 
and Musgrave 1984). Their indicators are aggregated by means of unweighted total-
ling of standardised component scores. Performance is then related to resource use 
on two levels: in each individual policy area, and for the public sector as a whole.
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This inspiring work leaves room for doubt when it comes to certain details. For 
instance, it is strange that economic growth and unemployment are regarded as 
indicators of the government’s allocation function, rather than its stabilisation 
function. It would seem more logical to treat indicators for individual policy areas 
(education, health care etc.) as allocation indicators. Secondly, the authors make the 
crucial mistake of relating public expenditure (rather than total expenditure) to inte-
grated effect indicators (life expectancy etc.). This means that the private resources 
that help to achieve measured performance are overlooked. For this purpose, a func-
tional defi nition of the public sector (here termed “public services sector”, see Box 
1.1 and Section 2.3) and the inclusion of private expenditure are of vital importance. 
Furthermore, in aggregating the individual indicators and setting up the fi nal analy-
sis, one can try to use more sophisticated techniques to help prevent the outcomes 
from being excessively infl uenced by arbitrary (politically sensitive) assumptions 
about the relative importance of indicators in various areas.
The ambition here is to improve on the work by Afonso et al. (2003) in several 
respects. Our analysis in principle applies to the twenty-nine countries covered in 
the present report. However, due to missing data, it was only possible to include four 
of the new eu entrants (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). New Zea-
land has been left out for lack of data. The analysis therefore in fact includes twenty-
two countries. Performance indicators for the public service sector are consistent 
with those used in earlier chapters. The nineteen indicators can be divided into four 
main groups: stabilisation/growth, distribution, allocation and quality of public 
administration (see the list in Table 7.2). The table shows the outcomes of a principal 
component analysis.
One problem with such an analysis is the rather arbitrary selection of criteria, 
which necessarily affects the results. One useful point of reference are the criteria 
from the Lisbon Agenda. The choice of policy areas (health care, education, law and 
order, and infrastructure) can easily be justifi ed. The precise choice of indicators 
and their weighting, which is implicitly refl ected in the aggregation to four main 
groups, remains subjective to a large extent. For instance, should gdp per capita 
(and growth in gdp) not be included among the criteria? If so, this raises the ques-
tion of whether income should not in fact be weighted more heavily. In addition, 
poverty implicitly carries extra weight, for the simple fact that it is the only indicator 
of distribution.
It would appear to be impossible to establish the relative importance of all the 
items concerned in a value-free manner, purely on the basis of economic theory. One 
may consider to weight indicators by resource inputs. While this approach is feasible 
for allocation (education, health care and police/judiciary) and distribution (social 
security), it is by no means certain that the importance of these policy areas can be 
directly associated with the resources spent on them.
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In fairly similar situations, it is sometimes possible to estimate the weights of indi-
vidual indicators via a cost function, which relates costs to production for a number 
of different products.4 This strategy might work for allocation, but would certainly 
not work for stabilisation and growth, or for the quality of public administration. 
Here, there is either no correlation or, indeed, a negative correlation between input 
and effect. When it comes to the quality of public administration, we are concerned 
not so much with the input of resources as with the quality of legislation, transpar-
ency and confi dence. In terms of stability and growth, while it can be assumed that 
a certain level of input into education, health care, law and order, and infrastructure 
is necessary to allow economic development, a high level of public spending can 
reduce potential for economic growth (certainly above a certain threshold). This 
has been confi rmed by both theoretical and empirical analyses (see for example 
cpb, 2003; Gwartney et al. 1998). Our data also point to a weak negative correlation 
between macroeconomic performance (growth and stability) and public expenditure 
as a proportion of gdp (see Figure 2.27).
A technique that yields useful information to discover dimensions of perform-
ance is to apply a principal component analysis to effect indicators. This technique 
was also used in Section 7.2, to analyse system characteristics. Results are shown in 
Table 7.2.
4  A good function would be: Ck = a1 Sk + a2 Dk + a3 Ak + a4 Qk, where Ck represents the 
integral (private + public costs of public administration, education and health care) and 
Sk, Dk, Ak and Qk are the composite scores for the main groups stability, distribution, 
allocation and quality of public administration in the k-st country.
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Table 7.2  Effect indicators for public sector, principal component analysis (2001)
System characteristics compo-nent 1
compo-
nent 2
compo-
nent 3
Stabilization and growth of the economy
1. GDP growth (average 1995-2003) -0.25 0.34 0.60
2.  unemployment rate 0.56 0.26 0.11
3. inﬂ ation rate (average 1995-2003) 0.77 0.36 -0.38
4. budget deﬁ cit as proportion of GDP 0.76 0.44 -0.01
Distribution of welfare
5. poverty rate -0.09 -0.14 0.34
Allocation of public services
6. education 1a: reading literacy 0.74 -0.57 -0.02
7. education 1b: mathematical literacy 0.71 -0.63 0.07
8. education 1c: scientiﬁ c literacy 0.58 -0.73 0.07
9. education 2a: percentage of drop-outs 0.35 -0.56 0.26
10.  education 2b: percentage with higher qualiﬁ cations 25-34 0.70 -0.03 0.07
11.  health care 1: life expectancy at birth 0.72 0.38 -0.48
12.  health care 2: disability-adjusted life years 0.64 0.43 -0.24
13.  health care 3: infant mortality 0.60 0.20 -0.32
14.  health care 4: subjective health status 0.59 -0.44 -0.37
15. 37- law & order: crime -0.55 0.20 0.27
Quality of public administration
16. bureaucracy 0.75 0.13 0.58
17. transparency 0.78 0.15 0.50
18. effectiveness 0.74 0.31 0.51
19.  corruption 0.95 0.08 0.06
Source: SCP
The fi rst component explains 43% of the total variance and that the fi ve most impor-
tant components together account for 85%. This implies that there is a considerable 
degree of correlation between the selected indicators. Virtually all indicators have 
a high positive score on the fi rst component (mostly between 0.5 and 0.8). The fi rst 
component describes high performing societies, characterised by a stable economy, 
a high level of public performance and a high quality of public administration  
Three indicators have a negative score: economic growth (slightly negative), poverty 
(slightly negative) and crime (fairly negative). Apparently, economic growth and 
income distribution (poverty) are not correlated with the other public performance 
indicators and high performing societies are faced with problems of law and order. 
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After including the other components in the analyses, the indicators form a number 
of clusters:
1)  economic growth
2)  stability (unemployment, infl ation and budget defi cit)
3)  distribution (poverty rate)
4)  crime
5)  educational achievement (3 indicators)
6)  upper secondary educational attainment
7)  tertiary educational attainment
8)  life expectancy, disability adjusted life years and infant mortality
9)  subjective health status
10) quality of the public sector (3 indicators)
11) corruption
There is also a considerable amount of correlation between some of these clusters. 
This applies, for example, to clusters 5/6 and clusters 10/11. In addition, there is a 
degree of dependency associated not so much with direct correlations between indi-
cators, but with a common history shared by certain groups of countries. For exam-
ple, a correlation is found between health indicators and economic stability because 
the new entrants score badly on both indicators (clusters 2 and 8). Such links reduce 
the number of relevant components even further.
We performed a similar analysis for the effectiveness/quality indicators combined 
with fi ve confi dence indicators: confi dence in (1) the education system, (2) the health 
care system, (3) the police, (4) the judiciary and (5) the civil service. The data avail-
able for the non-European Anglo-Saxon countries are incomplete, which reduces 
the number of countries for which usable data are available to nineteen. Since, in 
such an analysis, the number of variables (indicators) may not exceed the number 
of cases (countries), several indicators that show a strong degree of correlation with 
others were omitted. In this new analysis, the fi rst component explains 41% of the 
total variance, and the fi rst fi ve together explain 83%. A close relationship is found 
between confi dence in the police and in the judiciary, though the other measures of 
confi dence appear fairly independent (apart from the high score for the fi rst compo-
nent). Furthermore, it would appear that confi dence indicators, particularly those 
for the police and judiciary, show little correlation with effectiveness in the areas in 
question.
Such an analysis can also produce information on the clustering of countries (see 
Figure 7.5). Unlike in Figure 7.1, this analysis refers to performance in the public 
sector, rather than to system characteristics.
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Figure 7.5  Plot of countries on first (horizontal axis) and second (vertical axis) component  
Source: SCP (Luxembourg out of range) 
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The fi rst axis of Figure 7.5 represents the greatest common denominator of all vari-
ables, and thus produces a kind of composite ranking, with Finland at the top and 
the new member states and Southern European countries at the bottom. However, 
poverty, law and order and economic growth play no role on the fi rst axis, render-
ing the ranking useless. The second axis mainly refers to educational performance 
(negative). The third axis corresponds to economic growth and the quality of public 
administration, the fourth to poverty and the fi fth to crime.
What we do, however, see is that the grouping of countries found in all analy-
ses up till now, is repeated once more: the new member states in the bottom left, a 
number of Southern European countries in the top left and the Northern European 
and Anglo-Saxon countries to the right and in the centre. As is often the case, Lux-
embourg is in an exceptional position, with a high macroeconomic score, but fairly 
poor results for the effectiveness of its education system.
However interesting it may be, the outcome of a principal component analysis 
does not tell how the individual indicators should be weighted. The fact that groups 
of indicators appear to correlate in no way implies that these indicators should have 
a lower weight. Therefore, we have not used countries’ score on the fi rst component 
for the comprehensive assessment, but a very simple and transparent aggrega-
tion technique: an unweighted averaging of groups and sub-groups of indicators. 
We have corrected for differences in scale and variability in the variables by using 
normalised scores. (see Annex B.3). The idea behind this is either that variables with 
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a high relative standard deviation are more diffi cult to control or that there is less 
consensus over the desired value. To give an example: hyperinfl ation happens more 
commonly worldwide than a sharp fall in gdp, and is certainly less harmful.
7.5 Overall performance of the public service sector
The performance of the public services sector is measured here by the score on four 
public sector functions in Table 7.2: stabilization and growth of the economy, distri-
bution of welfare, allocation of public services and quality of public administration. 
Three of these functions are composed of a number of different indicators, added by 
using the z-score methodology (see Annex B.3). One is shown in Figure 7.2: alloca-
tion of public services (representing total performance of the public service sector). 
Figure 7.6 pictures growth and stability indicators for the economy and Figure 7.7 
quality indicators for public administration. Signs of indicators are changed to 
measure favourable and unfavourable circumstances. Distribution of welfare is 
measured by just one indicator (poverty), shown earlier in Figure 2.24.  
 
Figure 7.6  Stabilization and growth of the economy 
Source: SCP 
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Luxembourg and Ireland perform well in terms of stabilisation and growth. Lux-
embourg scores high on all components and Ireland very high on economic growth 
but less on budget defi cit. Of all eu-15 countries, Germany, France and Italy achieve 
the least satisfying results, mainly because of a rather poor performance on eco-
nomic growth and budget defi cits. New member states perform clearly less on the 
economic dimension. These poor results are brought about by rather bad scores on 
unemployment (Slovak Republic and Poland), on infl ation (Hungary and Poland) 
and on budget defi cits (Hungary and Czech Republic). On the other hand, economic 
growth is high in the new member states, except for the Czech Republic.  
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Figure 7.7  Quality of public administration  
Source: SCP 
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The variables indicating the quality of public administration are summed up in 
fi gure 7.7. The fi rst three variables have been taken from the World Competitiveness 
Report (imd 2003). The empirical basis of this study is fairly weak, as the data were 
collected via an international survey of managers and experts from the business 
community. The measure of corruption is based on the Transparency International 
indicator. 
In the bar diagram in Figure 7.7 the composite score shows a fairly wide range, 
from 2.5 to 8. This indicates there is a high degree of correlation between the indica-
tors. Finland again has the highest score, followed by Australia, Denmark, Sweden 
and Luxembourg. Then come Austria, Canada and the us. The Netherlands comes 
in the middle, and Greece, Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have the 
lowest scores.
Figure 7.8 offers a comprehensive overview of performance by all twenty-two 
countries in all areas selected: growth/stability, distribution, allocation and qual-
ity of public administration. In order to obtain a single aggregated score the usual 
z-score methodology has been used (see Annex B.3)
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Figure 7.8  Overall performance of countries
Source: various 
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The score for individual variables generally lies between 2 and 8. The range of vari-
ation is considerably smaller in the overall score in Figure 7.8, at 3.5 to 6.5. This 
is because no country posts high scores for all items. Leaders like Denmark and 
Finland score high for the quality of their public administration and for distribu-
tion, but low on allocation, particularly as a result of their high crime rates. Poland 
trails the rest of the fi eld, but does well on criteria like economic growth, income 
distribution and preventing school drop-outs. Generally speaking, the new member 
states score badly for stability and allocation, the Anglo-Saxon countries do badly on 
distribution, and Poland in particular does badly in terms of the quality of its public 
administration.
The choice of indicators, and also their weighting (via the categorisation into 
main groups) implies a considerable degree of arbitrariness. Table 7.3 considers how 
an alternative selection of indicators might have affected the outcomes. The main 
variant (four categories) is in line with the conventional categories: stability, distri-
bution and allocation, plus the quality of public administration. In variant 2 (seven 
categories), growth, education, health care and crime are weighted separately. Vari-
ant 3 (eight categories) takes account of differences in per capita gdp.
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Table 7.3  Sensitivity of ranking (aggregate performance)
4 categoriesa 7 categoriesb 8 categoriesc
ECB-
analysisd World Banke
Finland 1 1 1 10 4
Denmark 2 4 5 4 5
Luxembourg 3 5 2 1 2
Sweden 4 3 4 6.5 8
Austria 5 7 6 2 10
Netherlands 6 6 7 3 1
Ireland 7 2 3 5 14
Belgium 8 10 10 12 7
Czech Republic 9 14 16 – 20
Canada 10 8 8 8.5 6
Australia 11 9 9 6.5 9
France 12 12 12 13 13
Spain 13 11 11 15 15
Germany 14 15 15 11 11
Slovakia 15 16 18 – 22
United Kingdom 16 13 13 14 3
United States 17 17 14 8.5 12
Hungary 18 19 20 – 19
Italy 19 20 19 16 17
Greece 20 18 17 18 18
Portugal 21 21 21 17 16
Poland 22 22 22 – 21
a growth/stability, distribution, allocation, quality
b growth, stability, distribution, education, health, crime, quality
c former 7 plus prosperity
d Afonso et al. (2003)
e Word Bank Government Effectiveness Indicator 
Source: SCP
The fi rst three columns in Table 7.3 show that ranking according to the system used 
in the present report is after all fairly robust. Only two countries trade more than 
three places: Ireland (high growth and high gdp per capita) and the Czech Republic 
(low growth and low gdp per capita).
The two rankings based on external sources give entirely different results and also 
differ from each other. Finland scores much lower in the ecb analysis, while the us 
scores much higher. In the case of the us, this is partly explained because Afonso et al. 
overlook the use of private resources for a number of services. As demonstrated in the 
previous section, this can lead to a country’s performance being overstated. The World 
Bank analysis puts the United Kingdom, in particular, in a higher position.
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In terms of formal (Spearman) rank correlations, the differences actually turn out 
to be not that great. The correlation among the fi rst three columns is in the order of 
0.95, between the ecb column and the fi rst column (our main variant) 0.75, between 
the World Bank column and the fi rst column 0.7 and between the ecb and World 
Bank columns 0.8.
Chapters 3 through 6 examined the relationship between the effectiveness of 
public services and the confi dence that the public have in their national system. 
Figure 7.9 shows the relationship between the aggregated effectiveness and confi -
dence measures. 
Figure 7.9 Total performance versus total confidence
Source: various
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Italy, Greece and the Czech Republic score particularly low on public confi dence. 
The Northern European countries, Austria, Ireland and Luxembourg book the high-
est scores. The Netherlands falls somewhere in the middle, together with the bulk 
of the Western European countries. There is a fairly strong correlation between per-
formance and confi dence. Notable exceptions are the Czech Republic, with reason-
able performance but low confi dence, and Poland, where the reverse applies.
Figure 7.10, fi nally, links the overall scores from Figure 7.4 with the resources 
used. Here, private spending on education and health care have been added to total 
government spending. This gives ‘corrected public sector spending’ fi gures (see 
Figure 2.9). Using these corrected fi gures may be regarded as a signifi cant improve-
ment on the ecb analysis.
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Figure 7.10  Overall performance of countries and corrected government expenditure
Source: SCP 
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Roughly speaking, there is little connection between public performance and cor-
rected government expenditure. In Figure 7.10, a curve has been pencilled in to 
denote ‘best practice’. Ireland and Finland lie on the curve. Finland has by far the 
best performance score, while Ireland scores slightly above average. In the case 
of Finland, this high score is accompanied by fairly high (corrected) government 
spending, but Ireland has low (corrected) spending. Just behind the leaders on per-
formance we fi nd Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, but 
the fi rst three have relatively high government expenditure, while the last two have 
fairly average spending. Australia, Canada, Spain and the Czech Republic combine 
an average performance score with fairly low government spending, while others 
(particularly Germany, Belgium and France) occupy a fairly average position on 
both. The us and the United Kingdom have fairly poor performance scores and rela-
tively low public spending. Most Southern European countries, and also Hungary, 
have a poor performance score and average public spending. Poland produces poor 
performances with average spending.
The outcomes of the analysis in Figure 7.10 differ markedly from those in the ecb 
paper. To conclude that the law of diminishing returns applies to public spending, 
as the ecb paper does, is simply too simple. The highest levels of public performance 
are achieved in Scandinavia, and are paid for by high levels of public spending. The 
Netherlands also comes near the top in terms of performance, with considerably 
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lower spending. The example of the Scandinavian countries, in particular, would 
appear to show that high government spending need not necessarily be associated 
with poor economic performance or an unwieldy public sector.
7.6 Some concluding remarks
One of the most striking outcomes of the analysis in the present report is that the 
same clusters of countries repeatedly emerge in analyses of public sector perform-
ance, no matter what the policy area or level of analysis. Again and again, the 
Scandinavian countries, the Southern European countries, the Central European 
countries, the Western European countries and the Anglo-Saxon countries form 
fairly consistent clusters. This became clear in this chapter in the analyses both of 
system characteristics (Figure 7.1) and of performance (Figure 7.2). The same clus-
ters also emerge from analyses of macroeconomic characteristics (Figure 2.26), 
demographics (Mellens, 1999), education (Figure 3.36), health care (Figure 4.41), the 
police/judiciary (Figure 5.35) and public administration (Figure 6.17).
Table 7.4 lists the main characteristics of these groups of countries. These char-
acteristics refer to demographic profi le (1), institutional characteristics (7, 9, 11), 
resource characteristics (4, 5, 6) and performance (2, 3, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14). We should 
note that, though there is considerable correlation between public sector perform-
ance in the different areas, it is by no means perfect. Countries that do well in 
several respects also produce poorer performances in some other areas. Finland, for 
example, records high scores for many policy areas, but has a low score for crime. 
Poland does badly in many areas, but does well on economic growth, income distri-
bution and its school drop-out rate.
In most respects, the Netherlands shares characteristics with other Western Euro-
pean countries. The Netherlands falls somewhere in the middle when it comes to the 
size of its public service sector. Educational differentiation can be regarded as high 
(or even extremely high). Educational performance is good in terms of achievement 
and moderate in terms of attainment. Public confi dence in the public sector is fairly 
low. In our own ranking of public performance, the Netherlands comes sixth, in the 
ecb ranking it comes third, and in the World Bank ranking it actually occupies the 
top spot. In the World Competitiveness Yearbook, too, the Netherlands spent several 
years near the top of the rankings. The economic downturn after 2001 and, probably, 
the political wrangling of recent years, has caused the country to fall to the middle 
of the ranks, however.
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Table 7.4 Characteristics of country groups
Northern 
European1
Western 
European2
Southern 
European3
Central
European4
Anglo-
Saxon5
1. ageing medium medium high low low
2. prosperity (GDP per 
    capita)
medium medium low low high
3. economic growth medium low high high medium
4. public spending (% GDP) high medium low low low
5. size of public service 
    sector (staff)
high mixed low low/medium medium
6. private share of public 
    service sector
low medium low/medium low medium/high
7. educational differentia-
   tion
low high/medium medium mixed low/medium
8. educational performance medium/
high
medium/high low low/medium high
9. health care system Beveridge Bismarck Beveridge Bismarck Beveridge
10. health care performance high high medium/high low/medium medium/high
11. repressive law and order 
      system
low medium medium medium/high mixed
12. crime high medium low low mixed
13. quality of public 
      administration
high medium low/medium low/medium medium/high
14. aggregated conﬁ dence high medium/high low/medium low/medium medium6
1  Finland, Sweden, Denmark
2  Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, Netherlands; Luxembourg is a special case
3  Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy; Cyprus and Malta are special cases
4  Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland , Slovenia and Baltic States
5  United Kingdom, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand; Ireland is a special case
6  Based on partial data.
Source: SCP
Thus, countries differ in terms of system characteristics, resource use and perform-
ance of the public (service) sector. Nevertheless, It is possible to group countries 
into clusters that take account of each of these three dimensions. These clusters are 
almost entirely consistent with generally accepted geographical/historical classifi ca-
tions of countries. Though this suggests that our conclusions are plausible, it also 
makes them a little predictable.
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Annex A    Data sources and data correction
When comparing international data in different fi elds of the public service sector, it is 
desirable to use correct and comparable statistics for all countries involved. The quality 
of statistics is defi ned by Eurostat (2002) with reference to the following seven criteria:
– relevance, implying that the needs of the users are adequately met,
– accuracy, defi ned as the closeness between the value retained and the true value,
– timeliness and punctuality, referring to the lapse of time between the delivery and 
the data to which the data apply,
– accessibility and clarity, referring to the way data can be obtained and the quality 
of the documentation,
_ comparability, which is a result of using uniform concepts/defi nitions, measuring 
tools and procedures.
_ coherence, implying that the data are mutually consistent, and
_ completeness, defi ned as the extent to which the required data are available.
National data are diffi cult to fi nd and tend to be insuffi ciently comparable. For this 
reason, it is better to rely on data collected by international organisations. These 
organisations tend to have close contacts with the national statistical offi ces and other 
country experts and are thus able to make a multi-year effort to obtain data accord-
ing to uniform defi nitions. When a broad fi eld and many countries are involved, small 
organisations can hardly be expected to gather the necessary data on their own.
 For these reasons, the present report heavily relies on Online Data Bases and 
publications of organisations as Eurostat, oecd, World Bank, United Nations, Euro-
pean Council, the International Labour Organisation and the us Bureau of Census. 
Apart from these, population surveys such as the European and World Values Study, 
the Eurobarometer, the European Community Household Panel, the Luxembourg 
Income Survey, the International Crime Victims Survey and the World Competitive-
ness Report are useful data sources.
Although the organisations involved make a considerable effort to deliver high quality 
data, users face several problems that in particular restrict the comparability of data:
– Institutional differences,
– Differences in defi nitions,
– Differences in registration procedures,
– Longitudinal inconsistencies.
Institutional differences may seriously hamper international comparisons. The 
entities for which national data are collected may not allow a one to one translation 
into the international classifi cation used. This is for example the case in non-acute 
in-patient health care, where institutional arrangements differ drastically from 
country to country.
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Longitudinal inconsistencies fi nd their source in inconsistencies in national data. 
One of the reasons is that different defi nitions may have been used in the course of 
time. A major cause for inconsistencies is the recent revision of the National Account 
system. Another example is the recent changes in the isced-classifi cation system 
for education.
Although the activities of the international organisations involved proved very useful 
for the purpose of our study, the task of developing and maintaining huge datasets 
apparently places a heavy burden on the shoulders of their staff, and – as a result – users 
are frequently confronted with various types of shortcomings: 
– Incorrect data,
– Preliminary data,
– Inconsistent data,
– Incomplete data.
Human errors or errors in communication may result in incorrect data, the more 
so when priority is given to innovation and expansion rather than to painstaking 
maintenance of existing databases. Another source for discrepancies involves pre-
liminary data. For recent years, preliminary data are often published, which later are 
to be replaced by defi nite data. However, the preliminary data and the moment of 
substitution by defi nite data may cause differences between data published in differ-
ent reports of the same organisation or by different organisations. A related problem 
involves old databases, which are still available, but not adapted to new develop-
ments and insights. 
Far to often, data are inconsistent in the sense that parts don’t sum up to totals 
or in the sense that breaks in time series occur as a result of changing defi nitions. 
In the former case, parts can be readjusted to the total or the reverse. In the latter 
case, an appropriate technique is proportional correction of older segments of a 
time series. This involves multiplication of the older segment with the proportion 
between the new and the old segment for a year of overlap. Frequently, data are only 
available for some years, while the selection of years varies between countries. For 
the purpose of comparison, data for the same reference year are required. When 
numbers can be expected to be more or less stable, numbers for an earlier or later 
year may be substituted. In other cases, missing data can be estimated by interpola-
tion or extrapolation. In some cases this inter- or extrapolation has been performed 
with the aid of a reference category. To use an example from education, the enrol-
ment rate (the number of pupils divided by the size of the relevant age group) may be 
interpolated. Subsequently, the number of pupils can be estimated by multiplying 
the estimated enrolment rate with the size of the relevant age group. In estimating 
expenditure for missing years, information on the infl ation rate may be used, etc. 
etc. These types of data processing are accounted for in Annex C of this report (pub-
lished on www.scp.nl). 
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B.1  Calculation of Purchasing Power Parities
Cost and expenditure data are generally derived from information in nominal 
amounts in national currency units. To make these data comparable over countries 
and over time, three operations have been carried out: 
1 for the Euro-countries: conversion of local national currencies in euros for years 
previous to 2002 with the offi cial exchange rates on January 1st 1999 (see the fi rst 
column of table B.1), 
2 the conversion of data in national currency in Dutch euros (nl€) on the basis of 
Purchasing Power Parities,
3 the defl ation of all numbers on the basis of the Dutch index series for household 
consumption, with 2003 = 100.
Purchasing Power Parities (ppp’s) are conversion rates between national currency 
units, which are not based on exchange rates but on the purchasing parity. In order 
to obtain these ppp’s, organisation like the oecd, the World Bank and Eurostat 
investigate the price of a representative basket of consumption goods in the national 
currencies of the different countries. On the basis of this approach it was established 
that the purchasing power of 1 Dutch euro in 2002 was equal to that of 8.58 Danish 
crowns and 1.03 us dollars. Because the purchasing power of the euro also differs 
between the euro-countries, other euro-countries are characterized by conversion 
factors different from 1. For example, the conversion factor for Portugal was 0.72 
in 2002, implying that the purchasing power of a euro in Portugal is almost 40% 
(1/0.72) higher in Portugal than in the Netherlands. In this report the Dutch euro is 
chosen as a standard, but it is easy to recalculate all outcomes to French, German or 
other euros, or us dollars. The conversion factors are given in the second column of 
table B.1. By expressing amounts in this way, equal numbers imply an equal amount 
of purchasing power sacrifi ced.
In order to be able to evaluate developments of expenditure in ppp’s in time the 
Dutch price index for household consumption (see table B.2) is applied. Figures are 
to be divided by (100/index) to obtain amounts in fi xed prices of 2003. The outcome 
is (more or less) equivalent to the one obtained when the currency of another country 
is taken as standard and its price index for household consumption is applied.
In this way all fi nancial data have been made comparable between countries as 
well as in time.
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Table B.1  Conversion of amounts in national currencies
Country Euro-conversion
Purchasing power conversion 
(example 2002)
Belgium 40.34 0.96
Denmark 1.00 8.58
Germany 1.96 0.97
Greece 340.75 0.73
Spain 166.39 0.81
France 6.56 0.97
Ireland 0.79 1.00
Italy 1936.27 0.85
Luxembourg 40.34 0.85
Netherlands 2.20 1.00
Austria 13.76 0.93
Portugal 200.48 0.72
Finland 5.95 1.04
Sweden 1.00 9.92
United Kingdom 1.00 0.69
Cyprus 1.00 0.45
Czech republic 1.00 14.74
Estonia 1.00 6.71
Latvia 1.00 0.25
Lithuania 1.00 1.46
Hungary 1.00 127.43
Malta 1.00 0.25
Poland 1.00 1.96
Slovenia 1.00 143.64
Slovak republic 1.00 16.00
Australia 1.00 1.39
Canada 1.00 1.25
New Zealand 1.00 1.59
United States 1.00 1.03
Source: World Bank; Eurostat (NewCronos)
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Table B.2  Harmonized price index for household consumption in the Netherlands, 2003=100a
  year Price index
1995 81.6
1996 82.8
1997 84.4
1998 85.8
1999 87.6
2000 89.6
2001 94.2
2002 97.8
2003 100.0
a  term “harmonized” implies that the choice of a basket of goods and services is based on a common European 
 deﬁ nition.
B.2 Calculation of country means
Country means for groups of countries are calculated as weighted averages. This 
implies that larger countries obtain a higher weight than smaller countries. In most 
cases, the indicators used are ratios of numbers (such as patients per inhabitant, 
education expenditure as a percentage of gdp). Technically, the means are calcu-
lated as the ratio of sums and not as the average of ratios. In the patient example, 
this implies that all patients and inhabitants are added over countries. Next, the 
ratio of all patients to all inhabitants is calculated. Thus, the position of the aver-
age citizen in the country group is depicted. In the case of education expenditure as 
a percentage of gdp the sum of education expenditure in the countries involved is 
divided by the corresponding sum of gdp.
B.3 Calculation and aggregation of z-scores
In this report, a total of nineteen effect-indicators is used for measuring the per-
formance and quality of various segments of the public service sector. Because no 
a priori information is available on the weights that must be attached to the separate 
characteristics (see discussion in Section 7.4), indicators are aggregated by using an 
unweighted scaling and addition procedure. A similar procedure is used for the cal-
culation of sub-sector totals and aggregated confi dence.
In order to correct for differences in scale and variability, scores are normalized 
by a so-called z-transformation. The formula used is zi = (xi-m)/s, where zi stands 
for the transformed value for the i-th country, xi for the observed value, m for the 
country mean and s for the standard deviation of the observations. As a consequence 
of this transformation z has a mean value of 0. It is a well-known statistical rule-
of-thumb, that the values of zi tend to range in about 95% of cases from –2 to 2. 
Next, z is transformed in such a way that the resulting score can be interpreted as a 
308 Annex B    Technical notes
mark, which tends to lie between 0 and10: z*i = 5 + 1,5 c zi. The constant c may take 
the value +1 or –1. The former applies when ‘high’ is ‘good’, the latter when ‘high’ 
is ‘bad’. For example, high economic growth and a high government surplus are 
considered to be good, but a high poverty rate, a high infl ation rate and a high unem-
ployment rate are considered to be bad. If zi - as expected - ranges from –2 to 2, z*i 
will range from 2 to 8. Finally, the transformed scores can be aggregated to larger 
entities by calculating averages of the separate marks. If scores are highly correlated, 
the aggregated scores will also range from 2 to 8, if correlation is low or negative, 
the range of the aggregated scores will be much smaller.
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Annex C Explanatory notes
See www.scp.nl/9037701841
Annex D Source of data on staff and expenditure for law and order
See www.scp.nl/9037701841
Annex E Data corresponding to ﬁ gures
See www.scp.nl/9037701841
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